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Postcolonial literary critics note persistently recurring representations of 
colonial violence in post-independence Anglophone African novels.  I suggest that 
complex psychological and political processes of colonial trauma compel this 
narrative repetition.  This dissertation juxtaposes postcolonial and trauma studies in 
order to analyze literary representations of colonial violence in terms of race, gender, 
identity, and the post-independence nation-state.  To do so, I engage with black 
feminisms, African history, Subaltern Studies, and Latin American testimonio studies. 
I contend that, despite variations in aesthetic mode, melancholia, haunting, 
and mourning recur in realist and postmodern Anglophone African and diaspora 
novels with interesting variations beyond the usual stylistic differences.  This 
tendency spans sub-Saharan Africa, the Atlantic, and generations.  My work suggests 
that we use the vocabulary of psychoanalysis to fruitfully read post-independence 
literature as testimony representing the trauma of colonial occupation.  
  
 
Trauma and justice studies teach that testimony is the route to surviving 
productively after an experience of traumatizing violence.  While mine is not the first 
analysis of Anglophone African literature to employ the vocabulary of 
psychoanalysis, it is the first to suggest doing so in the context of traumatic 
testimony.  
I explore three modes of telling—testimonial bodies, censored testimony and 
its ghosts, and trans-generational testifying wounds—represented in Ayi Kwei 
Armah’s Fragments (Ghana, the United States, and France), Tsitsi Dangarembga’s 
Nervous Conditions (Zimbabwe), Nuruddin Farah’s Maps (Somalia), Moses 
Isegawa’s Abyssinian Chronicles (Uganda and the Netherlands), Meja Mwangi’s 
Carcase for Hounds (Kenya), Helen Oyeyemi’s The Icarus Girl (Nigeria and 
Britain), and in Zoë Wicomb’s David’s Story and J. M. Coetzee’s Disgrace (South 
Africa).  Modes of telling crisscross the continent, suggesting that traumatic suffering 
binds different communities together.  
Read as traumatic testimonies, the texts critique the intersected, normalizing 
discourses of globalization, trans-Atlantic migration, women’s rights, and 
decolonization.  They demonstrate that moments of national birth mark historical sites 
of potential for the collective to revise the past, create a national citizenry, and chart a 
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Chapter 1: Introduction:  Reading Anglophone African Literary 
Testimony 
 
Decades after independence, Anglophone African novels continue to represent 
themes of colonial violence and postcolonial traumatic accounts of national 
independence.  These representations are often bound up with the twin tropes of 
illness and healing as metaphors for (neo)colonialism and socially responsible 
decolonization.  These pairings illuminate the close relationship between colonial 
history and traumatic processes.  The literature thus illuminates larger questions about 
the relationship of violence to history and memory, and how these in turn can 
function to dismantle or reinforce neocolonial power.  I suggest that post-
independence African literature’s insistent representations of past violence are a 
means of navigating the complex psychological and political processes of colonial 
trauma and recuperation.  This dissertation examines eight post-independence 
Anglophone novels from across sub-Saharan Africa, all of which were written in 
response to troubled decolonization processes and all of which repeat representations 
of colonial violence.  In Ayi Kwei Armah’s Fragments (set in Ghana, the United 
States, and France), Tsitsi Dangarembga’s Nervous Conditions (Zimbabwe), 
Nuruddin Farah’s Maps (Somalia), Moses Isegawa’s Abyssinian Chronicles (Uganda 
and the Netherlands), Meja Mwangi’s Carcase for Hounds (Kenya), Helen 
Oyeyemi’s The Icarus Girl (Nigeria and Britain), and in Zoë Wicomb’s David’s Story 
and J. M. Coetzee’s Disgrace (South Africa), I find that, despite variations in 
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aesthetic mode, melancholia, haunting, and mourning recur in both realist and 
postmodern novels with interesting variations that transcend expected stylistic 
differences.1  This tendency spans the continent, the Atlantic, and generations.  In so 
doing, it demonstrates that traumatic suffering is fixed in neither time nor place.   
The psychoanalytic vocabulary of traumatic suffering and recovery provides a 
way of discussing these literary representations of colonial melancholia, haunting, 
and mourning.  The texts analyzed here suggest new ways of understanding mourning 
on a social scale as collective recuperation and a crucial component of postcolonial 
nation building.  The texts thus demand both theoretical consideration and political 
action.  Geoffrey Hartman theorizes the social politics of traumatic representation in 
literature, arguing that in both literature and in the preverbal context of trauma, 
knowledge is a fantasy:  of either of having knowledge or creating it.2  Both literature 
and traumatic testimony attempt to represent that which is unexpected in the language 
of negativity—by explaining the boundaries of, or that which is outside, the subject 
matter (Hartman 540).  The resulting, and necessary, embrace of the unknown is a 
direct refusal of what Étienne Balibar calls the colonizer’s “violent desire for 
immediate knowledge” (19, emphasis in original) and renders the marriage of trauma 
and post-independence African literature in service of social transformation 
appropriate.3  The literature studied in this dissertation demonstrates, as testimony, its 
potential to initiate postcolonial processes of mourning.  In the novels, collective 
mourning leads to individual and social transformation. 
In psychoanalytic theory, “trauma” refers to the experience of surviving a life-
threatening incident, which creates the sense of having missed the event.  The 
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traumatic moment is a lapse between the life-threatening event, which occurs before 
the ego is prepared to handle such unexpected and disturbing stimuli, and its 
recognition of the injury.  This traumatic slip is an informational lack.  Testimony, in 
its curative capacity relative to the traumatic slip, is a continually repeated verbal 
search for lost knowledge of the traumatic event.  Traumatic suffering is to live 
without knowledge of what has been survived.  To be traumatized is to be doubly 
haunted by two realities:  that of the violent event and that of not fully knowing that 
violence.  “Trauma,” then, is a psychic lapse between the traumatic event and the 
potential for knowledge.  Cathy Caruth characterizes this lapse as “the breach of the 
mind’s experience of time, self, and the world” (4).4  Jacques Derrida conceptualizes 
it differently, in terms of the temporal or as an existence in time that is “out of joint” 
(18).5  For the purposes of this study, I find it useful to read the traumatic “breach” as 
an informational lapse which the sufferer seeks to rectify through language:  either by 
testimony or encryption.6  
For an exemplary scene that captures the topic of this dissertation, I turn to 
David’s Story, set in 1991 in South Africa on the eve of apartheid’s demise.  In this 
scene, the novel’s unnamed female narrator is transcribing the memoirs of the title 
character, a former anti-apartheid guerilla named David Dirkse.  She probes him for 
more information about his apparently important relationship with his comrade 
Dulcie Oliphant, about whom he has been ambiguous and secretive.  David responds 
by reciting the biographical details from Dulcie’s military dossier, and the following 
conversation ensues during which the novel’s reader discerns the mounting frustration 




But she didn’t tell you this herself, I venture.  He glares at me 
suspiciously. 
     It’s no use, I say.  I give up.  This is a task for someone addicted to 
your cloak-and-dagger struggle stuff. 
     I suppose, David confesses, that I don’t see the need to flesh her out 
with detail, especially the kind invented by you.  You see, she’s not 
like anyone else; one could never, for instance, say that she’s young or 
old or middle-aged.  I think of her more as a kind of—and he has the 
decency to hesitate before such a preposterous idea—a kind of a 
scream somehow echoing through my story. 
     A scream, I laugh, a scream?  You won’t get away now with 
abstracting her.  Besides, Dulcie herself would never scream.  Dulcie 
is the very mistress of endurance and control.  Dulcie knows that there 
is only a point to screaming if you can imagine someone coming to 
your rescue; that a scream is an appeal to a world of order and 
justice—and that there is no such order to which she can appeal.   
     And since when do you know so much about her?  He asks. 
     David knows nothing of the art of inferencing, or perhaps he 
doesn’t realize how much he has told me, even if it is somewhat 
opaque.  (134) 
 
I introduce this scene early in the dissertation because it illuminates the intersections 
among the larger questions I want to address in the study.  In this scene, and in post-
independence Anglophone African literature, I find that gender shapes and is shaped 
by nation building and history making; that traumatic testimony takes many shapes 
including inference, invention, and absence; that traumatic testimony echoes 
repeatedly until it reaches a willing witness; and that the landscape of traumatic 
suffering is fenced in, preventing an easy path to mourning and the potential to end 
traumatic suffering.  I take the title of my dissertation from this scene because it 
illuminates my thesis that the testimonial representation which echoes through post-
independence Anglophone African literature unleashes its political potential.  In this 
chapter, I will illuminate the ways in which the psychoanalytic vocabulary that 
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underpins trauma and justice studies informs my reading of representations of trauma 
in contemporary Anglophone African novels.  I will suggest that pairing these 
discourses with African cosmologies of personhood and community provides the 
potential for avoiding intellectual imperialism.  I will trace the dissertation’s 
interdisciplinary contributions to postcolonial, trauma, feminist, and gender studies.  
Finally, I will summarize the dissertation’s chapters and suggest avenues for further 
research.  
While writing my M.A. thesis on women healers in Armah’s novels, I noticed 
that his literary depictions of African “healing” practices were very similar to 
contemporary Western counseling techniques.  Healing in these novels is performed 
on the individual body, the psyche, and the community, all of which are traumatized 
by both colonialism and neocolonialism depending on the novel’s historical setting.  
“Healer” women and men are also represented in Armah’s fiction in equal numbers.  
When Armah later spoke at Drexel University in 2003, I asked him at length about his 
healing/counseling scenes at a dinner party in his honor after the event.  He said the 
depictions were based on his extensive historical research of various African healing 
practices across the continent and were not derived from Western psychological 
practice.7  Armah noted that his research revealed that pre-colonial healing 
communities were egalitarian and were not gendered.  However, I could not help but 
see a connection between Armah’s representations of indigenous healing practices 
and Western counseling techniques.  Frantz Fanon links colonialism with psychic 
pathology and is a major influence on Armah’s writing.  I wondered if Armah had 
drawn from Fanon’s published case studies for his own literary representations.  
 6 
 
Regarding the similarities between pre-colonial African healing and contemporary 
Western psychological counseling practices, however, Armah suggested that we 
cannot speculate on the direction of influence if, indeed, any exists.  Armah is not the 
only writer studied in these pages whose literature includes representations of and 
references to psychoanalytic and counseling practices.  Nervous Conditions, Maps, 
and The Icarus Girl also feature psychoanalyst characters whose consultations with 
other characters yield drastically different results, and Dangarembga studied both 
medicine and psychology at university.8  The literature’s analyst characters provide 
models for bringing the discourse of psychoanalysis to the practice of reading African 
literature.  The most striking example is in Maps, in which the protagonist Askar’s 
Uncle Hilaal is writing a book on children survivors of war trauma.  Hilaal’s wife 
Salaado admonishes him when he turns his analytic lens on their nephew who has just 
migrated from a war zone to live with them.  “Please don’t psychoanalyse us” (145), 
Salaado asks Hilaal.  She means that Hilaal should avoid repeating psychoanalysis’s 
earlier penchant for universalization by ascribing set meanings to Askar’s trauma 
before hearing the child’s specifically individual testimony.   
Outside fiction, many of the leading African thinkers on race and colonialism 
employ the psychoanalytic vocabulary of traumatic suffering to discuss colonialism 
and its imprint on the neocolonial nation-state.  Fanon’s inclusion of case studies of 
survivors of colonial trauma in The Wretched of the Earth, while rarely commented 
on, underlines the necessity of Africanist decolonization and puts the entire project 
into a psychological framework of pathology versus health so that decolonization is 
rewritten as a matter of life or death.9  Uzoma Esonwanne’s reading of Nervous 
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Conditions argues that investigating psychoanalysis and African literature 
concurrently can help us identify heretofore unexplored desires represented in the 
literature that precipitate and address the colonized individual’s repressed identity, a 
nervous condition that Simon Gikandi calls “crises of the soul” (qtd. in Esonwanne 
142).10  Juliana Makuchi Nfah-Abbenyi compares and complicates the psychological 
implications of colonialism’s reliance on gender difference in Francophone and 
Anglophone African literature.11  Françoise Vergès examines the lie of colonialism’s 
rhetoric of benevolence in Mother France’s family romance with her colony off the 
East Coast of Africa, the island of Réunion whose mixed-raced population marks its 
colonial history of plantation slavery and gendered violence.12  Vergès argues that the 
island’s history of slavery informs its contemporary discourses of métissage 
(miscegenation), assimilation, and emancipation, as well as the ways in which 
masculinity is constructed.  Moroccan psychoanalyst, activist, and artist Rita el 
Khayat has written psychological studies of Maghrebian women, and Senegalese 
psychiatrist Bougoul Badji writes about psychopathology in Dakar.13  Finally, Achille 
Mbembe’s groundbreaking On the Postcolony decries the continuation of colonial 
violence long past the formal end of colonialism in psychoanalytic vocabulary.14   
My project’s theoretical framework of trauma theory arose from my reading 
of Nicolas Abraham and Maria Torok’s The Shell and the Kernel on traumatic 
representation and encryption as these relate to testimony, mourning, and 
melancholia.15  Three other texts augmented and rounded out my thinking.  First, Ifi 
Amadiume and Abdullahi An-Na’im’s The Politics of Memory connects trauma and 
justice studies in the African context of decolonization.16  Social justice theory is 
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based in the psychoanalytic vocabulary of trauma and is concerned with themes of 
reparation, testimony, memory, and the law.  These themes in black literature are 
linked with images and metaphors of health and pathology.  In post-independence 
Anglophone African literature, justice and healing are defined in terms of traumatic 
testimony and recovery.  Second, Anne Cheng’s The Melancholy of Race augments 
Fanon’s precedent for discussing the psychic harm that racism effects on the racially 
marked individual.  Finally, Caruth’s Unclaimed Experience links trauma, testimony, 
and literature.  The testimonial process is an impulse toward justice and cure (which, 
in cases of traumatizing violence, may be the same thing).  I find that the 
contemporary Anglophone African novel continues the widespread African griot (or 
griotte) tradition first by blending the political, historical, and literary and second by 
keeping secrets.17  Reading postcolonial Anglophone African literature that represents 
colonial violence as traumatic testimony allows a discussion of these larger critical 
concerns:  the pathology of racism, the speaker-griot linked to the community, social 
justice or healing, and gender.   
This final concern surfaces in the literature as a link between the physical and 
psychic health of the mother figure and the processes of postcolonial nation building.  
Colonialism gendered African females as “women” in order to create rape cultures 
that deployed patriarchal gender norms as cultural control (in already-patriarchal 
communities, gender stratifications were exacerbated).  In post-independence 
Anglophone African literature, African female characters use their raced and 
gendered bodies to wrest symbolic control over their communities away from the 
colonizer.  By repeating images of gendered violence and its aftermath in terms of 
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pathology and health, the literature critiques the colonial reformulation of the African 
female as woman and the African family as a gendered hierarchy.  In such a reading, 
it appears that when Anglophone African literature attempts to imagine postcolonial 
alternatives to the patriarchal nation-state, it continues to express possibilities through 
representations of the maternal (albeit not necessarily biological).  In light of African 
cosmologies that consider the health of the community to be predicated on the 
symbiotic relationship among all of its members regardless of age or gender, this 
dissertation questions the persistence of the literary emphasis on the maternal to 
gender a “healthy” nation.  Rather than suggest that Anglophone African literature 
cannot imagine postcolonialism outside the gendered paradigm of domination it seeks 
to escape, I explore the possibilities of what this literary persistence might suggest.     
I was initially interested in the multiple layers of reading and readers the texts 
represent and initiate.  In these particular literary texts, certain literary characters 
“read” other characters in various ways.  These reading characters in turn model for 
the novels’ readers how to and how not to read.  Stanley Leavy advises that the best 
analyst is an untrained one, much as the best reader of a traumatic testimonial text is 
an untrained witness.18  At best, the reader has no literary, historical, cultural or other 
preconceptions, only a “focused and gentle attention to the text at hand and rigorous 
self-discipline in order to meet it” (Andrade 240).19  Reading African testimonial 
narratives has the potential to dismantle our existing notions of African literature, of 
colonial trauma, of testimony, and of recovery, and to illuminate possibilities for 
reconceptualizing these notions.  I neither advocate psychoanalytic training for 
readers of post-independence Anglophone African literature nor argue that we should 
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categorize the literature as traumatic narrative.  The text is set and the reader-as-
witness possesses the potential for transformative action based on the variability of 
her relationship with that text.  This understanding recasts reading as a potentially 
political act with the possibility for social change.  Responsibility and, thus, 
possibility, resides wholly within the reader.  This expansion of the reader’s task links 
her to her community, of which she is a microcosm, and to its potential for 
transformative change as a result of her own transformative contact with the traumatic 
narrative.   
For me, the potential breakdown of productive reading is the possibility for 
reader misunderstanding, whether intentional or not, of the text’s message.  Dori 
Laub warns that the lack of a qualified listener “annihilates the story” and prevents 
either judiciary or curative responses (68).20  Hearing traumatic testimony changes the 
listener by entrusting her with juridical responsibility.  The changed listener who has 
been able to productively hear the testimony is then qualified to explore with the 
trauma survivor a means to transcend suffering.  An unqualified listener bears no 
burden of responsibility to the trauma survivor and thus offers no response to the 
testimony.  The crucial relationship in this scenario is that of the reader-witness with 
the text-testimony.  The reader bears a responsibility for continuous reevaluation of 
her position vis-à-vis the text in light of her perceptions of who speaks it and what it 
represents.  This responsibility calls attention to representation as a political act of 
control and challenges the reader to acknowledge and interrogate her historical 
indebtedness to and participation in collective networks of hegemonic control or 
justice.  The cross-cultural reader must remain cognizant of the fact that any lens she 
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trains over the text may taint or obscure its political potential and the culture it 
represents.  Such misapprehensions can create or reinforce false constructions of 
reality and thus be a detriment to the reader’s relationship with the literature. 
The relationship between the readers within a fictional world and the readers 
of the fictional representations of said worlds demonstrates the notion that any literary 
text’s readership is fragmented by gender, race, class, identity, age, and other factors.  
Each reader brings a particular lived experience to a text that mediates that reader’s 
reading of it.  This fracturing of the novel’s readership, coupled with the fact that 
much post-independence Anglophone African literature defies easy categorization, 
means that the processes of reading these particular traumatic literary representations 
are as fragmented and as fraught with interpretive possibilities as the processes of 
crafting and reading traumatic testimony.   
Literary characters learn about themselves and their worlds through the 
processes of reading other traumatized characters.  Simultaneously, the reader of the 
literary text learns about herself and her world through her own processes of reading 
the text’s representations of both traumatized characters and those characters’ intra-
textual readings of each other.  Shoshana Felman likens the productive study of 
testimony texts to both a performative and a transformative experience for the 
reader.21  When the reader approaches a testimonial text as a witness, the text teaches 
her about the nature of trauma and testimony.  Learning transforms the reader-student 
by traumatizing her.  In fact, Felman argues, nothing has “truly” been taught unless 
the act of reading pushes the reader into crisis, breaking down her accepted 
representational structures and frames of reference for both the testimonial material 
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and life (53).  This breakdown of the reader’s sense of understanding represents a 
traumatic crisis and is the only way she can learn from (and work through, or 
introject) the subject matter of the testimony text.  Reading these novels as traumatic 
testimonies traumatizes us as readers and thus shatters our conceptions of the Real.   
In this context, the literary representation of trauma functions as a dual 
witness to trauma:  as both observer of the trauma (the witness who sees what 
happens) and as a testimony of it (the witness who speaks about what happens).  
While trauma and justice studies both speak of a witness who listens to and is 
transformed by traumatic testimony that is spoken, I suggest that a literature which 
represents traumatic testimony thrusts its reader into the role of a testimonial witness.  
The witness’s ethical position is the one which Derrida suggests Hamlet unwillingly 
assumes when the ghost of his father appears and demands vengeance.22  The ghost 
similarly implicates the reader of Shakespeare’s play by haunting her as well across 
the space between herself and the page, and across time.  Both psychoanalysis and the 
novels I examine in this dissertation benefit from this interactive interplay between 
the reader and the implications for reading.  Both the practice of the discourse as a 
theoretical paradigm and the literary texts themselves benefit from such a mutual give 
and take. 
How do I avoid imposing my own cultural lens on the literature if I argue that 
we should read it in a certain way?  I keep Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak’s advice 
before me, that cross-cultural literary study requires that we as teachers and readers 
constantly interrogate our own subject and cultural positions in relation to the text and 
its author, and that we attempt to adopt a learning position in relation to the text rather 
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than an imposing one.23  Recent scholarship in Latin American testimonio studies is 
instructive in this regard.  The testimonio’s positioning of itself as history inverts the 
claim of fiction to know the other.  Testimonio is a community voice inviting the 
reader to become an ally in the text’s healing work.  The realist and postmodern 
novels examined in this dissertation position themselves similarly.  The function of 
testimonio is less about the relationship between the individual and his community, 
which is assumed to be of paramount importance, and more about the political 
potential embedded in the act of testifying.  The potential for politicization of the 
testimonial process resides in the space between speaker and reader.  The testimonio’s 
appeal to the cross-cultural reader, who cannot occupy the writer’s subject position, is 
to situate herself next to the writer as an ally.24  Many readers of post-independence 
Anglophone African literature are cross-cultural, and I suggest that such readers 
would do well to follow the testimonio reader’s example and read as a testimonial 
witness, or ally. 
To study trauma is to study response.  The survival of a traumatic event 
demands a response from the survivor, and the potential for cure demands a response 
from both the survivor and a witness.  Reading these novels as traumatic narratives 
implicates not only the colonizer as perpetrator but also the reader as listener in the 
form of a demand for reader response.  When a testimony is made, the listener is part 
of the creation of knowledge about the traumatic event.  After hearing the testimony, 
the witness moves forward with the trauma survivor to, in effect, write the future.  In 
the case of David’s Story, the narrator literally rewrites his story and those of his 
subjects.  “This is and is not David’s story,” she begins the novel:  “I took liberties 
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with the text and considerably revised sections that he had already approved” (1, 3).  
As Wicomb’s narrator does with David in David’s Story, the reader of the testimonial 
literature studied in this dissertation moves forward with the fictional characters to 
author an alternative notion of postcoloniality.  Time thus becomes a crucial buffer 
between the literary character’s experience of trauma and that trauma’s later 
representation as the testimony to be read or witnessed by both other characters and 
the reader of the novel.  For example, in Maps, Nervous Conditions, and David’s 
Story, which are framed as traumatic testimonies, the narrator indicates that time has 
passed between the traumatic events narrated and the setting down of the narrative, 
and again between that writing and its presentation in novel form to the reader.  While 
literature converts traumatic testimony from spoken to written form, the sense of 
passed time is the crucial element that transforms the reader into a responsible 
testimonial witness.  Time operates thusly for both readers in the literature and 
readers of the literature. 
When the reader of testimonial literature joins the testimony-speaking 
character in a search for justice, the notion of worlding as an act of postcolonial 
cultural inscription comes into play.  The literary texts inscribe a new version of 
postcolonialism through their testimonial impulse toward individual and social 
justice, or transformation.  Spivak first introduced the notion of “worlding” into 
postcolonial discourse in A Critique of Postcolonial Reason.  Homi Bhabha and 
Ranjana Khanna have since illuminated the ways in which the notion of worlding 
informs and is informed by psychoanalytic usage.25  I have suggested that the trauma 
sufferer creates a transformed future through her act of testimony.  In a testimonial 
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context, worlding is the creation of a narrative that bears the strife of its creation.  
This strife is the tension between the sufferer’s competing drives toward creation 
(narration/testimony) and concealment (silence/melancholic attachment to the lost 
object).  The trauma sufferer will always be marked psychically and/or physically by 
the traumatic event, but the life lived after surviving and accepting the traumatic 
event is also markedly different because it is built by the survivor out of a changed 
reality.  Worlding, like testimony, is thus the act of saying the unsayable.  In post-
independence Anglophone African literature, speaking the unsayable is a testimonial 
act that names the lost object of subjecthood.  For the postcolonial writer, speaking 
the unsayable engenders a national literature, which Fanon argues is the prerequisite 
of any postcolonial culture.  The novels’ representations of testimony do the same 
work.  By representing determined African subjects who read and make histories of 
trauma, the literature engenders the potential for authoring a post-independence 
African culture that exists outside the parameters of “nationhood” as defined by 
colonialist and imperialist frameworks of global community. 
Two critical decisions shaped this project:  first, I chose post-independence 
Anglophone African novels that represent various modes of testimonial transmission; 
and, second, I chose a critical framework that allows me to discuss representations of 
traumatic testimony in that literature.  I analyze novels that engage with testimony in 
three different ways.  First, Fragments, Carcase for Hounds, and Abyssinian 
Chronicles depict moments or scenes of testimony.  Second, The Icarus Girl and 
Disgrace represent an absence of testimony and the ways in which the censored, 
traumatized body makes its trauma known nevertheless.  Third, David’s Story, 
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Nervous Conditions, and Maps are framed as testimony.  The novels also depict three 
different testimonial modes, and my chapters reflect these groupings:  first, Nervous 
Conditions and Maps depict the changing native body as visual testimony; second, 
David’s Story, The Icarus Girl, and Disgrace portray the spectral ramifications of 
censoring testimony; and third, Carcase for Hounds, Fragments, and Abyssinian 
Chronicles depict the wounded character who voices the trans-generational testimony 
of a traumatized community.  These modes of telling crisscross sub-Saharan Africa, 
illuminating the notion that traumatic suffering links otherwise seemingly disparate 
communities together.  The cross-continental testimonial patterns dictate my choice 
of texts, allowing me to consider decolonization and traumatic testimony as 
simultaneous and crucially linked developments.   
 We can read other post-independence Anglophone African novels according 
to the template I propose:  as traumatic testimony.  South African Lauretta Ngcobo’s 
And They Didn’t Die depicts the delayed spoken testimony of a black woman, Jezile, 
and her son’s white body which bears witness to her employer’s crimes of rape and 
miscegenation.26  In Ghanaian Amma Darko’s Beyond the Horizon, an African 
prostitute in Germany, Mara, is bereft of witnesses to her testimony of traumatic 
coercion into human trafficking.  She narrates the novel to her own “virtually naked” 
reflection in a mirror (1).27  This template can also work with Francophone African 
literature:  Senegalese Mariama Bâ’s So Long a Letter is framed as Ramatoulaye’s 
letter to a friend, a testimony of the trauma of cultural genocide through Islam’s 
gendered reconfiguration of the African family.28  And, finally, the trauma of slavery 
and the crossing of the Atlantic have produced traumatic African diaspora 
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communities and writers in the Americas at large (for example, Paule Marshall, 
Jamaica Kincaid, and Gayl Jones, among others) whose writing also functions as 
testimonies of the past traumas of displacement from the homeland and the family via 
the Middle Passage.29  Toni Morrison’s Beloved is the most prominent example, for 
its engagement with ghosts and Sethe’s frequent testimonial observations of 
“rememories” of the past traumas of plantation slavery in the United States South.30  
Beloved is the subject of a growing body of scholarship on literary representations of 
traumatic repetition, memory, and history.  In the Caribbean, Haitian Edwidge 
Danticat’s Breath, Eyes, Memory depicts the twin traumas of migration and sexual 
abuse that repeat across the lives of Martine Caco and her daughter Sophie.31  
Sophie’s first-person narration is a testimony that also attempts to reconstruct 
Martine’s traumatic narrative against her wishes.   
I work with psychoanalysis for several reasons.  Most importantly, 
psychoanalysis allows us to scrutinize widely accepted postcolonial readings of 
African texts to excavate thematic elements that have been overlooked by a 
traditional focus on racial subordination or nationalism.  Contemporary trauma 
studies have grown out of Sigmund Freud’s conceptualizations of mourning and 
melancholia, and justice studies in turn relies on the psychoanalytic vocabulary of 
trauma.  Psychoanalysis thus provides a powerful vocabulary for discussing the 
literature’s representations of trauma and testimony and its themes of repression, loss, 
fantasy, desire, and personality development.  This last criterion is especially 
important when we note that so much postcolonial literature appropriates the 
Bildungsroman genre, a point to which I will return later in the dissertation. 
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While this dissertation brings to the forefront the way that African 
postcolonialism is described in terms of trauma and testimony, I do not suggest that 
trauma operates similarly across all postcolonial or all African literature.  Trauma is 
not exclusive to colonial and immediate postcolonial imaginings.  Contemporary 
writings in some post-independence nations (in Africa and elsewhere) are no longer 
concerned with colonialism and its continuing ramifications, but with other forms of 
trauma.32  The term “postcolonial” is thus fraught by its etymological focus on 
colonialism as the signifier of any community of people who were colonized, 
regardless of how recently or strongly—or not—the imprint of colonialism lingers on 
the contemporary cultural imaginary.33  I suggest that a theme of what we might call 
“traumatic postcolonialism” repeats across post-independence Anglophone African 
literature and elsewhere.  This thematic continuity provides a way of talking about 
trauma and testimony. 
Psychoanalysis also allows us to examine the ways in which racialized and 
gendered violence function in the texts to create psychic and material loss.  It allows 
us to further examine the ways that loss pairs subversively with themes of 
nationalism, gender transgression, and motherhood to generate new definitions of 
postcolonial “nation,” and to articulate new definitions of personhood in place of 
those obscured by colonialism.  Psychoanalysis thus allows us to read literary 
representations of violence as testimonial calls to begin processes of mourning and 
justice which, in the colonial condition, may be the same thing.  At the same time, 
however, pairing Anglophone African literature with psychoanalysis demands an 
awareness of the discourse’s earlier history of racialized and gendered application.  
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We must therefore scrutinize any engagement with the historical mythologies of 
psychoanalysis that does not apply to African cosmologies of social and familial 
organization (two primary examples of which are the Oedipus complex and certain 
constructions of gender difference).   
Within the rubric of psychoanalysis, I use Freud’s work because it helps me to 
articulate the ways that mourning and melancholia manifest in literary representations 
of the individual and the social.  Freud’s “Mourning and Melancholia” is the 
foundational text for discussing the essay’s two title categories of response to a 
traumatic event:  mourning is the transformative path toward existing productively 
after a traumatic event; melancholia is the state of stasis into which the traumatic 
sufferer becomes entrapped by her compulsion to cling to the idea of the object 
(literal or figurative) which was lost in the traumatic incident.34  Fanon set the 
precedent for discussing colonialism in psychoanalytic terms using Jacques Lacan’s 
mirror stage, and numerous other postcolonial and feminist critics have since 
employed Lacan to discuss difference as foundational to networked systems of 
domination.35  Lacan’s notion of the birth of the ideal self and the differentiating 
other is useful for elucidating the psychic split that results from internalized racism.  I 
use Freud to investigate what happens in the literature after we acknowledge 
difference.   
To me, the crux of Fanon’s discussion of Lacan is that the black man learns to 
see himself in terms that differentiate him from whiteness (of course, we have to add 
gender back into Fanon).  To Fanon, the colonized Antillean’s ideal sense of self is 
framed in terms of having “no color” prior to encountering his blackness when he 
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meets a white person and begins to idealize whiteness (Black 162, note 25).  But the 
colonized child describes his “no color” in terms of whiteness, as when he remarks 
that going on vacation gives him “rosy cheeks” (Black 162, note 25).   
Freud’s theories of mourning and melancholia diverge at this point from 
Lacan’s, as do Fanon’s.  For Lacan, mourning and melancholia are linked to desire 
which is born of a lack brought about by the initial separation of the infant from the 
mother.  This lack manifests in various forms throughout the life of the self and 
dooms the individual to suffering.  The individual can never regain the imagined 
experience of being one with—a part of—the mother.  At the end of Black Skin, 
White Masks Fanon suggests two ideas:  first, he argues that “freedom requires an 
effort at disalienation” and, second, that developing an ability to explain the other to 
the self may usher in a world of harmonious cohabitation (231).  While this ending 
vision has been described as perhaps excessively utopic, I suggest that Fanon points 
toward the potential for social and individual transformation through communal and 
testimonial bonds forged across racialized divisions.  Fanon’s hope for “freedom” 
challenges Lacan’s discourse of futility because Fanon’s hope is couched in terms of 
traumatic testimony.  Fanon thus appropriates Freud’s conception of mourning as 
transformative in his own call for social change.  I read testimonial representations in 
postcolonial Anglophone African literature as similarly challenging the discourse of 
futility by insisting repeatedly, as does Fanon, that community building and history 
making are essential in order to “create the ideal conditions of existence for a human 
world” (Black 231).  The literature repeatedly extols the potential for transformational 
success rather than the inevitability of human nature to exploit imagined differences.   
 21 
 
The discourse of trauma studies teaches us that the search to transcend trauma 
(which I conceive here as a form of mourning) can not eradicate the past experience 
of trauma.  David Eng and David Kazanjian suggest that mourning is a stage reached 
after melancholia, but only after repeated unsuccessful attempts.36  Mourning may in 
fact be a series of repeated attempts to relinquish a melancholic attachment and move 
beyond the traumatic loss.  Mourning is thus bound up in melancholia even as it 
attempts to move beyond it, and the notion of cure is similarly fraught and contested.  
In Nicholas Rand’s conception, “cure” is analogous to “mourning processes,” rather 
than an isolated stage reached only after mourning is complete.37  Mourning may 
never be complete and, in this light, we can view cure as the process of mourning.   
The process of learning to accept one’s past is an acknowledgment that a 
transformed self and future are worth working toward.  In this light, I see trauma and 
justice studies as aligned with Anglophone African literary representations and 
cosmologies through their mutual concern for the health of the individual as crucial to 
the health of the emerging postcolonial community.  I thus attempt to align my 
critical practice with the cultural cosmology that the literature represents.  I hope to 
make African literature accessible to metropolitan readers in a way that does not 
intellectually colonize the subject texts and the experiences they represent.  I take 
very seriously Armah’s caution to the literary critic of non-African descent to 
navigate cultural difference carefully in order to avoid replicating, through literary 
scholarship, colonial appropriation of African literary labor.38 
The dissertation’s central and organizing principle is best adumbrated in 
chapter two, “Testimonial Bodies,” because it positions the native body as both 
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repository for and manifestation of colonial trauma.  The literature demonstrates that 
while the testimonial text can function as a testimony, testimony—and therefore, 
social transformation—is grounded in the character’s body.  Chapter two lays the 
theoretical foundation for reading the literary character’s body as testimony.  
Chapters two through four then elucidate the various ways in which the native body 
articulates the testimony of trauma through physical change, spectrality, and 
emanating a historical voice.   
This dissertation contributes to four disciplinary discourses:  postcolonial, 
trauma, feminist/women’s, and gender studies.  While interdisciplinary scholarship is 
becoming more valued in the twenty-first century, transgressing institutional 
boundaries is still a fraught endeavor.  The multi-faceted, networked nature of 
colonial trauma, however, demands an interdisciplinary hermeneutic approach.  Using 
the psychoanalytic vocabulary of traumatic testimony to study Anglophone African 
novels that are themselves hybrid (in terms of genre, aesthetic mode, and literary 
form) suggests that one could read the literature in a fashion that helps to dismantle 
disciplinary, generic, and discourse boundaries.39  The act of reading can transform 
the reader’s understanding of the real by disassembling culturally-specific social 
institutions that are considered universal.  I suggest that reading post-independence 
Anglophone African literature can allow us to conceive new ways of thinking about 
history, nation, and postcolonial personhood.  Because history is referential and 
trauma is not, the novels examined in this dissertation demonstrate that the study of 
trauma requires us as readers to revise our conception of what constitutes a viable 
history:  to consider the notion that history may be able to exist where understanding 
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does not.  By dismantling the notion that history, memory, and literature exist in 
mutual exclusion, the literature demands a revision of the reader’s relationship with it, 
with sub-Saharan Africa, and with postcolonial, trauma, feminist/women’s, and 
gender studies. 
Post-independence Anglophone African literature is conventionally studied 
under the rubric of postcolonial studies, and scholarship on it has been concerned 
with issues surrounding self-definition.  These discussions attempt to navigate the 
forced hybridization of African modes of personal, literary, and cultural expression as 
mediated through the colonial experience.40  Themes of loss stemming from 
dislocation pervade African literature, and Carole Boyce Davies suggests that 
marginalization can become a site of creative subversion because forced relocation 
begets the necessary recreation of the self and of the nation.41  This notion, that 
location may embed political potential, informs the trope of forced migration in post-
independence Anglophone African literature.  My work extends the reach of 
postcolonial studies by suggesting a new way to examine the wide-ranging effects of 
dislocation and cultural genocide as traumatic loss for the colonized individual and 
community.  This mode of reading literary representations of loss as testimony shifts 
critical focus away from the literature’s litany of past abuses and toward its attempt to 
conceive a transformed future.   
While mine is not the first analysis of African literature to employ the 
vocabulary of psychoanalysis, it is the first to suggest reading post-independence 
African novels as traumatic testimonies.  The dissertation contributes to the discourse 
of trauma studies in two ways.  First, it demonstrates engagement with the field’s 
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challenge to disciplinary boundaries because postcolonial Anglophone African 
literature and studies of trauma and justice all juxtapose literary representation, 
history, traumatic experience, and testimony into a single narrative whose function is 
also political.  Second, my work bridges the gap between trauma and postcolonial 
studies because postcolonial Anglophone African literature and studies of trauma and 
justice are all based in the postcolonial moment but use the vocabulary and theoretical 
framework of psychoanalysis.   
Finally, this dissertation opens new lines of discussion within 
feminist/women’s and gender studies discourses by bringing the gender-inclusivity of 
African feminisms and literature to the fore of post-independence Anglophone 
African literary studies.42  Anglophone African literature represents cultures that 
overwhelmingly do not relegate men and women to spheres of influence and activity 
based exclusively on biological determinations.  This African conception of humanity 
is predicated on valuing the necessity of all the members of both the family and 
national units.  Post-independence Anglophone African literature grapples with the 
imposition of colonial gendering in ways that reconfigured pre-colonial cultural 
matrices.  African(ist) scholars like Amadiume, Oyèrόnké Oyěwùmί, M. J. Daymond, 
and Andrea Rushing (among others) and artists with an anti-colonial social agenda 
seek to destroy these oppressive matrices and to create and institute non-oppressive 
postcolonial ones.43  The literature studied in this dissertation is part of that project.   
In my attempt to read African literature as representing and representative of 
African cosmologies of humanity, I read novels written by both men and women, and 
which represent the experiences of men, women, and children.  This cross-gender 
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focus is imperative in order to illuminate the dialog between male and female writers 
as they explore the larger questions addressed in this dissertation.  I take very 
seriously Lois West’s warning that while the discourses of gender, domination, 
family, and nation intersect, scholarship in these areas has conventionally assumed 
that men and women operate in wholly separate spheres.44  African literary studies 
have been gendered based on these underlying patriarchal assumptions.  To Florence 
Stratton and other Africanist literary critics, African men’s and women’s writing are 
meant to be read together.45   
My analysis expands the reach of gender studies and feminist criticism in two 
key ways through its engagement with post-independence Anglophone African 
literature.  First, the dissertation demonstrates that Anglophone African literary 
interplay between genders unhinges gender in provocative ways, for example, by 
divorcing gender from the body in Maps, using gendered literary representations to 
critique gendered histories, nationalisms, and nation building processes in David’s 
Story, Nervous Conditions, The Icarus Girl, and Carcase for Hounds, and by 
prescribing gender-inclusive, egalitarian notions of postcolonialism in Fragments and 
Abyssinian Chronicles.  Second, this dissertation shifts the vantage points from which 
the metropolitan scholar approaches contemporary Anglophone African literature:  
away from a focus on exclusively masculine or feminine realms of inquiry and 
toward considering the trauma of the entire community in order to identify both 
systems of oppression and systems of valuation of figures previously devalued by 
patriarchy (for example, women, mothers, and girl children).   
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The dissertation is organized around three modes of testimonial telling in 
eight Anglophone African novels from across sub-Saharan Africa which engage with 
themes of colonial and neocolonial violence and traumatic suffering.  These novels 
represent the testimonial moment for a colonized people, which is the moment of 
revolution and the subsequent birth of the postcolonial nation.  In this postcolonial 
moment during which the global metropolitan center seeks to “modernize” Africa in 
its own image, literary self-fashioning is important, Fanon tells us, because it 
underpins the articulation of the national, cultural, and individual selves.  In an 
increasingly homogenized global community, localized self-fashioning is a crucial 
testimonial exercise in narrating a traumatic history of occupation and charting a 
locally-defined indigenous future.  I argue that the literature represents various modes 
of testimony to dismantle the structural hierarchies of neocolonialism and initiate 
processes of postcolonial mourning. 
Chapter two, “Testimonial Bodies,” traces the ways in which damaged bodies 
function as readable traumatic testimonies of gendered and racialized colonial 
violence in Nervous Conditions and Maps.  The novels represent traumatic suffering 
in images of bodily illness and mutilation to signify hypochondriacal responses to the 
psychic violence that accompanies the physical violation wrought by colonialism.  
Colonized bodies transgress patriarchal gender role boundaries, undermining the 
construction of knowledge about the nature of colonialism, the colony, the colonized, 
and the colonizer. 
 Chapter three, “Censorship and Testimonial Ghosts,” considers the testimonial 
censorship of and the subsequent haunting by the ghostly female body as symptom 
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and signifier of the traumatic loss of the ideal native space through enculturation and 
migration.  I explore the ways in which David’s Story and The Icarus Girl employ 
postmodern narrative tactics to critique and reject both the Western novel form as a 
mode of transmission of testimonial literature and patriarchal constructions of nation 
and family as pathological. 
Chapter four, “Testifying Wounds,” examines the ways in which the wounded 
body releases a voice that testifies of the collective’s traumatic history.  Carcase for 
Hounds, Fragments, and Abyssinian Chronicles represent characters who mourn the 
loss of a collective African identity by insistently responding to the physical and 
psychic wounds this loss inflicts.  The characters repeatedly bear witness to traumatic 
histories they not have lived and call for postcolonial justice that may be impossible 
to achieve.  These postcolonial Bildungsromane all end in either the realm of the 
ancestors or in an inverted reality, suggesting the need to reconfigure postcolonial 
citizenship and cultural construction. 
Chapter five, “Who is Writing (in) Africa?  Reading Anglophone African 
Literature,” examines the confluence of postcolonial and trauma studies in the figure 
of the metropolitan reader as witness to Anglophone African testimonial narratives.  I 
suggest that international reading practice dictates the potential for social repression 
or transformation through its identification of the progenitors of “African” literature.  
I juxtapose the speeches announcing Coetzee’s 2003 Nobel Prize in Literature, the 
responses of the African National Congress, the international press, and academe. 
 Through this study of reading literary representations of traumatic testimony 
in post-independence African literature, I have attempted to contribute to our 
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understanding of the global cultural production of “Africa” through reading practice.  
I hope to have created a space for interdisciplinary dialog to continue on the related 
questions of how trauma and testimony inform decolonization, nation building, and 
reformulation of anti-patriarchal notions of family predicated on revising colonial 
articulations of personhood. 
The area of non-patriarchal post-colonial formation of families is a rich one 
that I touch on briefly throughout the dissertation.  The field extends beyond the 
scope of this project, however, and is one that requires more scholarship.  In 
particular, literary representations of transnational adoption and transracial families 
like those portrayed in Maps and The Icarus Girl, and the formation what Hazel 
Carby calls “subversive” communities of women like those we see in varying 
permutations in Nervous Conditions, Abyssinian Chronicles, and Fragments, would 
yield fruitful scholarship but remain largely unexamined.46  I suggest that these 
literary representations of anti-patriarchal formations of family illuminate a means of 
navigating the postcolonial realities of a native population transformed by genocide, 
detention, migration, and rape.  Alternative postcolonial “families” transgress borders 
that biology cannot cross and will not acknowledge.  These transracial, transnational, 
re-gendered families are living histories of colonial trauma and so undermine the 
myth of a heterosexist, homogeneous postcolonial community.  These literary 
scenarios suggest a means for postcolonial populations to grapple with questions of 
social inclusion that challenge hegemonic models.  I read these families, formed as 
part of post-traumatic recovery, as metaphors for the post-independence nation in 
tension.  The new nation struggles to negotiate the competing demands of delivering 
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on revolutionary promises and embracing modernity’s expanding global network of 




Chapter 2: Testimonial Bodies 
 
Introduction 
All colonized bodies are marked by traumatic suffering.  In this chapter I 
examine two novels, Tsitsi Dangarembga’s Nervous Conditions (1988) and Nuruddin 
Farah’s Maps (1986), which represent traumatic suffering in images of bodily illness 
and mutilation.1  First, I will summarize the novels’ plots and explain how a 
psychoanalytic framework illuminates the narratives’ political potential.  I will then 
analyze the tropes of illness and bleeding in the novels and demonstrate the ways in 
which these bodily disfigurements tie the figure of the mother to postcoloniality by 
divorcing both from patriarchal notions of the “nation.”  I will conclude with 
implications for reading Maps, Nervous Conditions, and African literature. 
In Nervous Conditions and Maps, colonized characters’ changing bodies 
signify hypochondriacal responses to racialized and gendered psychic violence.  I 
refer to these changing bodies as testimonial bodies because they are visible 
testimonies of colonial occupation.  Nervous Conditions and Maps are about 
exploding boundaries and remapping terrains—geographic, ideological, and 
biological—that the discourse of colonization and the colonized subject previously 
considered stable.  Both novels are set in a moment of remapping the nation through 
struggle, and they depict changes to geographic and ideological perimeters as 
reshaping the contours of the native body.  The novels thus illuminate the crucial 
relationships among language, the colonized body, and the land.   
 31 
 
In both colonial Rhodesia (later Zimbabwe) and Somalia, land occupation and 
ownership are contested terrains because both nations are crucially positioned for 
trade and regional domination.2  Somalis and natives in Rhodesia consider land 
occupation a necessary element of national identity, and in each novel the fight over 
the land marks the native body.  The diseased or mutilated body is both a metaphor 
and substitute for the diseased colony of Rhodesia and for the mutilated nation of 
Somalia.  The body maps the narrative of these social and individual illnesses on 
itself.3  At the same time, however, changing testimonial bodies explode physical and 
conceptual boundaries of the notion of “native body” and introduce alternatives.  
These alternatives do not seek pre-colonial models, but they do seek to abolish 
imposed colonial ones.  Nervous Conditions and Maps represent bodily testimony in 
the psychoanalytic language of introjection, which is the healing process of 
acceptance of and growth beyond traumatic injury.  The bodies and the processes 
they signify allow us to conceive ways of being native outside those defined by 
colonial discourse.4   
Postcolonial discourse has already theorized the relationship between the 
colonized individual and his or her community.5  I examine what Dangarembga and 
Farah have contributed to this dialog through their representations of diseased or 
mutilated individual bodies as metaphors for the colonized community, and through 
their choices of which bodies to represent in this way.  The novels use female and 
male bodies to different ends, signifying their differently gendered relationships with 
the putative independent nation.  Spivak famously argues that any critical discussion 
of representation in ideology, subjectivity, the nation, the state, and the law must 
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acknowledge the gendered nature of these discourses to avoid repeating patterns of 
textual violence.6  Sangeeta Ray suggests that responsible discourse analysis requires 
an expanded understanding of gender that subverts the heterosexist “cultural matrix” 
of postcolonial national identity (En-Gendering 4).7  As we read, we must remind 
ourselves that despite the novels’ representations of marked male and female bodies, 
their textual presences function critically to delineate cultural sites which are marked 
as either “feminine” or “masculine.”  Feminist critics like Ray and Tovi Fenster 
suggest that such spatial gendering underlies the national myth of inclusion.8  Sallie 
Westwood adds that even as gendered inequality undermines the nation’s fictional 
unity, the “national story” is equally implicated in its heterosexist production and 
reproduction of inequality.9  Such national inequality derives in part from gendering 
bodies and their access to spaces in order to legitimate patriarchal power.  
Dangarembga’s and Farah’s texts critique colonialism’s masculinization of the 
subject under the guise of universalism.  Ray argues that this removal of the figure of 
the woman from cultural participation reassigns “the feminine” essence to the land, 
which is in turn gendered as the “motherland” (En-gendering 30-31).  Feminized 
bodies in the novels who transgress culturally-determined gender boundaries thus 
find themselves in uncharted relationships with the “motherland.”  They are forced to 
reconstitute their understandings of femininity as it relates to the creation of a 
postcolonial community.  Their own gendered subjectivities come into play as well 
because the collective fiction of the nation hinges on its articulation of the (subject) 
position of women.10  The male state protects its feminized national purity against 
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foreign infiltration.  Metaphorically speaking, the national father protects the 
“motherland” from the rape of the outsider/Other.   
It is through metaphors of rape that the discourse of colonialism explodes 
native gender stratifications and remaps their relationships to the land.  Anne 
McClintock notes the manner in which colonial discourse equates blackness with 
degeneration and conflates primitivism, lack of intelligence, immaturity, and 
femininity into a single trope and condition.11  Progress is symbolized in “the white 
father” who feminizes the black man by forcing him to work the land (234).  The type 
of labor the native performs is less important than the fact that black labor itself is 
feminized.  The colonial power re-imagines the colonized male body as labor and 
thus denies the colonized body ownership of the land he works.  The male body’s 
labor supersedes and, in colonial discourse, subsumes the labor of the female body 
which is re-imagined as the land.  Even as labor is perceived as performed by black 
men, the discursive imagery of colonial labor thus coalesces into an ideology of 
heterosexual penetration of the black female body.12  Mbembe corroborates 
McClintock’s progress/degeneration paradigm when he notes that the colonial 
European’s discursive “process of brutalization” of the African is a means of phallic 
domination (Postcolony 14).  By equating blackness with the subordinated feminine 
and whiteness to the dominating masculine phallus, colonial discourse feminizes not 
only the black African but African-ness as degenerate and, in the context of 
civilization, invisible.  To Mbembe, invisibility is the literal and symbolic death—
often by suicide—of the native self.   
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The citizen body is the figurative terrain on which the nation is built.  In 
Nervous Conditions and Maps, changing bodies mount political resistance by using 
the “the terrain of the nation” as a blank slate on which they record their 
marginalization from societies built on the “national story” of inclusivity 
(Westwood).  As colonial subjects, the nature of these claims is grounded in the 
future—in struggle and in decolonization.  As such, their influence contributes not 
only to the dismantling of the colony but also to the formation of post-independence 
nationhood.  Although both male and female colonized bodies are visible markers of 
colonial violence, the texts suggest that only the testimonial female body is capable of 
initiating the process of social mourning and, thus, healing of colonial trauma.  Her 
damaged testimonial body demands witness to the trauma she has suffered and a 
response of justice.  By representing the colonized native remapping herself, Nervous 
Conditions remaps the condition of postcoloniality.  In its representation of changing 
bodies that blur distinctions between nations, genders, and ethnicities, Maps suggests 
that justice for the colonized individual is a postcolonial condition devoid of gendered 
and racialized subordination.  The colonized male body, in contrast, can expose but 
cannot help heal the problem of national mutilation.  In the patriarchy, the colonized 
man wields the mutilating phallus.   
By aligning the native body on the verge of independence with the land, the 
novels remap patriarchal notions of gender and nation.  Nervous Conditions’ allusions 
to Black Nationalism and Maps’ representations of armed struggle—both of which 
nationalist discourse genders male—challenge the colonizer’s discursive 
representation of Africa as exotic and feminized.  Reading these novels together 
 35 
 
explodes and remaps the way we read postcolonial African literature, requiring the 
reader to explode and remap her own ideological boundaries.  In order to recognize 
and acknowledge the textual bodies’ politicization of global discourses of African-
ness through individual and collective testimonies of colonial trauma, the Western 
reader must break her ethnocentric reading lens. 
Trauma studies has benefitted from a growing body of scholarship on Latin 
American testimonies of colonial and neocolonial violence called testimonio, which 
are extended first-person narratives by survivors of or witnesses to traumas of 
repression, poverty, abuse, or struggle.13  Unlike trauma study, testimonio study is not 
grounded in psychoanalysis.  Nevertheless, both trauma and testimonio scholars are 
interested in the political potential and efficacy of texts that recount cultural 
domination and violence in a politically repressive environment.  Traumatic suffering 
binds different communities together via survivor response.  Testimonio studies 
informs this study of postcolonial African literature because scholarship on both the 
testimonio and traumatic testimony find that the narratives have the potential to 
instigate collective healing by functioning as histories of unspeakable traumas, thus 
revising monolithic institutions of language, literary mode, and genre.   
 
Subversion, and Subverting Literary Mode 
Read as testimonial literature, the realist Nervous Conditions and postmodern 
Maps remap Western literary conventions.  If we expand our understanding of what 
postcolonial realist and postmodern representations can do, then we can read the 
novels as transcending the boundaries set by modernism’s progenitors.  Kwame 
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Anthony Appiah and Ray both argue that post-independence literature which indicts 
neocolonial structures necessitates the creation of analytic modes that do not derive 
from colonial discourse.14  Appiah denies the possibility that postcolonial African 
literature that is also realist or postmodern can “reject the Western imperium” 
because its modal roots are modernist (152).  Appiah maps literary mode to a 
colonialist/anti-colonial binary that places cultural boundaries around the post-
independence African writer’s potential project.  This reinforces the colonial 
discourse of the world as limitless and without boundary for the colonizer and limited 
to the point of nothingness for the native.  Appiah draws new boundaries for 
postcolonial definitions of modernist modes, like “post-realist,” but these merely 
reinforce colonial discourse as a basis for analysis.  In contrast, Ray expands the ways 
we conceive postcolonial literary modes to transgress colonial limits and, in so doing, 
opens up new “explicitly subversive” possibilities for the postcolonial writer’s project 
(“Through” 6).  While Ray’s essay does not specifically address Appiah’s complaint 
about postmodernism, her response to his argument about realism’s presumed failure 
is transferable.  She explodes the boundaries of colonial discourse, expanding the 
conceptual territories of realism and postcolonial studies to accommodate previously 
unconsidered readings of realist, postcolonial literary representations.  Rather than 
accept Appiah’s creation of new critical categories, Ray suggests that we remap 
existing modal boundaries to accommodate postcolonial literary representations that 
are either realistic or postmodern and which indict the neocolonial state.   
As postcolonial traumatic testimonies, Nervous Conditions and Maps indict 
bourgeois ideology as well as advance subversive agendas.  Their appropriations of 
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realist and postmodern literary conventions suggest that mode alone cannot determine 
literature’s political capability:  function is equally important.  These realist and 
postmodern testimonial narratives have the political potential to redraw postcolonial 
discourse boundaries around notions of “native” and “national identity.”  Nervous 
Conditions realistically represents the traumatic nature of the daily life of colonized 
female bodies.  Maps also does this, but in a fragmented postmodern narrative style.  
Both novels’ literary representations thus transcend the discourse of modernism to re-
imagine realism and postmodernism in the psychoanalytic vocabulary of introjection.  
The novels’ framing as testimonies of colonial occupation not only indicts the 
colonial state but also envisions a postcolonial reality beyond and unlike colonialism. 
In their depictions of colonized children growing toward national and adult 
identities, Nervous Conditions and Maps establish a parallel between the colonized 
adolescent’s developing nationalism and the nation’s transformation through struggle.  
Both novels could be read as Bildungsromane:  they depict the search for a 
postcolonial self by characters whose alienation places them in a “condition of 
‘transcendental homelessness’” (Cheah 242-43).15  Nervous Conditions and Maps 
alter the genre to accommodate the postcolonial condition.  The novels pair the trope 
of illness with the process of decolonization:  the native society, a social organism 
sickened by the pathology of colonization, must reform itself into a postcolonial 
entity.  In each text, the protagonist’s narrative of development also represents the 
narrative of postcolonial nation building.  Dangarembga’s and Farah’s adaptations of 
the traditional Bildungsroman genre is consistent with Joanna Sullivan’s contention 
that the twentieth-century African novel differs from the “Western novel” in part 
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because its central focus is the community rather than a “heroic individual” (182).  
Dan Izevbaye suggests that, as in Sembene Ousmane’s God’s Bits of Wood and Ngũgĩ 
wa Thiong’o’s Petals of Blood, the “communal hero” as a literary technique is typical 
of African communities that view the collective as the source of social change (20-
21).16  As postcolonial Bildungsromane, both Nervous Conditions and Maps depict 
individual characters, Nyasha and Askar, whose searches for identity “frequently 
mask[ ] greater quest[s], plumbing the integrity, fault lines, and features of the 
communal identity through the symbolic identity of the individual” (Sullivan 183).  
For Pheng Cheah, the Bildungsroman genre is “imperative” for decolonization:  the 
national Bildung parallels that of the novel’s protagonist who symbolizes the nation’s 
“first patriot and ideal citizen” (239).  These decolonizing Bildungsromane are early 
post-independence novels that call for the creation of anti-colonial post-independence 
social structures.  New structures may incorporate any progressive elements of but 
cannot of necessity replicate or maintain pre-colonial models since those were 
instruments of cultural subjection.  As depicted in the novels, the national Bildung 
that seeks not to replace but merely to overlay “the foreign prosthesis” in the 
formation of a neocolonial state are doomed because colonial models cannot generate 
postcolonial freedoms (Cheah 246).  The ghosts of colonialism haunt the post-
independence nation and its repetitions of a traumatic past.  The ghost’s presence 
questions the new nation’s still-forming and stalled incarnations of freedom, the idea 
that the people can transcend the finality of bondage in the midst of postcolonial 
government corruption and lingering subordination to the former colonial power.  The 
ghost originates in the temporal as a specter of the past which haunts the present and 
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exposes the impossibility of a transformed future.  The impossibility of a national 
formation that does not replicate colonial models means that the post-independence 
nation is doomed to remain inhospitable to its native population.  The homeland 
becomes, instead, unheimlich to a portion of its inhabitants and thus challenges the 
national Bildung’s fiction of a homogeneous national family.   
In both novels, the subject of the Bildung is literally absent at the end of the 
narrative, at the moment of testimonial telling.  Both authors of the testimonies we 
read are removed from the events recounted by the passage of time.  At the 
testimonial moment, the moment of telling which occurs at the end of both novels, we 
realize that both Nervous Conditions and Maps are the testimonies of not one but of at 
least two people—the text’s narrator and another—recounted retroactively.  Nervous 
Conditions is Tambu’s “account” of her escape from both poverty and mission 
education, and Nyasha’s rebellion against false privilege (1).  Maps is a transcript of 
Askar’s repeated testimony to various entities of the judicial system—the hopelessly 
intertwined “story of (Misra/Misrat/Masarat and) Askar” (259).  The novels thus 
explode the conventions of the Bildungsroman genre first by doubling the genre’s 
conventional number of protagonists to two, and second by representing Bildungs of 
key feminine and feminized characters.  The novels prescribe a gender-inclusive 
postcolonial citizenry through ungendering the narrativization of the national Bildung.  
Nervous Conditions ends with the hospitalization of a gravely ill young black 
Rhodesian girl Nyasha and Tambu’s future confession that while Nyasha’s rebellion 
“may not in the end have been successful” (1), she has changed as a result.  Maps 
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ends with the imprisonment of a young black Somali man Askar after the murder of 
his Ethiopian mother Misra in Mogadiscio.   
Although all of their struggles with choice are gendered, Nyasha, Tambu, 
Askar, and Misra finally resist the narrative of the nation.  Nyasha ends her 
participation in her father Babamukuru’s colonial mimicry, and Tambu rethinks her 
colonial education.  Askar validates Misra’s claim to motherhood despite ethnic 
difference, although he is too late to tell her so.  While Misra is dead at the end of 
Maps, she transgresses national and ethnic borders in service of motherhood while 
she is still alive.  At the end of the novels, the narrators Tambu and Askar realize that 
the narratives of Nyasha and Misra are inextricably entwined with their own.  Their 
narratives of symbolic repetition are delivered to the reader as Nervous Conditions 
and Maps. 
 
Nervous Conditions and Maps:  Summaries 
Nervous Conditions outlines the trans-generational violence of colonial 
mimicry on Nyasha’s increasingly skeletal body on the eve of the Zimbabwean 
independence struggle.  Colonial mimicry is the native’s participation in her own 
death by internalizing the colonial idealization of whiteness or mimicry to the point 
of eradicating herself from existence.  To Bhabha, native mimicry is doomed to fail 
and so enables and elevates the colonizer.  Nyasha’s father Babamukuru repeatedly 
and futilely attempts to identify with the white racial ideal, a mutual obsession Fanon 
calls “dual narcissism” (Black 10).  But Babamukuru complicates Bhabha’s claim in 
that even as Babamukuru’s mimicry ultimately reinforces white supremacy, it enables 
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him to achieve economic and social supremacy over his less imitative family 
members and former neighbors who remain mired in poverty.   
Nervous Conditions opens in 1968 with the death of narrator Tambu’s brother 
Nhamo, but immediately flashes back to 1965, months before real-life Rhodesian 
Prime Minister Ian Smith announces a unilateral declaration of independence (UDI) 
from Great Britain in order to continue white minority rule as an independent state.17  
While Nyasha’s story is part of Tambu’s, the novel is framed as Tambu’s later 
recording of an incomplete version of Nyasha’s story.  In the novel, Tambu’s cousin 
Nyasha has returned after five years in England where the latter’s parents earned 
Master’s degrees.  As a result, Nyasha’s father Babamukuru is promoted to 
headmaster of the local mission school, the highest rank an African can reach in the 
colonial education administration.  After Smith’s declaration, Britain negotiates to 
regain control of its former colony and the African voices of Black Nationalist 
rebellion arise.  In the novel, Nyasha lends her own voice to this call while 
Babamukuru futilely attempts to curtail her individuation in order to protect his 
professional position.  In tandem with her frequent arguments with Babamukuru, 
Nyasha’s endocryptic identification with Babamukuru’s failed racial assimilation 
manifests as her frequent refusal to eat.  She often purges when she does.  Nyasha 
both takes on and takes in—even as she resists by purging—her father’s unaddressed 
grief over his failure to racially assimilate.  Her eating “disorder” emaciates her 
adolescent female form.18  Having offloaded his failure onto Nyasha, Babamukuru’s 
male body remains unmarked.  Nyasha’s femininity, however, prevents her from 
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bolstering Babamukuru’s quest for racial identification through gender.  Nyasha’s 
secret, of the father’s repeated failure to assimilate, eats her gendered body alive.   
Nervous Conditions depicts Nyasha’s struggle with the narratives of maturity 
offered to her.  The breakdown of her body is a metaphor for the necessity of making 
a choice.  Nyasha’s struggle against the narratives of maturity her gender, class, and 
racial position offer doom her to fail in all forms of mimicry as not quite.  Nyasha’s 
diminishing body is a visual testimony of her struggle to negotiate two narratives of 
maturity, that of the colonized native of privilege and that of the emergent 
postcolonial nation.19  In contrast, Tambu’s family’s poverty insures her survival.  
She has no chance at class, racial, or gender identification; Tambu’s multiple 
positions as outsider allow her to tell Nyasha’s story.   
In turn, Nyasha’s decline and hospitalization instructs Tambu—it plants the 
“seed of doubt” in her mind about the deleterious psychic effects of her convent 
education (203).  The haunting “seed” of doubt is Nyasha’s ghostly body, a catalyst 
to Tambu’s development as the postcolonial citizen Nyasha may or may not become.  
Tambu’s maturation allows her to process what she has seen of colonialism and what 
it does to the native body.  Nyasha’s and Tambu’s mother’s wasting bodies tell her 
that “our Government was not a good one” (103).  When the real-life Smith bans all 
Black Nationalist political activity in the late 1970s, rebels launch Chimurenga 
(guerilla warfare for national independence).20  The independent nation of Zimbabwe, 
established April 18, 1980, is built on the graves of twenty-five thousand freedom 
fighters.21  I read Nyasha’s skeletal body, her broken crypt, as a metaphor for the 
struggle and rebirth of the postcolonial nation.   
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Maps traces the native’s embrace of neocolonial nationalism in blood on the 
bodies of Askar and on his multiple black mother figures in the Ogaden and in 
Mogadiscio during the Somali-Ethiopian war.  Askar’s birth and early childhood are 
set against the historical backdrop of the Somali state’s support of ethnic Somali 
rebels in the Ogaden region demanding independence from Ethiopia.22  In the novel, 
as anti-colonial tensions in the Ogaden slowly coalesce into an organized armed 
independence struggle, Askar’s growing nationalism increasingly compromises the 
unconditional nature of his love for Misra, an Ethiopian immigrant who adopts him at 
birth.  Askar has episodes of hypochondriacal bleeding for both the actual wounds 
inflicted on Misra throughout the novel and at crucial moments in Ethiopia’s 
occupation of the Ogaden where Askar lives.  Askar repeatedly demonstrates his 
growing conviction that his nationalist desire to return the Ogaden to the Somali 
motherland invalidates Misra’s claim of inter-ethnic and transnational motherhood.  
Askar’s attempt to privilege nation over mother metaphorically wounds him and is 
destructive to Misra until he recognizes that the Somali cosmology of nation as clan 
is a cultural identification rather than a biological imperative.  Askar’s attempts to 
father a nation by denying the mother gender his vision of postcoloniality.  His 
inability to repair either the mother or the nation (which, to him, come to be the same 
thing) is destructive to both until he is able to mourn both losses and accept his role in 
nation building as ally and not savior.  The absence of wounds on his bloody body 
signifies his inability to gender the new nation as male.   
In both the novel and in history, Somalia invades the Ethiopian-held Ogaden 
in 1977.  Ethiopia expels the Somali forces in 1978 with assistance from the Soviet 
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Union.  At this moment of losing the Ogaden so conclusively, the dream of an intact 
motherland seems lost to many Somalis in both the real and fictional worlds.  Askar’s 
malaria and Misra’s kidnapping and murder by evisceration during this weekend 
symbolize the real national loss and subsequent collective mourning.23  In the novel, 
Misra’s mutilated body is washed clean of its blood by the water in which it is found.  
I read Misra’s mutilated but unbloody body, paired with Askar’s bleeding but 
unwounded body, as a metaphor for Somalia’s struggle for rebirth as an ungendered 
postcolonial nation. 
The Bildungs of Nyasha and Misra are nested within Tambu’s and Askar’s.  
Nyasha’s incomplete story is part of Tambu’s narrative, and Misra’s unfinished story 
is embedded in Askar’s.  Tambu’s trauma thus complicates Nyasha’s because Tambu, 
as narrator, obscures some evidence of Nyasha’s narrative of maturation with her 
own immature bumbling.  Likewise, Askar’s trauma complicates Misra’s because he 
obscures elements of her narrative through his own immaturity.  In Maps, Misra’s is 
the transnational body that serves as a metaphor of individual and national struggle 
for postcolonial identity.  Nesting multiple Bildungs that represent different 
nationalisms within the same Bildungsroman creates what Joseph Slaughter calls 
intertextual “reading genealogies” that transport the protagonists into an international 
rather than national imaginary (1418).24  As the narrating Bilds of Nervous 
Conditions and Maps, Tambu and Askar learn from Nyasha’s and Misra’s narratives 
of maturation during their own individual development.  While Nyasha is in recovery 
and Misra has not survived at the conclusion of their respective national liberation 
struggles, Tambu and Askar both continue to develop as mature adults, it is 
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suggested, after the new nations emerge.  At the moments that they relate these 
narratives, Tambu and Askar are poised with wisdom gained of experience and 
observance to be ideal postcolonial citizens.  In this sense, Nyasha’s and Misra’s 
testimonies of colonial trauma—of trying to survive colonialism—become primers to 
Tambu and Askar for surviving into postcoloniality.   
 
Testimonial Bodies 
Although Nervous Conditions and Maps hail from different geographical and 
cultural spaces, I examine them together because both represent individual 
testimonial bodies in service of social healing.  Similar testimonial modes in East and 
Southern Africa suggest a cross-cultural relationship between colonial history and 
traumatic processes.  Trauma and justice studies teach us that testimony is the route 
to surviving productively after having experienced traumatizing violence.  Because 
Nervous Conditions and Maps are framed as traumatic testimonies of colonial 
occupation, psychoanalysis helps us understand both the form and content of these 
African representations of traumatic suffering and mourning.  The vocabulary of 
trauma uncovers this testimonial literature’s political potential:  to initiate processes 
of social mourning.  The texts engage with Fanon’s questions of colonial subjectivity 
and his edict that discussing the traumas of the colonial encounter initiates recovery.  
But the representations also illuminate the limits of psychoanalytic potential for 
change:  Tambu’s refusal to hear Nyasha’s testimony and Askar’s rejection of his 
mother Misra symbolically kills them.   
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For me, the psychoanalytic vocabulary of trauma marshals the literary tropes 
of illness and mutilation in Nervous Conditions and Maps to illuminate the centrality 
of trauma, melancholia, and mourning to the postcolonial condition in a way that 
postcolonial criticism has not addressed.  For Claudia Tate, psychoanalysis fills a 
void in black literary scholarship by examining the ways in which black individuals 
internalize racialized experience to make “personal meaning” out of the tensions 
between the social “protocols of race” and individual desire—particularly when 
individual desires conflict with the collective’s national plot of “racial/social protest 
or affirmation” (Tate 15, 13, 14).  While postcolonial readings of Nervous Conditions 
and Maps do accommodate racial and social protest, they do not accommodate the 
complex melancholic and testimonial desires of Nyasha, Tambu, Misra, and Askar 
that are rarely only about race and sociality.  As an interpretive framework for reading 
black literature containing content that may not fit the traditional models, 
psychoanalysis opens up possibilities for new definitions, interpretations, and (social, 
generic) change.  In other words, psychoanalysis provides a vocabulary to discuss 
complexes of black desire in the context of racialized psychic trauma.  Clare 
Counihan argues that the field of postcolonial studies frames its questions of 
nationalism and identity by replacing racial with sexual difference so that the question 
of female desire is erased in the contexts of mourning and melancholia.25  Spivak 
echoes this concern, arguing that the discourses of patriarchy, imperialism, subject 
constitution, and object-formation obscure the figure of the woman, violently trapping 
her into a constructed “third-world woman” figuration “caught between tradition and 
modernization” (“Subaltern” 306).  Counihan asks:  What does the woman 
 47 
 
character’s presence or absence in the text “enable or prevent?” (162).  Nervous 
Conditions and Maps benefit especially from a psychoanalytic reading because 
tracking the figures of Nyasha and Misra helps us as readers to map the presence of 
female desire onto the ideological and epistemological terrains of the emerging 
postcolonial nation.   
I propose that we read Nervous Conditions and Maps for the changing figure 
of woman—Nyasha, Tambu, her mother Ma’Shingayi, Misra, Askar’s Aunt Salaado, 
and feminized Uncle Hilaal—because the primary testimony in each text is “hers” 
despite its mediation through a narrator.  In the novels, all relationships to traumatic 
testimony are fraught, and the reader must read behind the testimonial representations 
of Nyasha, Misra, and other feminized characters to determine not only what Tambu 
and Askar reveal as narrators, but also what they attempt to conceal.  Tambu and 
Askar create Nyasha’s and Misra’s stories as they tell them, and so Nervous 
Conditions and Maps are representations of worlds created—or worlded—within the 
texts.  In her commentary on “worlding” the so-called Third World in nineteenth-
century British novels, Spivak warns against underestimating the critical role that 
literature plays in cultural production and representation.26  Spivak’s notion of 
worlding, or writing a new world “on uninscribed earth” draws on the idea that the 
strife of creation is a detectable element in a text, and that representing this strife is 
the work that art undertakes (Critique 211; 115, note 4).27  European imperial 
expansion and colonization required adherence to the fiction of an uninhabited, 
“uninscribed” Africa, open to the inscription of a British version of “Africa” over the 
existing one.  The European’s worlding of Africa reinscribes the native as 
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nonexistent.  No longer a subject, the native must now view herself as other.  Nervous 
Conditions and Maps demonstrate the potential to world Africa again through their 
depiction of testimonial bodies.  In so doing, the literary representations make native 
bodies explicitly visible as texts marked by the strife of colonial occupation and 
violence.  Reading Nervous Conditions and Maps in a psychoanalytic context allows 
us to understand that in the novels, colonized testimonial bodies suggest the potential 
for a transnational, trans-gendered identity as the postcolonial re-inscription of Africa.  
 
The Cryptophore’s Secret in Nervous Conditions 
The colonial project of civilizing the natives presents the native racialized 
body as only and always partially assimilable through colonial mimicry, and 
guaranteed to fail.  When Tambu wonders if her uncle Babamukuru’s apparently 
successful mimicry, evidenced in his appointment to headmaster of the mission 
school, was in part facilitated by “unspeakable forces” (64), she may be asking:  did 
Babamukuru achieve his position in a manner about which he is unable to speak 
because that manner is incorporated mimicry?   
Bhabha suggests that the purpose of colonialism’s civilizing mission is to train 
the native to mimic the colonizer.  And, indeed, colonial education stressed colonial 
mimicry not as a means of grooming new colonial citizens, but as a means of training 
the native “mimic men” as a labor force.28  In Nervous Conditions, missionaries want 
to train certain Africans “to be useful to them,” thus framing “becoming” British as 
tantamount to becoming civilized and climbing up the Family Tree of Man toward 
 49 
 
whiteness (48, 14).  The goal of colonial mimicry is thus not to produce sameness but 
to highlight difference in the fact of repeated attempts at sameness.   
The native’s mimicry negates the self by affirming the other, appropriating 
racist attitudes toward herself in the form of illness that manifests as a preemptive 
strike against dismissal by the dominant culture.  Babamukuru’s employment of a 
black African servant, Anna, who must kneel in the family’s presence and serve its 
English meals, simultaneously affirms and mimics British colonial domination of the 
African.  When the desire to achieve a racial ideal meets guaranteed failure, and the 
lost fulfillment is not mourned productively, the failure can produce racial narcissism, 
or melancholia.  Cheng’s notion of “racial melancholia,” or the simultaneous 
incorporation of the other, is based in Freud’s notion of melancholia (73).29  For 
Cheng, colonial mimicry is the incorporation of a failed bodily ego of an ideal other:  
the white body “it has been told it has forever lost and never had” (53-54).  In colonial 
discourse, the black body is so alien to ideal whiteness that “the black body is formed 
by deformation” (Cheng 53-54).  While Bhabha and Fanon’s language on this point 
refer solely to colonized men, Cheng suggests that the black woman could also 
respond hypochondriacally to melancholic incorporation of the racial other.   
Traumatic suffering is characterized by a lack, an unmet desire, and 
Dangarembga’s characterization of Babamukuru illustrates this idea.  Although he is 
the headmaster of the mission school, Babamukuru receives inferior housing 
accommodations and he will never advance “beyond a manageable level” of “good” 
African (19, 107).  Unfulfilled desires produce unintended outcomes that, left 
unattended, can manifest in the individual as schizophrenia.30  Schizophrenia is a 
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diagnosable, “marked social or occupational dysfunction” (“Schizophrenia” 274),31 
and the schizophrenic cannot couple with other entities.  She is thus marked as 
dysfunctional within the social system and may develop the fantasy of hyper-
functionality within that same social system.  The native’s attempt to exist in the 
colony’s patriarchal society is marked by physical and social schizophrenia.  Tambu’s 
cousin Nyasha is also thusly marked.  Nyasha cannot, try as she might, perform the 
colony’s behavioral expectations for black women.  She attempts to compensate in 
other ways, like over-studying. 
Louise Demers writes that inattention to unfulfilled desires is unproductive 
mourning.  This melancholia contributes to the formation of a narcissistic personality 
disorder clinically characterized by “a grandiose sense of self-importance” and 
preoccupation with “fantasies of unlimited success, power, brilliance, beauty, or ideal 
love” that elevates the sufferer to a position of privilege (658).32  This is Babamukuru 
and Nyasha, but the psychic wounds manifest differently for the two characters.  
The ineffectually mourning parent, Babamukuru is an ectopic mourner.33  He 
addresses his loss through unproductive or unhealthy mourning processes, which are 
masking or distancing strategies designed to hide the lost object within the sufferer’s 
psyche, away from his consciousness, in order to avoid knowing about or feeling the 
pain of that loss.  Babamukuru functions as if he has not suffered the loss of bumping 
the glass ceiling of racial division.  As his wife Maiguru points out, he runs his home 
and his family as the exemplary patriarch, imposing Christian observances under the 
guise of familial benevolence by financing two-week Christmas celebrations and 
Tambu’s parents’ wedding.  He even finances the celebration party honoring his 
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return from Europe.  In these acts, Babamukuru performs the role of one whose 
economic status exceeds that of his peers.  They are a series of repeated attempts to 
erase the racial division that separates mimicry from being.  Babamukuru’s mimicry is 
all-encompassing:  he appropriates English table customs, home décor, and fastidious 
attention to proper Western dress, evidenced in the household’s emphasis on 
bleaching his white shirts.  Like his displays of wealth and piety, the shirts are white 
masks with which Babamukuru repeatedly attempts to cover his black skin, metaphors 
of repeated and futile attempts at racial identification. 
In psychoanalysis, the ectopic parent unconsciously designates a child as a 
repository and mask for his grief.  He thus escapes having to address his grief directly.  
The child designated to act as both crypt and cryptic for the parent’s (or a previous 
generation’s) unresolved grief is a cryptophore.  I mean to use both “crypt” and 
“cryptic” in their psychoanalytic contexts to evoke metaphors of the tomb (crypt) and 
that which cannot be defined (cryptic).  For me, both terms emphasize that the 
incorporating self has both buried the object in a tomb (crypt) and obscured any 
awareness of the lost object’s existence (encryption).  Both the entombed object and 
its tomb are obscured and buried—both are encrypted.   
The arrangement is unhealthy to the child who is compelled to unknowingly 
carry the parent’s crypt, “a rejected and unmanageable part” of the parent’s ego 
(Demers 31).34  The cryptophore struggles with her unconscious relationship to an 
unnamed ghost, the crypt of her parent.  In Nervous Conditions, Nyasha is a 
cryptophore for her father’s unresolved mourning and subsequent incorporation of his 
failed attainment of the white racial ideal.  Nyasha is as Anglicized as a black African 
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woman can be.  But Anglicization during her preteen years has replaced and thus 
robbed her of a Shona cultural education during her formative period.  Babamukuru’s 
offloaded crypt is built on “the narcissistic importance” of his failed racial 
identification and on his guilt over the “secret misdemeanor” of negating his African 
self in this racially melancholic incorporation of the white ideal (Demers 36).  He has 
“ingested” English letters, or education, and he glories in the adoration he receives as 
a “been-to” even though valuing his Westernization delegitimizes Shona culture 
(Dangarembga 36). 
Even as trauma itself is unspeakable, its presence in the psyche creates a 
language, or cryptology, as a means of representing the event to the survivor.35  
Cryptic mourning moves from the psychic in the first generation to the somatic in 
successive generations.  The incorporating ego marshals the resources of the self—
language, behavior, bodily states, or several of these simultaneously—to support its 
magical fiction of compensation.  Thus, the encryption of the object obscures the 
presence of that object in its crypt.  Yet, as much as incorporation attempts to obscure 
the accurate representation, or meaning, of the object and of its repression, the fact of 
its repression is actually an accurate and timeless representation.  Incorporation is 
characterized by the tension between the lost object’s proximity and invisibility.  This 
is the basis of racial melancholia, which is the incorporation of the ideal, unracialized 
self.  The entombing crypt is in turn engraved with the markings of the object’s 
interment.        
Babamukuru’s failure to identify with the white racial ideal is entombed within 
Nyasha so that he can avoid admitting to and grieving for his failure.  His failure 
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engraves itself on her body, which marshals its resources in a hypochondriacal 
enactment of her father’s melancholia.  Nyasha’s incorporative bond with the lost 
object has redefined her desires, but her incorporating body’s new desire for secrecy is 
ambivalent.   In psychoanalysis, the cryptophore wants desperately to tell a listener of 
the intergenerational crime she carries, but to put the unnamable into words would 
explode her reason for being and kill her.  To protect her parent’s crypt, argue 
Abraham and Torok, the cryptophore exchanges her own identity for a “fantasmic,” 
endocryptic identification with the “life” that the parent has lost “as a result of some 
metapsychological traumatism” (“Lost” 142).36  Nyasha thus incorporates and 
encrypts Babamukuru’s failure to become English through her own hyper-mimicry of 
Englishness in the two areas of Babamukuru’s own greatest exercises of mimicry:  
education and eating.  She tells Tambu she is “on a diet” “to discipline” her body and 
mind, internalizing the trauma and broadcasting it hypochondriacally as an eating 
disorder (196-97).  She zealously replaces food with studying for the Form Three 
entrance examinations to avoid capitalizing on the admission guaranteed by her 
father’s status as a “good African” headmaster (107).  Babamukuru’s position is 
based, of course, on his incorporation of the English other.  Nyasha’s compulsive 
studying despite guaranteed academic advancement masks her anxiety:  she tells 
Tambu that to stop working is to start worrying.  But her body testifies her secret:  
“she [looks] drawn and [she has] lost so much of her appetite that it show[s] all over 
her body in the way the bones cre[ep] to the surface” (107).  Nyasha says her nervous 
condition is about more than food but that she does not know why she purges it.  She 
only knows that she is “not coping very well” (189-90).  She studies obsessively for 
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academic advancement which will, she hopes, garner Babamukuru’s approval of her 
perceived success at mimicry and thus prevent her from being haunted by the specter 
of failed identification. 
Abraham and Torok have noticed that the cryptophore uses her body rather 
than her voice to testify her parent’s encrypted secret crime, acting out the 
entombment of the lost object.37  The changing body performs the testimony of 
trauma that the repressing ego encrypts.  The body and the ways it changes through its 
use of illness to mask repression simultaneously performs a traumatic testimony.  The 
endocryptic body is both mask and marker of the crypt in which the ego hides the 
object.  Nyasha’s bodily illness belies the simultaneous ambivalence of the 
cryptophore’s competing attempts to mask and broadcast Babamukuru’s unresolved 
grief.  Nyasha is “too svelte:”  her body testifies her traumatic suffering because her 
mouth cannot (197).  In three months, Nyasha shrivels from too thin to “skeletal” and 
withdrawn, with diminished cognitive ability and motor skills—she weaves when she 
walks (198).  Nyasha’s struggle is writ on her body so clearly that Tambu notices her 
weight “drop[s] off her body almost hourly” (199).  Nyasha’s body has become 
“grotesquely unhealthy” because she vomits her “vital juices” down a Western toilet 
(199), literally purging her own life force into that of Western industrialization. 
Endocryptic identification marks Nyasha’s cryptophore body with the history 
of Babamukuru’s psychic pathology.  Babamukuru’s colonial mimicry is Nyasha’s 
parasite, literally starving her body.  Her eating disorder begins when Tambu’s brother 
Nhamo arrives to live with her family in order to attend the mission school as part of 
Babamukuru’s plan to educate representative family members.  Babamukuru’s plan 
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belies not only his own efforts at mimicry, but also his hope to create additional 
“mimic men” in the family.  Soon thereafter, we see Nyasha’s body growing “a little 
duller and dimmer,” as though she is “directing her energy inward” in an 
incorporative gesture (52).  Nyasha’s wasting body is a manifestation and symptom of 
her ego trying to protect Babamukuru’s secret misdemeanor, and a symptom and 
manifestation of her simultaneous attempt to expose it.  Nyasha’s marked body names 
Babamukuru’s crime, and Tambu’s mother Ma’Shingayi correctly reads mimicry’s 
pathology on it:  “‘It’s the Englishness,’ she sa[ys].  ‘It’ll kill them all if they aren’t 
careful’” (202).  Ma’Shingayi “wo[n]’t say much about Nyasha.  ‘About that one we 
don’t even speak.  It’s [Nyasha’s body] speaking for itself’” (203).  Critics typically 
read Nyasha’s illness as evidence of her own realized attempt at mimicry.  To an 
extent this may be true, but I believe that Nyasha’s illness is much more complicated.   
Abraham and Torok observe that the incorporative fantasy is predicated on an 
impulse to symbolically repair the actual injury to the ideal object:  “the 
[cryptophore’s] fantasy of incorporation reveals a utopian wish that the memory of the 
affliction had never existed or, on a deeper level, that the affliction had had nothing to 
inflict” (“Mourning” 134).38  The root cause of Nyasha’s eating disorder is located in 
Babamukuru’s self, not Nyasha’s.  She is trapped into mourning his unmourned failed 
racial ideal in addition to her own.  Nyasha’s hypochondriacal relationship with 
English food is a bodily manifestation of her psychic suffering.  Nyasha’s condition is 
less a product of racial identification than of economic and social privilege which 
enables both her encounter with the assimilative mandate (of colonial mimicry) and 
her hypochondriacal response to it.  Tambu, whose poverty has denied her access to 
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the economic “opportunities” which Nyasha has encountered, recognizes that Nyasha 
can afford to be choosy about whether to seize or refuse “opportunities” because she 
is affluent (179).  The poor, like Tambu, instead have to “take whatever chances 
c[o]me” (179).  Nyasha’s illness stems from a complex nexus of racial and gender 
subordinations intertwined with economic privilege and unattended grief.  Looking at 
the illness from only one of these perspectives ignores the other contributing factors.  
The text suggests two ways Nyasha might escape the burden of Babamukuru’s failed 
racial identification.  First, she might achieve Babamukuru’s failed racial 
identification with the ideal other in his place.  To do so, she must repeat her father’s 
incorporation of the white racial ideal through her own performance of white 
femininity.  Second, Nyasha might remove his need to mimic whiteness through her 
own embrace of Black Nationalism.   
Cheng suggests that white feminine beauty is part of gendering the 
construction of the ideal national subject.39  The girly girl who values the white male 
protector is the sign of Western national femininity and the gendered other who 
emphasizes through difference the white masculine ideal.  Where whiteness sets the 
standard for beauty, the body which is not white has two choices:  distance itself from 
whiteness or strive toward it.  For the female racialized other, conformity to white 
femininity is the height of mimicry in a white dominant culture.  The racialized 
woman’s performance of gender identification creates the fantasy of racial 
identification.  The beautiful black woman who performs a fiction of ideal beauty 
convinces no one that she is white.  She relocates the question of identification to the 
realm of fantasy, thus erasing the problem of addressing racial disparity in reality.  
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The fact of performance both highlights and erases the question of difference.  In 
certain ways, Nyasha repeats Babamukuru’s incorporation of the white racial ideal so 
successfully that Tambu’s early impression of her equates “Anglicized” with 
“glamorous” (76).   
Understanding the difference between notions of performance and 
performativity clarify the difference between Nyasha’s and Babamukuru’s 
relationships to femininity.  Race and gender shape the nature and experience of both 
trauma and cure, and Judith Butler demonstrates that Western conceptualizations of 
both race and gender are performances based on cultural representations that they in 
turn reinforce.40  She asks whether the female body is the source of cultural-political 
systems of gender, or if these forces in fact shape the female body.  Behavior suggests 
a certain type of identity, Butler suggests.  The behavior marks or contorts the body’s 
surface to suggest a particular internal essence to onlookers.  This essence is a fiction 
sustained by cultural signs and discourse.  For Butler, the performative element of 
gender is the social fiction that assigns arbitrary “gender” to a set of behaviors and 
social cues.  Performance is the individual’s acting out the agreed-upon social cues 
and in turn being understood by onlookers as a particular gender based upon the set of 
cues enacted. 
John Noyes suggests that performance can function as an act of representation 
that subverts a repressive social infrastructure by de-literalizing the violent actions 
upon which the structure is based.41  Noyes examines what he regards as an emerging 
awareness of sadomasochistic (s/m) sexuality and sexual imagery in post-apartheid 
South African culture.  Noyes sees a crucial distinction between simulated s/m 
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performance and the actual practices of racialized and gendered sex and violence 
which South African s/m participants, black and white, reenact.  South Africa remains 
marred by high incidences of sexual and other violence and, to Noyes, the 
performative nature of s/m provides a means of eroticizing the navigation of gendered 
and “racially coded power relations” (148) via representation rather than literal action.  
The political effect of representation allows black-white s/m interactions to reenact 
and transgress racialized and gendered prohibitions and hierarchies.  The 
performances thus play out fantasies of access to and wielding social power that is 
unavailable in reality.  Performing the prohibited undoes the prohibition, particularly 
if the performance is a fantasy representation and not a literal act in the realm of 
reality.  Fantasy performance of the prohibited fills the void created by adherence to 
that same prohibition in reality.  Performance based on fantasy thus conceptualizes—
in other words, names—that which is named only in the prohibitive (i.e., negative).  
Fantasy, in its invocation of language and awareness, represents a potential for cure.  
Nyasha’s performance of Western beauty from the space of the other ungenders and 
unraces her because she becomes both seer and seen, gazing at her own performance 
of womanliness while simultaneously being the woman who performs beauty.  Her 
perceived conformity to white beauty is so successful that her black female classmates 
resent her for it:  “she thinks she is white,” they “sneer” (94). 
Gendered and ungendered bodies experience racial melancholia in dissimilar 
ways; therefore their diseased bodies function differently in the colonial social 
structure.  Gender difference disrupts the magic perfection of Nyasha’s incorporation.  
She has internalized the Western beauty ideal of thinness through dieting to prevent 
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growing “fat” to the extent that she has incorporated and fears conforming bodily to 
the racist stereotype of the African woman’s “large backside” (91).42  The dinner 
table, and specifically the act of eating, is the site of Babamukuru’s greatest show of 
colonial mimicry and of Nyasha’s greatest endocryptic display of her role as 
Babamukuru’s designated cryptophore.  The entire eating process in Babamukuru’s 
home is Anglicized.  It is thus the site of Nyasha’s greatest clash with Babamukuru.  
When Babamukuru says, “you’ll eat the food we bought you!” (189-90), it unleashes a 
series of struggles manifested in Nyasha’s vacillating relationship with food.  While 
her family eats English food at the English dinner hour, says English “grace” prior to 
the meal, uses English tableware, and is served by an African servant, Nyasha 
struggles with the question of eating European food.  Nyasha frequently refuses to eat 
and then binges and purges.  The binge is obedience; refusal and purge are resistance. 
Her refusal to digest Babamukuru’s food is the heart of Nyasha’s endocryptic 
identification because it belies her preoccupation with female white ideals of beauty.  
Nyasha’s eating disorder is an ambivalent navigation between embracing British food 
and dieting to achieve the European ideal of thinness as proof of British-ness.  The 
problem is that, in a patriarchal system, men and women have different relationships 
to food.  The male is head of the house and family, provider of the food, and authority 
at the table.  The female’s relationship to food in that system is to receive it as 
provision from the male as well as to avoid excess consumption of it in maintenance 
of thinness as beauty.  Because Nyasha’s body is gendered differently than 
Babamukuru’s, her relationship to the food on his table is in part contradictory to their 
shared task of mimicry and encryption.  The site of Nyasha’s greatest endocryptic 
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identification is also that of Babamukuru’s greatest need of her as crypt, and this is the 
source of their greatest clash.   
In a last, desperate bid to maintain Babamukuru’s crypt, Nyasha embraces 
Black Nationalism, but the crypt is already cracking, undone by patriarchal gendering.  
She attempts to remove Babamukuru’s failure and his crime by removing the need for 
mimicry and thus racial suicide.  Eventually, she can no longer incorporate 
Babamukuru’s racial melancholia if doing so means continuing to internalize racism 
against herself.  Her body echoes her words as “she beg[ins] to rock, her body 
quivering tensely.  ‘I won’t grovel.  Oh no, I won’t.  I’m not a good girl.  I’m evil’,” 
she says, acknowledging her refusal to aspire to her father’s position of “good 
African” (200).  Nyasha calls British literature “fairy tales,” turning instead to 
histories of racialized trauma in search of solutions in the “facts” (93).  She sees and 
draws attention to “things you’d rather not talk about” and “exposes frivolity we think 
we need” (97).  When Babamukuru gets Ma’Shingayi’s sister Lucia a job as a cook at 
the mission, Nyasha refuses to join the others’ admiration of his benevolence, arguing 
instead that, “based on history,” Babamukuru’s status in the colonial administration 
obligates him to help poor blacks like Lucia (159).  Nyasha has begun to view 
Babamukuru and other influential blacks who help those like Lucia out of familial 
obligation rather than racial solidarity as “historical artifact[s]” of colonialism (160), 
impeding the potential for postcolonial social transformation.  While Tambu and 
Nyasha’s entire family busily emulates the “beautiful” whites, Nyasha busily watches 
Tambu’s very un-English family, rehearsing Shona and studying their social rules 
“with an intensity that ma[kes] her uncomfortable” (104, 52).  Later, Nyasha becomes 
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obsessed with making clay pots, but neither as play or as water carriers, their primary 
utility.  To Nyasha, making pots is a serious “hobby” of crafting pen holders (149-50).  
Nyasha’s attempt mimics the purpose of the pots as holders, but fails to replicate their 
full practicality.  In the end, as with her claywork, Nyasha’s illness is a manifestation 
of her unfulfilled desire to become Shona, not her failure to achieve the racial ideal of 
Englishness.43  Her attempt to become Shona is a reparative attempt to resuscitate the 
African self that Babamukuru has killed in his incorporative embrace of colonial 
mimicry, to try to achieve the white racial ideal.   
This particular body, Nyasha’s, and its marking (emaciation) is used as 
testimony to illuminate the notion that the testimonial body must die when the crime 
is named and the end of secrecy begins.  Her search for an analyst is her first attempt 
at exposing Babamukuru’s secret:  in psychoanalysis, cryptophores go to the analyst 
to give themselves up.  Typically, the cryptophore protects her self and the secret by 
enlisting the analyst as an accomplice in secrecy.  In the novel, when Nyasha’s white 
analyst dismisses her diseased body because “Africans [do] not suffer in the way we 
had described” (201), he refuses to see her body’s testimony of the historical 
pathology of colonial mimicry.  He also refuses to help Nyasha protect Babamukuru’s 
secret and so, in effect, sentences her to death in three ways.  First, he negates the 
story that is her bodily testimony.44  Second, he guarantees that Nyasha will attempt to 
reveal Babamukuru’s secret to another witness even though confession will kill her 
reason for being.  Finally, he invalidates the reality that is the confluence of Nyasha’s 
African body and its visible marking by a disease he associates only with the white 
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feminine ideal.  Excluding Nyasha from white femininity returns her to African-ness, 
removing her from the world and symbolically killing her.   
Nyasha’s parents bring her to the psychiatrist after she has an episode that, she 
assures Tambu, is only the beginning:  “There’s a whole lot more,” she says.  “I’ve 
tried to keep it in but it’s powerful.  It ought to be.  There’s nearly a century of it” 
(201).  Nyasha’s outburst is her final endocryptic display, writing the unspeakable 
onto her body:   
 
shredding her history books between her teeth (“Their history.  Fucking 
liars.  Their bloody lies.”), breaking mirrors, her clay pots, anything she 
[can] lay her hands on and jabbing the fragments viciously into her 
flesh, stripping the bedclothes, tearing her clothes from the wardrobe 
and trampling them underfoot.  (201)   
 
But this time, Nyasha speaks with her voice as well as with her body.  Before her 
explosion, she tells Tambu, “I don’t want to do it, Tambu, really I don’t, but it’s 
coming, I feel it coming” (200).  Then, “her eyes dilated,” she confesses the secret she 
can no longer protect:  “‘They’ve done it to me,’ she accuse[s], whispering” (200, 
201).  Nyasha continues:  “They did it to them too. . . .  To both of them, but 
especially to him.  They put him through it all. . . .  Daddy grovels to them.  We 
grovel to him” (200).  If groveling is Nyasha’s term for mimicry—for failed 
assimilation—then she traces the genealogy of shame from colonizer to colonized 
adult, to colonized child. 
Unburdening her self of Babamukuru’s secret, Nyasha opens the crypt.  Her 
bony body is now both testimony and metaphor for the shattered crypt.  Nyasha 
releases the lost object and opens the path for herself, if not for her father, of working 
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through intergenerational traumatic suffering.  The social nature of testimony—and in 
particular the fact that the testimony changes the responsible witness—implies the 
potential for social transformation born of the suffering of the victim.  The task for 
Nyasha is to find not only a witness, but a responsible one as well.  “I’m afraid,” she 
tells Tambu, “It upsets people.  So I need to go somewhere where it’s safe.  You know 
what I mean?  Somewhere where people won’t mind” (201).  Tambu, Nyasha’s 
chosen witness, is eventually able to read, see, and hear Nyasha’s testimony but it is 
so much later, the text suggests through Nyasha’s example, that, ultimately, the most 
visible testimony of colonialism is the native Nyasha’s skeletal, almost spectral body.  
While Nyasha’s individual rebellion “may not in the end have been successful” (1), 
the text suggests that Nyasha’s part in the collective rebellion may have succeeded.45   
Nyasha’s body, emaciated, scarred from her cutting episode, is a microcosm 
of the larger written recording of her story and that of her community.  The novel 
Nervous Conditions, we learn at the end, is itself Tambu’s later recording of the 
events narrated.  Perhaps the near-death experience of Nyasha’s testimonial body is 
necessary to instruct the reader.  After all, Freud tells us that the price of melancholia 
is suicide.  Nyasha’s self-induced starvation is, at the very least, part of a slow, 
painful suicidal gesture.  The novel that ends long after the near-death experience of 
its primary character can serve as a testimony of that character’s suffering in life; it 
can also illustrate the severity of unsuccessful mourning.  If the character is a 
metaphor for the community, then the ambiguity surrounding Nyasha’s survival sends 
a formidable message to the builders of postcolonial Zimbabwe:  a message of the 




Bleeding for the Mother(Land) in Maps 
I have shown that Nyasha’s diminishing colonized female body testifies of the 
multigenerational pathology of colonial mimicry in Nervous Conditions, leaving the 
colonized male body physically unmarked.  I will now read representations of 
bleeding in Maps as the ambivalent relationship between motherhood and national 
independence.  In Maps, both male and female colonized bodies display the 
pathology of colonial domination in varying degrees of severity.  In the novel, the 
colonized male body bleeds from symbolic wounds in the mouth and on the groin.  
Colonized feminized bodies also bleed, but this blood appears at sites of actual 
wounding, most often from reproductive malady and excision.  That blood marks 
both male and female bodies in the novel speaks to the Somali cultural significance of 
blood.  In Somali cosmology, blood’s role is primarily reproductive, and the power of 
reproductive blood is revered.  It is the vehicle for and marker of female reproductive 
capacity, casting a woman of child bearing age as the embodiment of the life force.  
Farah tells an interviewer, “from the earliest times, the magic of creation was seen as 
residing in the blood of women retained in the womb and which was thought to 
coagulate into a baby” (“Conversation”).47  In many African communities, women’s 
reproductive power affords them special status among both women and men who 
have respected the fertile woman’s crucial role in preserving the health, well-being, 
and longevity of the community since before colonial intervention.48  In Somali 
cosmology, reproductive blood also denotes and symbolizes familial, clan, and 
national belonging.  Somali nationhood is predicated on the ideology that all ethnic 
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Somalis descend from a common ancestor, Samaale, and that all of those descendents 
belong to one of six clan families.  “Blood is where we all began,” Farah says, “blood 
our ancestor, blood our kinship, blood, the thicker the better, our immediate family 
unit” (“Conversation”).   
In Somali cosmology, clan is nation.  In the novel and in the Somali belief 
system, to wound the mother is to wound the nation.  Motherhood and nationality are 
unstable terrains in Maps, exploding colonial definitions of both notions and 
demanding new conceptions of both.  In Somali mytho-reality and in the novel, 
motherhood and nationality are cultural rather than biological identities.  In a culture 
predicated on bloodlines that are often symbolic, Maps represents motherhood and 
nationality as divorced from the biological moorings colonial discourse imposes.  The 
only mother with whom Askar shares a biological tie is his birthmother Arla who dies 
immediately after giving birth, possibly even before putting the infant to breast.  
Because Askar is given many other mothers in the novel, motherhood is represented 
in Maps as divorced from biology.  Misra, Askar’s family maid, is allowed to 
informally adopt the newborn whom she discovers near his birthmother’s corpse.  
Akar’s maternal Uncle Hilaal and Hilaal’s wife Salaado later formally adopt Askar to 
secure his safety from the worsening violence in the Ogaden by documenting his 
Somali citizenship and establishing Mogadiscio residency.  Motherhood is also 
ungendered and disconnected from genealogical precedent in the person of Hilaal who 
“live[s] in the contradictory roles of ‘Mother’ to [Askar] and Salaado” (156).  Later, 
Hilaal and Salaado also formally adopt Misra to sponsor her Somali citizenship and 
capitol residency for reasons of safety as well.  That Hilaal is a mother figure to his 
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wife, son, and to his son’s previous mother further disrupts generational difference as 
a precursor to parenthood and produces interesting conversations on traditions of 
genealogy.  The novel’s representations of multiple adoptions both subvert and 
critique the state’s attempt to regulate the family unit as a means of protecting national 
solidarity and security.   
In Maps, the boundaries of both motherhood and motherland Somalia are 
repeatedly attacked and eviscerated.  David Laitin and Said Samatar find that as long 
as any Somali-inhabited territory belongs to neighboring nation-states, Somalis feel 
like a “dismembered nation” (67).49  The national project is to rejoin dispersed ethnic 
Somalis, now nationals of Ethiopia, Kenya, and Djibouti, into one state.  To some 
members of the African community and in particular to Somalia’s neighbors, the 
Somali compulsion to reattach the three excised constituencies onto the Somali 
national body “borders on the obsessive” (Laitin and Samatar 67), and former 
Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassie garnered a generous share of international 
sympathy for his beleaguered Eastern border.  But more so than obsession with 
kinship and borders, practicality drives Somali nationalism.  In part because of a deep 
ideological sense of clan, ethnic, and national brotherhood, and in part because of the 
fragile material balance Somalis have reached with the desert’s scarce resources, 
mutilation of the national body erodes the potential for individual survival and the 
health of the entire pastoral community.50  Somalis share a communal work ethic, so 
the division of communities of workers via state borders results in alienation from the 
African community, economic crisis, and famine.  Psychic and somatic traumas 
follow in the forms of loss and alienation.   
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Of particular concern to many Somalis is the return of the Ethiopian-held 
Ogaden which lies between Somalia and Ethiopia and is home to about four million 
ethnic Somalis.  Many Somalis view a Somalia without the Ogaden as a mutilated 
motherland, a symbolic mother figure cut off from her child.  On late twentieth-
century Western maps of Africa, Ethiopia juts sharply into Somalia, forming a wide-
angled point that opens Somalia into a long, thin crescent.  Somalia looks more like a 
border strip along Ethiopia’s edge than a neighboring nation.  The visual effect is one 
of mammoth penetration, almost bisection.  Maps describes the territory penetrating 
into Somalia’s opened curve as the “Ogaden/child separated from her” (101).  It is 
then used to penetrate her.  In the novel, Askar draws maps of Somalia as a hobby.  
He marks the Ogaden “Western Somalia” because, to him, “the Ogaden was always 
an integral part of Somalia” (227).  Interestingly, Askar does not describe the 
Ogaden’s occupation in terms of geographic rape.  Instead, he divests Ethiopia of its 
phallic power over the Ogaden.  Askar describes the region’s shift in ownership in 
passive terms like “wrung out of Somali hands” and “returned to Ethiopian hands,” 
terms that relocate the power of the transaction from Ethiopia to its Soviet backers 
(21, 182).    
The novel represents the fractured native body as the individual’s ideological 
and metaphorical loss of identity when the integrity of the national body is 
compromised.  It does so primarily in the figure of Misra, but also in its 
representations of news reports of mutilated war casualties and survivors.  The news 
stories of mutilations mark the dissolution of national unity:  cannibalism, torture, and 
war wounds tell stories of “fragmented bodies” as much as the “fragmented bodies” 
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themselves tell stories of individual and social trauma (160-61).  As the nation is a 
symbolic mother to the Somali individual, Misra’s increasingly mutilated body—
through mastectomy, abortion, beating—suggests that the loss of a healthy mother is 
tantamount to losing the ideal, or unified, nation.  In Somali culture, the son-to-mother 
bond is of paramount importance.  In a cultural context in which mother-son and 
intra-clan bonds define individual identity, Maps depicts Askar, for whom wholeness 
of the mother and nation are continually threatened and compromised.  In 
psychoanalytic theory, these repeated threats to wholeness could presage the potential 
for the individual to develop a narcissistic attachment to one or both of these entities 
in an attempt to preserve or reinstate the lost ideals.  The individual’s inability to 
release and mourn the loss of the imago—the image—of an ideal self linked with that 
of the ideal mother can inhibit his ability to individuate, or to develop separately as an 
individual.  In Maps, Askar’s sense of self is tied up in his expectations of a unified 
Somalia and a physically intact mother.  Psychoanalysis tells us that when the ideal 
self is symbiotically tied to the ideal mother, the individual strives to preserve both 
images.  He cannot substitute more practical representations.51  In Maps, Askar’s 
inability to mourn the linked lost ideals of self and mother sometimes prevents him 
from viewing Misra as anything but foreign and himself as anything but motherless.  
He becomes dually obsessed with his mother(s).  First, he suspects that his birth 
precipitated Arla’s death.  Second, he is precociously conversant in Misra’s sexuality, 
which binds Askar to her in an eroticization of their earlier mother-son bodily bond.  
Misra’s sexuality also repels Askar.  This revelation is most evident in the scene in 
which Askar, a child, awakes during a storm of both rain and bomb blasts and sees his 
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toy “rifle” lying “astraddle on his own bed” and pointing at Misra’s head as she 
sleeps, supine, in her own bed (121).  Misra’s genitals are exposed in an unintended 
suggestion of sexual invitation.  Appalled, Askar chooses to “leave her be,” literally 
leaving the room (121, emphasis in original).  His reading of this scene as a violently 
erotic tableau and then leaving it behind illustrates his struggle between familial 
loyalty to Misra and the perceived threat of her sexual and ethnic difference.   
Askar’s discomfort with ethnic difference takes on the additional tenor of race.  
Fanon refers to the trauma of racism in the context of being a black man in a white-
dominant culture.  In the world depicted in Maps, however, the notion of “race” 
operates differently because the colonial conflict involves communities that are both 
black.  When referring to post-independence black African states, the global discourse 
community typically substitutes the term “ethnicity” for “race” to distinguish among 
ethnic groups or clans.  In the context of colonial occupation, however, regardless of 
the lack or presence of racial difference, colonizers and the colonized are divided.  
Immanuel Wallerstein argues that in the world community, skin color is irrelevant 
because the term “race” really means “class,” and racism maintains the global class 
hierarchy (199).52  The international class system racializes competing ethnic 
Ethiopian and Somali nationalisms depicted in Maps.  The Ethiopian-Somali divisor 
of “race” in the novel is grounded in both ethnicity and class, but Hilaal and Askar 
frequently take pains to situate the Ogaden war in an international context which 
aligns Ethiopia with the West and Somalia with Africa.  Internationalizing the conflict 
also racializes it in the global class system, effectively whitening Ethiopia and 
blackening Somalia.  Askar’s traumatic complex, which stems from Ethiopian claims 
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to the Ogaden, is thus racialized.  The only possible result of enforced racial 
identification which results in racial melancholia for the black man is “self-
objectification” and mutilation (Cheng 53-54).  Fanon laments:  “I took myself far 
from my own presence, far indeed, and made myself an object. . . .  What else could it 
be for me but an amputation, an excision, a hemorrhage that spattered my whole body 
with black blood?” (Black 112).  In the tradition Fanon relates, the colonized black 
man in the novel, Askar, acts out external and internalized racism, unknowingly and 
symbolically wielding the mutilating knife even as he bleeds for his mutilated 
mother’s wounds.   
In a psychoanalytic context, I read the bleeding on Askar’s body in Maps as 
the hypochondriacal expression of the symbolic colonial mutilations of the mother 
and the nation.  His wounds are metaphorical.  As a child, Askar distances himself 
from his immigrant mother Misra while training to “die and kill for his mother 
country,” symbolically trying to give birth to the new nation by “doing whatever it 
[takes] to be a man who [is] ready” (110).  Intent upon augmenting his masculinity in 
order to take the place of his father, a fallen freedom fighter for Ogaden liberation, 
Askar mimics the male-dominated rebel guerilla training exercises.  When he awakes 
one morning with a bloody groin, Askar is horrified that his own body may have 
“misbehaved” by functioning as female (110).  He misses, of course, the irony of his 
ambivalent, hyper-masculine appropriation of the female reproductive act, indicative 
of his attempt to father a unified Somalia by jettisoning his mother.  When Misra later 
divines from raw meat that Askar will travel to the coast and that “death and distress 
and disaster” await, Askar is elated by the promise of adventure, but then he “senses 
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something weird had taken place” and he tastes blood (119).  Although Askar does 
not understand it at the time, Misra has foretold her death and the fall of the Ogaden to 
Ethiopia.  Askar tastes the future bloodshed of Misra and Somalia’s would-be 
liberators. 
Elaine Scarry finds that pain’s relationship to knowing is based in the body.53  
A wound’s visible transgression of the body’s boundary renders the experience of 
pain sharable.  Witnessing pain, therefore, is social.  A visible weapon or bodily 
wound represents pain to the witness by association.  Non sufferers must see the 
weapon or the wound in order to believe that the sufferer is in pain, as if the object 
that creates the wound is the entity that carries the pain and not the body which has 
been invaded.  In this way, even though a weapon enters the body to produce pain 
inside it, the witness conceives of pain as external to the body.  In contrast, the 
unmarked, intact body that suffers an internal wound does not communicate the 
bodily experience of pain to another.  For the witness who is not in pain, hearing 
about instead of seeing pain is “to have doubt” (Scarry 5).     
Maps explodes Scarry’s paradigm that links the visible wound to pain.  The 
novel represents bloody bodies that are neither wounded nor in pain.  Askar’s 
woundless and painless bleeding removes the evidential nature of blood from the 
experience of pain.  Evidence of pain—blood—is remapped instead onto the intact 
body.  Askar’s bloody body, which should express the physical pain of a wound, 
signifies instead the absence of a wound on the male colonized body.  He appears 
instead to bleed for the wounds on the mother figure’s body, wounds that are invisible 
to the witness because they appear at sites of reproduction that are culturally rendered 
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private.  Misra’s abortion, Salaado’s ovariectomy, and Hilaal’s vasectomy are all 
rendered socially invisible on the material body.  Pain’s material and social 
invisibility renders it also politically invisible (Scarry 2).  Askar’s bleeding makes 
visible what is publicly and politically invisible:  reproductive wounds on the maternal 
body.  His bloody body proves the existence of maternal and national pain that the 
neocolonial community does not otherwise perceive as existing or worthy of political 
attention. 
The wounds of the mother figures in Maps cause infertility.  Askar perceives 
this infertility as a loss of reproductive autonomy on both the individual and national 
levels.  Betrayed by the mother figure’s infertile body, the son Askar tries to repair or 
reinstate maternal and national wholeness.  Although Askar does not remember doing 
so, Hilaal claims that he once suggested that Salaado and Misra should combine their 
mutilated bodies so that he “would have had a living mother with no organ partly 
mutilated or half removed!” (160).  Even at age seven, Askar seeks a reproducing 
mother in control of her body. 
Askar also seeks a unified nation that controls its borders by containing all of 
its ethnic members.  As the Somalia-Ethiopia conflict over claim to the Ogaden 
escalates, Askar’s growing Somali nationalism alienates him from Misra.  In the 
novel, when Somalia invades the Ogaden in 1977, it becomes dangerous in Askar’s 
hometown of Kallafo.  Qorrax sends Askar to live with his Uncle Hilaal and wife 
Salaado, childless academics in Mogadiscio.  Askar is thus forcibly removed from his 
transnational mother at a moment of uncertain national wholeness and transferred to a 
new, citizen mother in Somalia proper—an attempt to replace the nationally impure 
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mother in an internationally unstable region with a nationally pure mother in the state 
capital. 
A decade later, at seventeen and having failed to repair either the mutilated 
maternal or national bodies, Askar finds himself at a crossroads of how best to work 
toward Somali unification.  He debates with himself, with Hilaal, and with Salaado on 
whether to apply to university or join the Western Somali Liberation Front in its 
continuing struggle to liberate the Ogaden.  At this time, Misra arrives in Mogadiscio, 
beaten, gang-raped, ill, and exiled for her alleged role in the recent ambush of six 
hundred Ogaden rebels.  Askar becomes convinced that he must either kill Misra to 
avenge the deaths of his country men, or kill his country men to avenge the brutal 
violation of his mother.  For awhile, replacing the alien mother with allegiance to the 
motherland in the hope of achieving national wholeness seems, to Askar, to be the 
more pressing option.  Modern nationalism divides its populace even as it purports a 
fictive, homogeneous unity.  Westwood describes “this national imaginary,” to which 
Askar subscribes in the novel, as one “which privilege[s] one ethnicity over others, 
marginalizing diversity and presenting a monologic account of national memory and 
construction” (Westwood).  This privileged ethnicity usurps and becomes the national 
narrative, depicting inclusive unity yet excluding difference from the national 
discourse.  To Askar, Misra represents difference that must be purged from the Somali 
national imaginary, but their familial relationship complicates his need to expel her 
foreignness.  
Askar symbolically destroys the mother by shunning Misra when she arrives 
in Mogadiscio.  In so doing, Askar explodes the culturally paramount mother-son 
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bond.  Ironically, while Askar hopes to replace his mother with the nation, his 
dismissal of Misra temporarily undoes their familial bond and symbolically 
demolishes the clan-nation.  Askar’s attempt to repair the ideal mother and nation 
destroys both.  He soon begins to believe Misra’s claim of innocence, but he is too 
late.  In both history and in the novel, Ethiopia quashes resistance and regains the 
Ogaden.  That same weekend in the novel, Misra is found murdered, her heart 
removed.  
Askar’s investment in preserving an intact mother and motherland is selfish:  
by repairing them, he hopes to repair his lost ideal self.  His dilemma is that the 
colonized male body is gendered both male by patriarchy and female by racism.  He 
can expose but cannot heal the problems of individual or national mutilation because, 
as a man, he is ultimately part of the problem.  Askar’s role as a colonized man is 
simply to record the collective trauma of a mutilated motherland on his body.  Gilles 
Deleuze and Félix Guattari suggest that the mere existence of what they call the body 
without organs disrupts the productive forces of social desire.  The notion of a body 
without organs refers not to a material body but to a condition of imagelessness—in 
other words, the ideological opposite of a material body.  This condition of 
imagelessness is the same void of invisibility to which Mbembe argues that Western 
imperial discourse has rendered Africa and black Africans:  the colonizer forcibly 
removes the native from the world by making him or her invisible to it.54  This body 
without organs—this imagelessness that is the black African—this testimonial body 
becomes “a recording surface” in response to its interactions with pathological 
“external desires” (Deleuze and Guattari 10).  The body without organs’ interactions 
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with social drives create “points of disjunction” which the schizophrenic “inscribes on 
his own body[,] the litany of disjunctions” that not only chronicles but indicts the 
traumatic violence of social desire (Deleuze and Guattari 10-11).  Butler gestures 
toward the phenomenon and ineffectuality of the body as a recording surface because 
civilization destroys the body while history’s task for the body is to both chronicle and 
expose the destruction (165).  The testimonial body, in Butler’s terms, is under the 
continual tension between external forces of domination and the internal drive toward 
creation:  to simultaneously chronicle and indict those destructive forces.  As a male 
recording body, Askar’s task is to become able to mourn both losses and accept his 
role as recorder, and to recognize that he cannot repair the social trauma of colonial 
occupation.  Askar’s recording body can not heal the nation, but he can chronicle its 
destruction.  
The testimonial body of Misra, more than any other in the novel, requires the 
consideration of new ways of conceiving not only motherhood, but also a postcolonial 
“Somalia.”  Her mother-bond to Askar transgresses national, biological, and legal 
boundaries.  This subversive bond suggests that if families can form along 
international, informal lines, then a community might as well.  Wallerstein suggests 
this formation outside traditional national boundaries in a revision of the sociological 
term “status group” (193).  He suggests a community formed autonomously and based 
on material conditions that bind its members—like collective trauma—as opposed to 
ethnic bonds or national boundaries.  For Wallerstein, status groups form via shared 
ideology and demands rather than institutionalized stratifications.  I suggest that 
through the international body of Misra specifically and the infertile mother figure in 
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general, Farah opens via Maps the possibility of a new conception of “Somalia” 
outside the bounds of either the ethnic group or the nation-state, one that transgresses 
international boundaries and forms instead a collective based on experiential and 
material similarities or, in Wallerstein’s terms, a large status group.  Hilaal conceives 
Somalis as already bound by a shared experience:  language.  “Somali identity,” he 
explains to Askar: 
 
is one shared by all Somalis, no matter how many borders divide them. 
. . .   If [Misra’s] Somali is as good as yours, then I doubt if any 
bureaucratic clown would dare stand in her way or dare deny her what 
is hers by right.  Remember this, Askar.  For all we know, there is no 
ethnic difference which sets apart the Somali from the Ethiopian.  
(174)   
 
In one redeeming moment, Hilaal doubly binds Misra to Askar, first by their shared 
language, and second by potential shared ethnicity.  By erasing Misra’s linguistic and 
ethnic difference, Hilaal introduces a means for Misra to be Somali.  In so doing, 
Hilaal offers Askar both a mother and a secure nation in the figure of the adopting 
immigrant, Misra.  In this way, Misra’s mutilated transnational mothering body 
suggests—or even becomes—a fertile symbolic ground for developing models of a 
new and inclusive Somalia across ethnic or genealogical lines.   
In the time surrounding Misra’s kidnapping and death, Askar tastes blood in 
his mouth as he realizes her value as a mother and, through her innocence of the rebel 
massacre, her transnational value to Somalia.  The taste of blood reappears for Askar 
at several moments during Misra’s gradual disappearance and postmortem discovery.  
The bleeding mystifies Askar, who wonders, “had I underestimated my body?  Was it 
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seceding from me, making its own autonomous decision, was my body forming its 
own government, was it working on its own, independent of my brain, of my soul?” 
(233-34, emphasis in original).  But the blood also presages Askar’s arrest for Misra’s 
death and repeated testimony afterward of “the story of (Misra/Misrat/Masarat and) 
Askar” which exonerates Misra (259).  We readers know that Askar’s body is not 
creating its own nation; instead, Askar’s bloody-tasting saliva links him to the 
wounded Misra through their bodies as they were linked when he was young.  Linking 
bodies through wounds and blood that do not coincide suggests their affiliation 
through shared pain.  Askar is not in pain, but his woundless bleeding and bloodless 
taste of blood expose the malleability of the boundaries of the body and the self.  
Askar’s “bloody” mouth is evidence of his body mourning Misra’s loss, repeatedly 
and prematurely.  His “bloody” mouth suggests his capacity to record the importance 
of the figure of the mother to the development of a truly transnational community 
specifically configured outside European models of nation-statehood.  The blood in 
Askar’s mouth must come out, as Misra’s story must come out after her death.  The 
blood in his mouth is history, and Askar’s bloody, testimonial body is the visible 
chronicle of the mutilated mother and a motherland, Somalia, mutilated by colonial 
boundaries.  In the end, Maps divorces the broken body of the mother from the land, 
ungendering it in the process.  The novel suggests, in the figure of the transnational 





Nervous Conditions and Maps represent bodily testimony as a process of 
introjection that reconceives postcoloniality outside the biological and ideological 
boundaries of colonial discourse.  I want to conclude by suggesting that the characters 
in Nervous Conditions and Maps . . . map the possibility of an alternately conceived 
post-independence community by remapping the contours of their native bodies.  The 
testimony of the changing body is a redrawing of the boundaries of the territory that 
comprises the self.  Gikandi gestures toward this idea when he suggests that writing is 
a territorial act of claiming one’s text, space, and identity.55  The novels’ testimonial 
bodies thus function not only as recording narratives of self discovery, but also as 
physical markers of spatial repossession.  The testimonial body that walks through an 
oppressive space is subversive.  By continuing to live in a Rhodesia and Somalia that 
have savaged them, Nyasha and Misra, respectively, use their testimonial bodies to 
reclaim these oppressive spaces, rewriting national histories and charting changed 
futures.  Tambu and Askar remain behind to tell these stories. 
The novels represent the postcolonial national body as a multi-gendered terrain 
containing elements of both masculinity and femininity, both genders enjoined in one 
body to form a whole.  The texts propose post-independence community formations 
that are not gendered but what I suggest we call wholly gendered.  I recall here the 
conception of selfhood in many African communities that pairs two halves of the self:  
the masculine and the feminine.56  Bracha Ettinger gestures toward this notion in the 
context of motherhood.57  She proposes replacing the phallic split and subsequent 
mourning of the lost m/other with a “transsubjectivity” that redefines gender as 
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inclusive rather than exclusive (183).  Ettinger proposes that we develop an awareness 
of what she calls a Matrixial space outside the phallic framework in which femininity 
exists without any forced relation to phallic difference.  This “Feminine-Matrixial 
difference is an impregnation of a borderline,” of a sense of being that is always being 
created and understood at the present moment (184).  Ettinger argues that a woman’s 
biological potential for motherhood can be a political means of subverting patriarchy 
because embodying even the potential for motherhood grants women the ability to 
transgress boundaries among outside/inside, public/private, and past/present/future.  I 
do not mean to essentialize womanhood on the basis of reproductive capacity.  
Instead, like Rey Chow, I mean to argue against essentializing any one representation 
of woman-ness or African femininity.58  I read both Nervous Conditions and Maps as 
exploding boundaries and binaries of gender and nation.  This ability to transgress 
boundaries suggests the potential for conceiving new ways of being.  The opening of 
Maps eloquently suggests this kind of multiplicity: 
 
You exist, you think, the way the heavenly bodies exist, for although 
one does extend one’s finger and point at the heavens, one knows, yes, 
that’s the word, one knows that that is not the heavens.  Unless… 
unless there are, in a sense, as many heavens as there are thinking 
beings; unless there are as many heavens as there are pointing fingers.  
(3, emphasis in original) 
 
The reader inhabits the mind of Askar at this point in the text but has been placed in 
the position of speaker by the second-person narration.  The text explodes the standard 
positions of and boundaries between reader, textual subject, speaker, and listener as 
the narrator thinks.  Here Farah envisions a multiplicity of possibilities for identity, 
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truth, and national belonging.  This moment in the text demonstrates the nature of 
introjection:  a multiplicity of possibilities on a multiplicity of planes.   
*  *  * 
Reading these texts as traumatic testimonies obligates the reader as witness to 
undergo transformation in the act of reading—not just a transformation of her ways 
of reading African literature but, like the postcolonial native, a transformation of the 
self.  The act of reading traumatic testimony changes the listener by entrusting her 
with juridical responsibility.  This breakdown of the reader’s sense of understanding 
of trauma, testimony, reality, and the self represents a traumatic crisis.  Askar 
demonstrates this notion when he tells Hilaal about his fear that Arla’s death enabled 
his birth, that ghosts haunt the living in order to continue existing, that he 
menstruated, and that Arla speaks through him.  Afterward, Hilaal burns all of his 
research on children sufferers of war-related trauma, explaining that “he had been 
moving in the wrong direction all along” (158).  Askar’s testimony upends Hilaal’s 
research paradigm for trauma, changing his understanding of life and suffering’s role 
in it.  Trauma studies tells us that a changed listener who has been able to 
productively witness a testimony is qualified to explore with the trauma survivor a 
means to “transcend” the trauma (Rand 6).  This is now Hilaal’s position in relation 
to Askar.  I hope that after witnessing the testimonial bodies in both novels, we as 
readers will hold similar relationships with Tambu and Askar, and with other African 
post-independence testimonial narratives. 
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Chapter 3: Censorship and Testimonial Ghosts 
 
Introduction 
In this chapter I examine the politics of gendering postcoloniality through the 
censorship of testimonies of traumatic histories of colonial loss.  Zoë Wicomb’s 
David’s Story (2001) and Helen Oyeyemi’s The Icarus Girl (2005) both use ghosts as 
the means to express the unsayable feminine and in so doing world potential 
postcolonial identities hitherto censored.  First, I will summarize the plots of the 
novels and explain why a psychoanalytic paradigm helps us to read traumatic colonial 
histories fraught with gaps and tensions in order to excavate their adumbration of new 
visions of postcolonial identity.  I will then analyze the trope and technique of 
testimonial censorship and the ghosts that censorship engenders in the text.  I will 
illuminate the ways in which gendered censorship of the familial narrative functions 
as a metaphor for gendered censorship of the narrative of the emerging nation, which 
forestalls its postcolonial articulation.  I will conclude by examining potential 
implications for reading testimonial ghosts in David’s Story, The Icarus Girl, and 
post-independence African literature. 
While the term “postcolonial” refers to a particular period of time (which 
begins with formal independence), the notion of postcoloniality is much more about 
the dynamic tensions inherent in history making than about locating specific histories 
within specific chronologies.  Through reconstituting histories of individual and 
collective trauma, characters in the novels challenge the nationalist discourse of 
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sublimating personal history in order to participate in the imagined community.  The 
novels articulate a different version of the postcolonial nation by including bodies 
hitherto not imagined as part of the emerging nation.  In emphasizing the significance 
of women as mothers, and other marginalized and diaspora populations as integral to 
the fashioning of the nation, the novels suggest that the nation may be conceived as a 
transnational family. 
In both David’s Story and The Icarus Girl, the ghost is a particular female 
spectral body who has been censored from both the national and familial narratives.  
In both the family and the nation, the loss remains unaddressed and prevents forward 
development of the collective unit.  This attempt to masculinize the postcolonial 
nation invokes the ghost of the censored figure of woman.  Her ghostly presence 
reiterates the importance of “woman” in its various iterations to the formation of the 
new national citizenry. At the insistence of their ghosts, these novels offer a native 
subject speaking herself into existence from outside the space of colonized otherness. 
While David’s Story is quite explicit in the connections it makes between 
family and nation and gender, The Icarus Girl is less so.  The ghostly haunting by 
TillyTilly ties to the postcolonial nation that cannot yet partake of postcoloniality.  
The ghost of Fern (TillyTilly) represents the ghost of the female body censored from 
the failed articulation of the postcolonial family and nation.  The dead baby girl 
symbolizes and signifies both the familial and national losses of the female body.  
TillyTilly is the ghost of the baby who has not been mourned, but the specter also 
represents the postcolonial nation that has not come to pass.  The ghost that 
simultaneously signifies loss also brings the potential to begin mourning.  In the 
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novel, the arrival and migration of the specter TillyTilly brings the potential for 
Jessamy (and, through Jess, for Sarah) to address the incorporated losses of family 
(Fern) and nation (Nigeria).  
In this chapter, I will compare the manner in which the David’s Story 
narrative repeatedly tries to breach David’s censorship of Dulcie to the way in which 
the “appearance” of TillyTilly in The Icarus Girl is a literal and ghostly apparition of 
that censorship. Both novels are censored testimonial narratives and a comparison of 
the two modes of censorship allows us to understand the relationship between silence 
and history.  Much like the ghosts who act as witnesses to these silences in the 
fictional worlds of the novels, the reader listens for these silences in the text, in which 
she will hear the voices of ghosts.  They haunt the spaces left when speech and 
existence are censored from the historical record.  Listening for ghosts in testimonial 
literature is similar in method to my reading of these novels, which illustrates the 
manner in which the novels function like histories from below.1  Wicomb’s narrator 
reconstructs the tales of Dulcie and other women freedom fighters that David censors 
from his South African history, and Jess unearths Fern in the spectral form of the 
censored twin TillyTilly.  We can read Dulcie, TillyTilly, Griqualand, and Nigeria as 
the human and geographic remains (or traces) that haunt the diaspora nation and the 




David’s Story and The Icarus Girl:  Summaries 
The narrative action of David’s Story bookends the inception and imminent 
demise of apartheid in South Africa.  The novel opens in Cape Town in 1991 during 
the demolition of the apartheid apparatus in South Africa.  At this point in history, 
more than thirty thousand people have been detained without trial and thousands have 
been tortured under former President P. W. Botha’s campaign of terror.2  F. W. de 
Klerk succeeded Botha as President the previous year and has ended a five-year 
national state of emergency,3 lifted the thirty-year ban on leading anti-apartheid 
groups,4 and released various political prisoners including Nelson Mandela, leader of 
the African National Congress (ANC).  The armed resistance, known as the MK,5 has 
suspended armed operations and South Africa has begun negotiating its ideal vision 
of a “new,” postcolonial nation.6   
As its title suggests, the novel begins as the history of former MK cell leader 
David Dirkse who is in the process of demilitarization.  At this moment of crafting the 
new nation of South Africa, of which land redistribution is an integral premise, David 
wants the trauma of Griqua land appropriation by white imperials publicly known 
through the testimony he dictates to the novel’s narrator, an unnamed female 
transcriber whose sole qualification for the position is that she is “literate and broadly 
sympathetic to the liberation movement” (2).  David reveals parts of the story to her 
and obscures others.  His obsession with his family history focuses on male leadership 
to the exclusion of all but cursory mention of his female ancestors, all mothers and 
grandmothers, who play important roles in securing community safety.  He omits 
mention of the liberation movement’s gender abuses and, for that matter, dismisses as 
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unimportant any reference to women’s roles in both the inception and demise of 
apartheid, censoring both the female body and the fact of its abuse from his historical 
record.  The narrator reads between the lines of David’s recitations and recreates not 
only behavioral motivations but entire histories for the strong women to whom he 
only alludes.  David becomes angry at the narrator’s repeated attempts to turn the 
manuscript narration towards women’s roles in early Griqua leadership and to 
gendered violence in the resistance.  He accuses:  “You have turned it into a story of 
women; it’s full of old women, for God’s sake. . . .  Who would want to read a story 
like that?  It’s not a proper history at all” (199).  David’s suggestion for transforming 
the “story of women” into a “proper history” belies the primacy of his concern for 
gendering history over accurately reporting it:  “Can’t some of the oumas at least be 
turned into oupas?” he asks the narrator.  “There’s no harm in that, just turning the 
she’s into he’s” (199).  In David’s proposed story, the mother figure is expelled from 
the work of forging a new South Africa, and David’s “story” is haunted by the ghost 
of this censored female body.  Her ghost is a metaphor for his doomed project of 
fathering the postcolonial nation.   
While David’s Story is set in the moment of articulating a vision of the 
postcolonial nation that occurs prior to the commencement of formal independence in 
South Africa, The Icarus Girl takes place several decades into post-independence 
with no cohesive national identity in place.  Ongoing government instability has 
driven large numbers of Nigerians into diaspora and the novel is set in London at the 
beginning of the twenty-first century.  The protagonist is eight-year-old Jessamy 
Harrison whose mother Sarah is a Yoruba immigrant from Nigeria and whose father 
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Daniel is white and British.  Sarah has migrated to London from Nigeria to seek 
personal safety and a medical degree.7  Against her father’s wishes, Sarah switches to 
an English literature major and thus undermines both her family’s and host country’s 
expectations for her residency in the metropole.  Although studies show that most 
third world women relocating in the West migrate as domestic or low wage labor, or 
as a dependent daughter or wife, Sarah subverts this model of the female immigrant.  
She has moved independently and has begun a family after her arrival.  Oyeyemi 
portrays Sarah as the stronger household leader and, when Daniel falls ill later in the 
novel, Sarah assumes responsibility for the family.  Jess identifies Sarah as such an 
overpowering force in the family that she overshadows its other members to the point 
of obliterating them.  In a word association game with her psychologist Dr. 
McKenzie, Jess associates “Mom” with “large,” “Dad” with “smaller,” and “Jess” 
with “gone” (135). 
As the novel opens, Sarah struggles to finish a novel, Jess battles social 
alienation and anxiety after having skipped a grade in school, and Daniel seems 
mildly distant, befuddled by his place in the family.  Jess tells her spectral friend 
TillyTilly, whom only she can see, that her classmates are “too different from me.  It 
makes me…weird.  I don’t want to be weird and always thinking weird things and 
being scared, and I don’t want to have something missing from me,” (127, emphasis 
in original).  Jess does not realize that what is missing is her stillborn twin Fern, about 
whom Jess’s parents have never told her.  Jess’s ignorance of the loss—both of Fern’s 
existence and death—prevents her from mourning it.  The loss nevertheless manifests 
for Jess in the form of the ghost TillyTilly who arrives unexpectedly during a family 
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visit in Nigeria and becomes Jess’s best friend back at home in England.  Jess’s need 
to mourn Fern is vicarious simply because she has never seen or heard of Fern, but 
she does need to mourn both for her own experience of loss and because she has 
inherited her parents’ unfulfilled need to mourn.  Sarah’s and Daniel’s unmet desire 
becomes one that Jess has no choice but to fulfill. 
Jess is reclusive, moody, and given to one “serious tantrum” per week in 
school (90).  Sarah and Daniel are troubled by Jess’s outbursts, which especially 
frustrate Sarah.  She complains to Daniel:  “I can’t mother this girl.  I try, but…I’m 
scared of her” (211).   Sarah brings the family to Nigeria with the hope of unhinging 
Jess’s difficulty and perhaps relieving their mother-daughter tension.  In Nigeria, 
TillyTilly entices Jess into performing increasingly troublesome mischief.  When 
TillyTilly follows the Harrisons to London, her pranks both with and on Jess escalate 
to include property and bodily damage to others.  Jess is extremely close with her 
father and he grows increasingly depressed and lethargic during TillyTilly’s 
escalation.  Daniel’s illness causes Jess increasing horror:  “this wasn’t her father at 
all, it was a thing, slurred of speech, emptied” (275), and she fears TillyTilly may be 
to blame.  The connection between TillyTilly’s escalating mischief and Daniel’s 
worsening illness is the family’s headlong rush toward exposing the secret of Fern.  
Exasperated, Sarah connects Jess with Dr. McKenzie.  When Jess befriends 
McKenzie’s daughter, Shivs, TillyTilly becomes jealous and Jess rightly fears for the 
safety of her first material friend.  Eventually, analysis reveals the problem to lie in 
unattended parental mourning.  Sarah’s stalled mourning manifests in her refusal to 
speak of Fern to Jess.  Sarah’s silence is a form of censorship:  she has censored Fern 
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from the family narrative.  Fern’s censored residue of loss takes the form of the 
apparition TillyTilly who haunts the text, Jess, and, eventually, the entire family.  
Jess’s wild behavior is her way of acting out Fern’s loss, even though the fact of that 
loss is at first a mystery to her.   
Building on Khanna’s idea that ghosts of colonial trauma haunt postcolonial 
intellectuals who recharted the practice of psychoanalysis by redirecting its lens 
inward to expose its ghosts, I wish to suggest that ghosts also haunt fiction writers 
and their characters, and I suggest that we turn our lens on their texts to illuminate 
those ghosts and their demands.8  The ghost of the discipline of psychoanalysis is its 
historical application as a colonial tool, which is precisely why Khanna argues for the 
discipline’s unique applicability to examine not only the significance of ghosts and 
other textual representations of trauma, but also to illuminate the ways in which 
colonialism and its practice inform these themes in the literature.  Simply put, the 
mere presence of ghosts in the text constitutes a demand to discuss them in the 
language of trauma.   
In their rescripting of psychoanalysis as a symptom and signifier of colonial 
trauma, postcolonial writers rewrite both psychoanalysis and postcolonial nation 
building as new epistemological and ideological territories haunted by their colonial 
pasts, even as they gesture toward just (e.g., anti-colonial) futures.9  Khanna suggests 
that “the affect” or ghost of colonialism haunts the formation of the postcolonial 
nation-state in the form of ethnic divisiveness and other modes of political disunity 
(12).  Africa’s divisions into nation-states remains based largely on the international 
boundaries negotiated during the late nineteenth century’s Berlin Conference.  
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Individual colonies won independence through the late twentieth century, but the 
colonial boundaries remain largely intact.  Many African communities remain split 
across international boundaries while in other independent nation-states like Nigeria, 
large numbers of culturally different communities have been forced to attempt 
democratic cohabitation when the sheer number of variant communities renders 
equitable government representation nearly impossible.  In the face of such inorganic 
modes of national construction, the collective’s sense of national identity fractures 
along ethnic lines or across international borders.  The national self is thus fractured.  
The psychic dissonance of unbelonging and loss compounds the twin pathologies of 
racism internalized and encountered.   
I read David’s Story and The Icarus Girl together because despite their 
differences in historical moment, nation, their protagonists’ age and gender, and the 
contexts in which the ghosts appear, both novels articulate the connection between an 
emerging nation and a disintegrating family as linked moments of gendered crisis.  
The speakers of the novels’ censored stories, David and Sarah, have different 
relationships to the female bodies they censor from their national and family 
narratives, and the witnesses to whom they relay censored testimony and who 
mediate those experiences for the reader.  Considering these novels together is thus 
useful because both are framed as exercises in creating literary histories of trauma.  
Traumatic suffering and its concomitant lack of knowledge stymies the literary 
characters’ desires to bear witness to traumatic histories of colonial oppression.  The 
ghost in each text is a symbol of the residue of this struggle.   
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David’s Story and The Icarus Girl are about correcting faulty testimonies by 
exposing the ghosts that scream their censorship from within testimonial texts.  Both 
novels employ postmodern narrative tactics to critique and reject the western novel 
form as a mode of transmission of testimonial literature.10  The texts represent loss in 
ways that call attention, however, to their traumatized engagement with Western 
narrative norms.  David’s Story as a novel is the penultimate nonlinear narrative.  
Indeed, its form replicates the process by which a traumatic narrative—which is 
always nonlinear and fragmentary—is constructed, complete with informational gaps, 
transcriptions, speculations, corrections, and primary source quotations, all arranged 
in a non-linear order that jumps back and forth between time periods and locations.  
David’s Story, of all the novels analyzed in this dissertation, most closely resembles a 
faithful transcription of a traumatic testimony.  Despite the prevailing critical 
tendency to do so, I argue against describing Oyeyemi’s novel as magic realist 
because it dismisses the text’s relationship to the Yoruba literary tradition of “cosmic 
totality,” which Wole Soyinka defines as “a consciousness in which [a person’s] own 
earth being, his gravity-bound apprehension of self, [i]s inseparable from the entire 
cosmic phenomenon” (Myth  3).  Jess’s journey into the realm of the ancestors during 
the novel’s denouement is not just a next step in the hero’s journey outside the usual 
realms of consciousness as part of her Bildungs process.  Jess’s journey is not 
intended primarily to transform her into a better citizen upon her return, but instead to 
reunite her with her lost half, her companion “to walk your three worlds with” 
(Oyeyemi 176).   
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*  *  * 
The characters’ unreliability as narrators of trauma demonstrates that we as 
readers must revise our conception of what constitutes a viable history, to consider 
the notion that history may reside outside of comprehendible narratives.  In this light, 
we can read haunting as a disruption of the discursive separation of history from 
traumatic testimony.  Haunting dismantles the ideological opposition between fact 
and experience.  It thus changes the act of reading a literary representation of a 
traumatic history by infusing it with the political potential for social transformation 
through mourning.  Eng and Kazanjian suggest that the way in which we interpret the 
ghostly remains politicizes loss and shapes the possibilities for mourning.11   
To examine traumatic loss is to read the ego’s network of melancholic 
attachments to lost objects.  Accumulations of these “traces” lend themselves to 
interpretation as a “hermeneutic domain” (Eng and Kazanjian, “Mourning” 4).  As the 
ego expands by appending to itself the residue of each loss, the testimonial text 
expands by accommodating the ghost created by each act of censorship.  To examine 
a testimony of loss is to read a network of traces of the speaker’s losses and, in the 
case of the two novels discussed here, these traces are embodied in the ghostly 
specters of Dulcie and Fern (TillyTilly).  In the way that Wicomb’s narrator and Jess 
“read” the spectral traces of censored colonial loss, the act of reading Wicomb’s and 
Oyeyemi’s novels can initiate a process of recovery by witnessing the loss the 
testimony represents.  In this way, one may read the two novels as doing history, to 
paraphrase John Williams’ term for resurrecting historical silences in a 
historiographic text in order to initiate the work of collective mourning and thus 
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social change.12  For Williams, charting the deployment, discovery, and illumination 
of silences in colonial history is tantamount to “charting a theory of change” and, 
more specifically, of changing official history (164).   Wicomb’s narrator and Jess 
listen for these “silences” across national and family narratives to discern what the 
censored ghosts reveal about the conditions of their erasures.13  Like the postcolonial 
scholar, the metropolitan reader’s task is to listen for traces of erasure in moments of 
textual silence, mark them, and to record their histories.  Bhabha most clearly 
articulates the intellectual’s responsibility to the ghost who calls for historical justice:  
 
This act of writing the world, of taking the measure of its dwelling, is 
magically caught in Morrison’s description of her house of fiction [in 
Beloved]—art as “the fully realized presence of a haunting” of history.  
Read as an image that describes the relation of art to social reality, my 
translation of Morrison’s phrase becomes a statement on the political 
responsibility of the critic.  For the critic must attempt to fully realize, 
and take responsibility for the unspoken, unrepresented pasts that 
haunt the historical present.  (12, emphasis added)14 
 
This is the task for the metropolitan reader of African testimonial literature. 
 
Reading Censorship, Reading Loss 
The trauma sufferer’s ego houses both loss and the fact of loss.  Each 
melancholic attachment to a lost object appends more psychic material onto the ego 
like so many scars.  The meaning of traumatic testimony is also derived from loss.  
Violated by a troubled ego, the nature of traumatic testimony is censorship:  it is 
riddled with gaps and fissures created by trauma’s informational lack, the sufferer’s 
forgetting, and denial.  Naomi Morgenstern observes that because it is censored text, 
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traumatic testimony is “a traumatized text” violated by the excision of the censor, a 
traumatized ego (107).  I use the term “censored text” to mean that text which has 
been altered by either the refusal (or failure) to include certain material while creating 
it or the later excision of relevant material from its already completed form. 
 Torok’s essay on the rhetorical implications of editorial decisions not to 
publish certain of Freud’s letters suggests that censorship both obscures and displays 
conceptual alternatives.15  To Torok, a censored text reveals at the least two distinct 
yet related narratives.  First, censored text itself stands as meaningful testimony.  
Second, traces of alteration point to the existence of the missing text.  As a result, the 
censored text’s reader is at once deprived of the excised text and strikingly aware of 
its conspicuous absence.16  In the context of censorship and its relationship to loss, I 
suggest that traumatic testimony’s gaps and fissures are not merely holes in the text.  
These gaps are filled with the residues of what has been either erased or omitted.  This 
residue is the lost object which both hides and marks its erasure.  
The figure of a ghost signifies the textual matter that was erased.  The ghost 
haunts the gaps and fissures of the censored testimony, screaming her presence in 
search of a witness.  The ghost thus marks an unattended loss and makes it real.  
Avery Gordon writes, “disappearance is real only when it is apparitional” (63, 
emphasis added ).17  While loss may originate in an absence, a loss is not the same as 
an absence.18  Loss is a particular event tied to a particular moment in time.  Losses 
litter the past as ghostly remains pointing back to the particularity of each traumatic 
event while absence, which is sometimes but not always a condition of having 
endured a loss, transcends time.     
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The ghost haunts because the dead demand recognition (acknowledgement) 
and action (justice).   In this sense, the ghost is a testimony of the trauma of erasure.  
While the ghost usually signifies dead bodies, it does more than that.  The ghost 
points to a particular dead body or missed opportunity.  It also illuminates a larger, 
traumatizing social pattern or cultural institution.  The ghost disrupts the discursive 
boundaries of history, subjectivity, and the Real, “import[ing],” writes Gordon, “a 
charged strangeness into the place or sphere it is haunting, thus unsettling the 
propriety and property lines that delimit a zone of activity or knowledge” (63).  The 
ghost makes traumatic testimony transgress the epistemological and ideological 
boundary between fantasy and fact.19  We can read haunting as a way of knowing 
what is or has happened that challenges the witness’s reliance on and 
conceptualization of the familiar because it disrupts and even destroys the way that 
she believes she constructs knowledge and what she thinks she knows.  This 
knowledge is never sought.   
The unfamiliar—or that which we do not already recognize—appears to us as 
a ghost.  If the way we know ourselves and our world is structured around our notions 
of what we believe to be familiar, then how do we recognize the unfamiliar?  How do 
we know it when we see it?  Kelly Oliver suggests that “the tension between 
recognizing the familiar in order to confirm what we already know and listening for 
the unfamiliar that disrupts what we already know” is the basis for the current critical 
understanding of the notion of recognition (2).20  Because we seek the familiar, we do 
not always know how to look for the ghost.  We can only be open to an encounter.  
The ghost in the text seeks out the reader as a witness by haunting her, and then “pulls 
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[her] affectively into . . . a reality [she will] come to experience as a recognition” of 
that which she could not see before (Gordon 63).  In the haunted context, witnesses’ 
addenda and ghostly embodiments are viable testimonial options.  Because it 
engenders a specifically transformative way of knowing, haunting can function in the 
context of trauma as the testimonial possibility of productive mourning.  We can 
conceive of loss in David’s Story and The Icarus Girl in terms of traumatic testimony, 
censorship, and haunting because loss in the novels is framed in terms of remains.  
Dulcie’s and Fern (TillyTilly)’s ghostly presences in the texts mark both loss and the 
fact of it.  Both texts represent narratives that attempt to hide secrets that we later 
realize have been revealed to us all along:  they are testimonies from which 
traumatized female bodies have been censored.   
 
Decolonizing the Mother 
The novels suggest that replacing patriarchal notions of womanhood and, in 
particular, of motherhood is crucial to the project of building post-independence 
African nations.  I do not mean to essentialize African womanhood by limiting 
African female subjectivity to the realm of biological fertility.  Nor do I intend to 
privilege an ideal notion of African motherhood.  I refer instead to the cultural 
practice in most African communities of adult women sharing maternal relationships 
with young people in their acquaintance.21  “That motherhood is venerated in African 
communities is trite” Shereen Mills reminds us,22 but I suggest that the complexity of 
the mother figure’s cultural importance to decolonization remains unaddressed.  I 
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believe these novels clamor for a theorization of the relationship between African 
cosmologies of motherhood and nation building.   
As is familiar to us now, many postcolonial feminist scholars have highlighted 
the myriad ways in which women are deployed as hallmarks of tradition.23  The site 
of “woman” as sign of the private and of tradition is also the site of national anxiety.  
Ray argues that Benedict Anderson’s claim, that national identity in the modern 
world is as fundamental an identity marker as gender, does not consider the 
differences among identities articulated “at the intersection of gender and nationality” 
or the ways in which these identities variously inform the national imaginary (En-
Gendering 5).24  
Reintroducing the figure of the mother as mother in discursive constructions 
of the nation upsets the public/private split and destroys patriarchal privilege.  If the 
family is the microcosm of the nation, then the construction of an anti-colonial, post-
independence national community begins at the family level. The novels demonstrate 
that repositioning motherhood is central to family and national health after 
colonialism.  History bears out this contention.  Within the larger theoretical 
framework of the figure of woman and the importance of this figure to the emergence 
of nationalism, I introduce the histories of militant motherhood which demonstrate 
that mothers have comprised significant percentages of women’s organized protests 
against specific colonial injustices like pass laws in South Africa.  As this example 
shows, women’s organized agitation against masculinist government oppression 
becomes a powerful symbol for rejecting patriarchy and a metaphor for the national 
liberation struggle.  The fact that many of these women were mothers “was central to 
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the power of [their] symbolism” as an image of anti-patriarchal liberation (Mills).  
The image of women ungendering the liberation struggle through various forms of 
participation in it is particularly powerful when contrasted with the representation, in 
David’s Story, of women’s subordination within that struggle.25   
 
Spatial Dislocations 
Both novels represent a native lived experience shaped in part by the colonial 
experience of forced migration—either as part of the apartheid regime in David’s 
Story or to escape dictatorial violence in The Icarus Girl—that require new 
determinations of group identity and configuration.  The “diasporic nation” is such a 
formulation, one that accommodates “the myriad ways in which embodied citizens 
break out and reconstruct their relations with the nation as, for example, classed, 
gendered, raced, subjects with specific relations to the national project, thus 
producing disassembled,” or diaspora, nations (Westwood).  Such alternative 
formulations of postcolonial communities suggest that postcolonial “African-ness” is 
not dependent on living in the ancestral homeland, or even in Africa.26  This notion of 
postcolonial identity as being necessarily diasporic and, thus, postmodern, infuses 
both Wicomb’s and Oyeyemi’s novels.  African postcolonial theorists have argued 
that “new kinds of state structures, cooperation and networks will emerge” if 
decolonization processes dismantle colonial-era borders, and African communities in 
particular will form instead along locally defined lines of “popular affinity” (van 
Binsbergen  27).   
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I began this chapter by suggesting that David’s Story and The Icarus Girl 
“world” an uncensored postcoloniality in their revelations of that which had been 
censored.  In the same way that decolonizing African communities have the 
opportunity to rewrite African national borders, I read decolonizing African literature 
as seizing the opportunity to rewrite our literary, and thus historical, notions of 
“Africa.”  Bhabha suggests that critical reading reveals cues in the postcolonial text 
that expand and rewrite our ideological and epistemological cartographies of what 
Africa (or postcoloniality in general) can be.  He writes: 
 
If we are seeking a “worlding” of literature, then perhaps it lies in a 
critical act that attempts to grasp the sleight of hand with which 
literature conjures with historical specificity, using the medium of 
psychic uncertainty, aesthetic distancing, or the obscure signs of the 
spirit-world, the sublime and the subliminal.  As literary creatures and 
political animals we ought to concern ourselves with the understanding 
of human action and the social world as a moment when something is 
beyond control, but it is not beyond accommodation.  (12, emphasis in 
original)   
 
Spivak’s application of the term “worlding” to literature is a multi-layered reference 
whose base is “the contradiction involved in the necessary colonialist presupposition 
of an uninscribed earth” onto which the colonial power reinscribes itself as discoverer 
and owner of an already inhabited territory (Critique 228).  I will return to the notion 
of colonizing the earth shortly.  For now, I want to discuss colonizing the “native.”  
This colonial fiction of “uninscribed earth,” when backed by the military and 
ideological forces of imperial Europe, is forceful enough to compel the “native” to 
see himself as “other” (Critique 211-12).  To Khanna, the colonized native thus 




the “closed,” the “concealed,” or the “earth” through the [colonizer’s] 
establishment of the world.  To understand not only the world as it is 
brought into unconcealedness, but also the strife in its inception, 
allows us to see how the earth itself is changed forever through the 
creation of the world.  “Worlding” involves a creation of strife; 
understanding worlding involves an analysis of that strife—critically 
worlding the processes of the previously earthed, thereby seeing the 
historical, political, and economic dynamics of strife through its 
unconcealment.  (4-5)  
 
For both Spivak and Khanna, art projects an essence of the unsayable to its observer.  
The work of art bears traces of the strife that marked the process of creation of that 
projection.  Spivak hopes that we will not be able to read a literary narrative without 
also recognizing the traces it bears that mark the strife of its creation within a 
particular cultural, political, or ideological context.27   
Postcolonial discourse has exhaustively rehearsed colonialism’s perpetration 
of a network of traumatic losses on the native.  Loss of native life, personal 
autonomy, and possessions has been theorized at length, but the traumatic loss of 
native land through forced relocation or seizure is only recently receiving attention in 
the international critical discourse on colonial loss.28  For many African communities, 
the land and occupation of it are as psychically significant to cultural and national 
identity as they are somatically crucial for survival.  The act of removing the 
individual from her or his local resources censors history by stifling the native 
historical voice.  The national self is censored as a result of land loss.  The past dearth 
of critical attention to land loss has censored its importance and its existence as a loss 
from the discursive and historical texts, even as colonial land appropriation has been 
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widely linked to black poverty, white appropriation of black resources, patriarchy, 
and the subsequent erasure of the female body from the nation.   
The South African Griqua and Nigerian Yoruba are displaced and diasporic 
due to forced migration.  To be disconnected from Griqua ancestral land and Yoruba 
geopolitical freespace is tantamount to the loss of not just one loved person but of a 
loved community.  Although Freud ranks the loss of a loved person above that of any 
other kind of love object, communities impoverished by displacement from their land 
like the South African Griqua and Nigerian Yoruba in diaspora “continue to suffer 
material loss” such that land can be the lost object for a colonized and postcolonial 
people (Johnson 293).  Their lost object is the national Heim, and the literal and 
symbolic loss of homeland undermines national identity.  Freud calls the unheimlich 
(literally, “unhomely,” but also “uncanny”) “that class of the frightening which leads 
back to what is known of old and long familiar” (“Uncanny” 220).29  This 
juxtaposition of the frightening unknown with the safety of the heimlich (literally, 
“homely”)—is at the root of Freud’s question in “The ‘Uncanny’” of “in what 
circumstances the familiar can become uncanny and frightening” (220).  Freud begins 
with the borrowed premise that the unheimlich is something which has been revealed, 
but which should have remained hidden (225) and, in English, “uncanny” implies 
supernatural involvement in the revelation.  Freud muses that “something has to be 
added” to the unfamiliar to make it frightening, that:   
   
among its different shades of meaning the word “heimlich” exhibits 
one which is identical with its opposite, “unheimlich.”  What is 
heimlich thus comes to be unheimlich. . . .  the word “heimlich” is not 
unambiguous, but belongs to two sets of ideas, which, without being 
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contradictory, are yet very different:  on the one hand it means what is 
familiar and agreeable, and on the other, what is concealed and kept 
out of sight.  (224-25)   
 
In the essay, Freud concludes that in its development “in the direction of ambivalence, 
until it finally coincides with its opposite, unheimlich. . . . is in some way or other a 
sub-species of heimlich” (226).  The combination of familiarity and secrecy is the 
marker of the unheimlich within the homespace.  The attribute of “foreignness,” 
which should disappear or be concealed when the immigrant claims the host country 
as home, remains a brand that always prevents the immigrant from claiming both the 
new and host homes.  In both novels, the people’s relation to the land as loss figures 
prominently such that in the novels African peoples are defined by traumatic loss of 
their land.  In the post-independence community, affiliation is in part based on the 
common experience of land loss.  In David’s Story and The Icarus Girl, David’s 
displaced Griqua family and Jess’s diasporic, biracial British-Yoruba subjectivity 
function as metaphors for the Griqua community’s relationship to the apartheid South 
African government and for the fragmented Yoruba community’s relationship to the 
dictatorial postcolonial Nigerian government.   
As a backdrop to David’s Story, Griqua law criminalized the sale of Griqua 
land to “foreigners” regardless of whether the land was privately or communally 
owned (Johnson 285).  When the Griqua lands were appropriated by British and Cape 
Colony authorities and about two thousand Griqua were subsequently relocated to 
Nomansland four hundred kilometers to the east across the Drakensberg, the Griquas 
considered the occupation at most a forced rental to a series of colonial occupiers and 
never an ownership transfer.  By the end of the century, most Griquas were landless 
 102 
 
and impoverished.  The Griquas still claim continuous ownership of their land.  They 
demand acknowledgment of their ownership and restitution for ancestral lands stolen 
by the apartheid government.  These claims surface at the moments of apartheid’s 
inception and demise.  Its one hundred year battle for the return of land stolen by 
whites defines the Griqua community.  Although the post-apartheid government 
promises to return stolen land in South Africa, Griqua land remains in the control of 
whites who claim, with the support of the official historical record, that the Griquas 
sold or bartered the land to them and that white residency is thus valid and 
uncontestable.  The Griqua community stands almost no chance of regaining its 
parcels.  With no real hope of returning to their ancestral land, the Griquas are a 
people defined by migration.   
*  *  * 
Forty years of post-independence government violence has required many 
Nigerians, like Sarah in The Icarus Girl, to forge communities outside the homeland, 
communities unencumbered by international borders or even by nationality.  For the 
many Yoruba, for whom political alienation and repression has made the homeland a 
dangerous place, to be postcolonial Nigerian is to be an immigrant.  The Nigerian 
government’s exclusion of the Yoruba from post-independence political 
representation has effectively jettisoned almost half of all Yoruba from the nation, 
reframing neocolonial exile in diaspora as land loss.  The series of corrupt military 
governments means that the dream of “postcolonial Nigeria” is lost to Nigerians 
unable to enjoy the safety, economic and educational opportunities, and ethnic 
political representation in-country which independence promised but has not 
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delivered.30  Many Yoruba who immigrated to Europe in the 1980s dare not return to 
Nigeria to work or aid their families because the Yoruba there remain unrepresented 
by post-independence Nigeria’s succession of “ethno-military” dictators (Sekoni).  
After the apparent 1993 presidential victory of Yoruba candidate Moshood Abiola, 
incumbent president Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida alleged fraud and voided the 
results.31  Nigerians in general and the Yoruba in particular had hoped that 1993 
would see the post-independence election of Nigeria’s first truly democratic 
government.  All were disappointed.   
Griqua and Yoruba who want to establish postcolonial communities in their 
homelands face the formidable task of nation building in spaces that remain 
inhospitable to these factions of the native citizenry.  David’s Story and The Icarus 
Girl represent microcosms of these African nations in the process of creating their 
ideal images of postcoloniality.  The novels depict the family’s preoccupation with its 
own troubled interrelationships as a metaphor for the postcolonial nation’s attempt to 
coalesce into a nation-state. 
 
Reinstating the Mother Figure  
In both novels, migrations symbolize the loss of an ideal postcolonial nation.  
The novels rectify colonialist notions of nation building by validating the importance 
of women and motherhood in the processes of crafting gender-inclusive national 
parameters.  As part of the growing body of theoretical scholarship on the 
permutations of “motherhood,” Daymond observes that the state of motherhood 
motivates political activism and invokes the mother-child bond as a frequent African 
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“major model of social relationships” (xxvii).  Contemporary African feminists do not 
seek a return to pre-colonial family models, but they do seek to break free of 
colonialism’s imposition or exacerbation of existing patriarchal social structures, as 
well as the residual effects of colonialism’s successors, neocolonialism and 
globalization.  Oyěwùmί argues succinctly:  
 
From an African perspective, what is most troubling in many feminist 
theories of motherhood is that the mother’s god-like power over the 
infant is not recognized as such.  Instead the mother is seen as trapped 
by her role as primary caregiver; her god-like power over her child, 
and the authority this gives her within society are not acknowledged.  
(“Abiyamo”)32   
 
In Yoruba cosmology, the process of giving birth is so metaphysically significant that 
birth mothers are invested with “mystical powers, especially over their offspring” 
(Oyěwùmί, “Abiyamo”).  Each birth creates three entities specific to that particular 
birthing experience:  a baby, a mother, and the important bonds they share.  Children 
know that their mothers can at any time invoke ikunle abiyamo, their special 
mothering powers granted by both the birthing process and by social and 
metaphysical valuation of their mothering status.33  Similarly, before globalization, 
Igbo communities prized people as their most important resources and markers of 
wealth.  Their idioms reflect this orientation:  azuka ego means “siblings are much 
more important than wealth,” and maduka means “greatness is dependent or 
predicated on people.”  To have children was of paramount importance to sustain 
both the family and the community, and the mother’s role in these endeavors was 
revered.  Mothers were referred to as “the source of the spring, isi mmili” (Nzegwu).34  
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Becoming a mother whether through biology or other means elevates a woman to the 
“ranks of the most revered women in Africa” (Sudarkasa).  A woman’s sphere of 
power and influence extends over both her children and their father—and this 
increase in power and influence is a socially expected result of becoming a mother 
(Sudarkasa).  An Akan proverb that says a woman gave birth to the king illustrates 
the notion that motherhood “antedates the king and therefore cannot be subordinated 
to any social institution.  If anything, it is the originary source—the fountainhead of 
the social” (Oyěwùmί, “Abiyamo”).  Motherhood is a role of elevated social 
importance, but this importance also means that motherhood is an observed state, and 
that respect is conferred based on how well the mother is observed to function as a 
mother.  Reintroduction of the importance of the mother to social systems is 
beginning to replace “phallic ways of understanding” creativity, and of conceiving 
authorship as communal rather than an individual “ownership of meaning” (Daymond 
xxvii).  By challenging colonialism’s phallic reinscription of Africa by in part 
returning its cultural emphasis toward the collective, postcolonial motherhood 
discourse suggests the potential for developing new modes of inclusive nation-state 
creation. 
I will now read the two novels in order to suggest that, in the texts, the loss of 
land prefigures and is the precondition for censoring the mother from the birth of the 
postcolonial nation.  David’s and Sarah’s censorship of female bodies from their 
personal and historical texts functions as a metaphor for the larger social elision of 
women from the postcolonial nation.  Dulcie’s and TillyTilly’s ghostly testimonies 
expose and castigate their censorship in calls for justice.  A just response would be to 
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listen for silenced women’s voices, somehow screaming through the traumatic, 
historical, and/or literary texts. 
 
David’s Story of Women 
The text of David’s Story reflects the struggle between its two principal 
speakers for primacy of voice and purpose.  The novel is a compilation of David’s 
recitations, oral histories, epigraphs and longer quotations from newspaper articles 
and other historical monographs, the narrator’s suppositions and reflections on the 
collaboration, journal entries from her life, and transcripts of their conversations 
about the work and other topics.  While the text cites newspaper and other media 
sources, it never signals a transition from David’s history to the narrator’s poetic 
license or back again.  It frequently records, however, David’s outrage at such 
inclusions afterward.  To further demolish the lines between speakers, the text uses no 
punctuation to demarcate conversation, the result being that the uncareful reader 
easily loses track of who is speaking.  Finally, the novel traverses time and space 
frequently, between 1991 and the nineteenth century, and between Cape Town and 
Kokstadt.  The overall result appears to be a jumble of historical fact and supposition, 
presented in a narrative full of holes and ghosts.  The literary conventions that make 
David’s Story’s a postmodern text are also the psychoanalytic conventions that 
qualify it as a textual testimony of trauma. 
David avoids questions about fellow MK cell leader Dulcie Olifant with 
whom he is widely suspected of having an affair.  “David cannot or will not answer 
such questions,” the narrator tells us, “except that she is single and works as a 
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researcher for a nongovernmental organization, which accounts for the flexibility of 
her time.  Her story is of no relevance to his own, he says weakly” (78), but the reader 
and narrator discern otherwise.  It is important that he says it weakly; David’s tone 
gives the narrator a clue that Dulcie is actually key to his story.  David’s ambivalent 
desire to both encrypt and reference Dulcie “has already betrayed the belief that some 
trace of hers is needed for his to make sense; he has already betrayed the desire to 
lose her story within his own” (78). 
A powerful woman, Dulcie is an oxymoronic affront to the patriarchal 
structure of the MK organization.  She is ritually tortured for her rise in the ranks:   
 
The men in balaclavas come like privileged guests into her bedroom, 
in the early hours, always entering the house by different routes, 
ridiculing her reinforced bolts and locks. . . .  Occasionally a real 
doctor is brought along. . . .  Sometimes in the delirium of pain she 
wishes to say something soothing, comforting, for she knows that he 
does not understand the ways of the world, the ugly secrets of war.  
(81, 82)   
 
Scarred, silent, Dulcie is both keeper and marker of “the ugly secrets of war,” and in 
David’s text she is regularly ungendered or rendered non-normative as well as 
censored.  David tells the narrator:  “She is not pretty, you know, not feminine, not 
like a woman at all” (80).  When the narrator asks about how male guerillas treat 
female comrades, he “barks” that the question is “irrelevant. . . .  In the Movement 
those kinds of differences are wiped out by our common goal” (78).  David “doesn’t 
want [Dulcie’s] voice represented” so intensely that he wrangles with the narrator 
repeatedly over her speculations about Dulcie (199).  These arguments litter the text:  
“he has brushed aside my piece on [Dulcie’s] obsession and silence as an absurd 
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exercise in style,” the narrator tells the reader (198).  But the narrator also recognizes 
that Dulcie’s place outside the story represents woman’s place outside the new nation:  
“I have nothing to lose and so push ahead with my inventions.  Dulcie has, after all, 
always hovered somewhere between fact and fiction” (198), just as womanhood in 
the new South Africa will always hover somewhere between the Real and the margin 
unless the liberation movement breaks the colonialist cycle of sexism.   
In contrast, the reader sees no struggle over the narrator’s inclusion of the 
history of David’s ex-comrade and wife Sally whom David expelled from the 
Movement when he married her.  At the time he told Sally that “it was only sensible 
that they should think about the future, of leading normal family lives” (14).  Does 
David provide more detail on Sally or is she—like Dulcie—another of the narrator’s 
“inventions?”  I suggest that Sally’s status as wife and mother, and not comrade, 
conforms to patriarchal modes of familial citizenship and eliminates her threat to the 
MK’s historical and ideological patriarchy.  Sally’s conformity allows her to inhabit 
David’s history while Dulcie’s nonconformity bars her from it.  Indeed, while David 
is uncomfortable giving place to Dulcie because she defies patriarchal norms, the 
narrator reports that in his history “David would like his wife to be something of a 
character” (17).  Despite David’s permissions, however, we see less of Sally than we 
do of Dulcie in the text.  David’s confinement of Sally in the text to the role of 
mother over that of comrade is emblematic of the mother’s marginality in reference to 
the liberation movement—a harbinger of her confinement within the margins of the 
new nation.  Perhaps the narrator is indirectly responsible for Sally’s marginalization 
in the text as well:  because David does not attempt, as strongly as he does with 
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Dulcie, to censor Sally from the text, the narrator is less driven to resurrect her 
minimally suppressed voice and existence.   
The apartheid state was so male “in its self-conception, representation and 
control” that all women were “absenced,” that it censored all women from its 
articulation of “the people” such that “people” meant “men” (Daymond xv).  
Censoring women from the social text makes naturalizing violence against them 
possible, and David’s androcentric recitation cannot obscure the gendered 
dehumanization that underpins the Movement’s opposition to racialized 
dehumanization.  For female comrades like Dulcie and Sally, both the state and its 
opposition are male.  Censoring women from “the people” and from the people’s 
liberation movement presages their exclusion from the “new” South Africa.   
David’s desire to not articulate Dulcie’s story in detail is tied to his conviction 
that sexual relations between comrades in a revolutionary organization undermines 
the integrity of the unit.  In seeking such prohibition, however, he unintentionally 
opens up the possibility of the rape of women, what Sally calls “this unspoken part of 
a girl’s training” (123) because it is common knowledge both inside and outside the 
Movement that to be a woman in the MK is almost certainly to be raped.  This 
knowledge is perhaps David’s reason for curtailing Sally’s participation in the 
revolution.  Sally’s role as mother is incompatible with the female comrade’s 
vulnerability to rape or torture.  David fails (or refuses) to realize that after several 
years as an elite cadre, Sally has surely already been raped.  Indeed, when David 
ejects Sally from the MK to protect her from rape, the mother ejected has already 
been raped and so the ejection is useless.  She has seen her swimming trainer’s 
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“bulging shorts and [known] that her time had come, as she had known it would come 
sooner or later” (123).  David fails to see that excluding mothers from armed struggle 
in order to protect them from rape does not dismantle socially sanctioned gendered 
subordination.  Instead, motherhood becomes an additional tool for gendering women 
as women in order to censor them from the project of crafting the new nation.  Their 
motherhood is used to strip them of their nationalist roles, barring them from 
participation in the national birth in retribution for their past association with 
biological birth.  For Sally, removed as with a curette from her chosen work, “there 
was an emptiness, a hollowness inside as if she had aborted, no, miscarried” her 
nationalist maternity (14).  Instead, Sally is relegated to the revolution’s sidelines of 
community service and is textually reduced to a shrew, jealous of David’s association 
with her own former comrade.  Sally’s fear that David may sleep with Dulcie betrays 
her knowledge and experience of the Movement’s paradoxical embrace of gendered 
subordination in resistance to racial subordination.  Sally’s relationship to the 
Movement after she is no longer part of it is thus represented as unproductive and 
antagonistic.  Wicomb demonstrates that absenting the mother figure from the critical 
operations of nation building is counterproductive to the birth of an inclusive nation. 
*  *  * 
Literary representations depict cultural markers.35  In a patriarchy, rape and 
other forms of gendered violence are the literary and cultural absences or gaps that 
signify social crisis and censorship.36  Censoring gendered violence from the cultural 
text normalizes it to the point that both men and women eventually come to expect 
women to be victimized based on their gender, and normalizing that censorship erases 
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women from the citizenry.37  Normalized sexual violence becomes a force that helps 
to reinforce gender difference and identity constructions that, in turn, reinforce the 
existing patriarchal reality.38  Reading the literature of an emerging postcolonial 
nation illuminates the ways in which testimonial ghosts can reveal the residues and 
ramifications of cultural censorship.  For example, Wicomb argues elsewhere that 
Miriam Tlali’s story “Fud-u-u-a!” about women sexually molested on a crowded train 
demonstrates South African social pressure on black women to identify only white 
men as sexual predators even though some black men are also perpetrators.39  Black 
women in Tlali’s story use the vague terms “they” and “men” to describe their 
molesters and thus render them anonymous.  The women display ambivalence in the 
ways they censor their testimonies of sexual abuse.  Wicomb asks:  do the women 
refer to black men on the train, the authorities of the state who “create conditions in 
which abuse becomes possible,” or men in general “who control female discourse?” 
(“Hear” 51).  Black women’s language conceals the possibility of black men as 
perpetrators and emphasizes instead other potential predators in the scenario.  Erasing 
abuse from the social text exonerates the abuser, and the women’s nonspecific 
language obscures the reality of black male predators in their indictment of male 
sexual predation in general.  Tlali’s story demonstrates the women’s employment of 
the trope of concealment necessary to “negotiate the conflicting loyalties of race and 
gender” that was the cultural reality of the resistance and which has become the 
cultural reality of post-independence Africa (Wicomb, “Hear” 51).   
Even as it conceals, however, the women’s speech also informs those who 
know—who participate in and benefit from this cultural discourse of concealment—
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that black men are the sexual violators on the train.  The black women’s concealment 
of the black male sexual predator in Tlali’s story is illusory.  None of the women, or 
anyone who overhears their conversation, wonders at the answer to Wicomb’s 
question above about the objects of the women’s discussion.  In Tlali’s apartheid 
South Africa, as in Wicomb’s almost-“new” South Africa, everyone knows where the 
potential for gendered violence resides, as well as who will administer it and who it 
will victimize.  But no one speaks this information in order to protect its censorship in 
the emerging national imaginary.   
Wicomb’s essay illuminates the secret of a double censorship in which the 
othered South African black woman, censored from the social text of the new South 
African “we,” is pressured to ensure the new nation’s health by censoring her own 
gendered abuse by black men from the historical record of apartheid abuses.  
Daymond sees this pressure as a cultural directive to rank one’s various subjectivities 
with respect to race, class, age, and gender.  To rank abuses is, of course, to create a 
hierarchy.  Politically, black women’s adherence to the mandate to rank their race 
above their gender invisibilizes gender and gendered abuse from public view and 
discourse.  When the individual must sacrifice aspects of her self for the common 
good, then the “common good” is replaced by a collective of repressed selves.  Thus, 
the censored female body participates in culturally censoring the very mechanism that 
erases her from the cultural text.  Her participation both perpetuates her own erasure 




Haunting thwarts censorship of the other because erasure fails to eradicate her 
completely from history’s text.  The ghost reveals gendered violence including rape as 
the failed secret and symptom of social pathology.  David supposes that black women 
can overlook their sexual oppression within the Movement as less violating than the 
apartheid oppression of racism and, apparently, sexual predation from whites.  His 
argument is flawed and the narrator’s rewriting of his story exposes that flaw—the 
attempt to censor gendered violence from the text—cultural, testimonial, or 
otherwise—reveals its pervasive presence.  The culturally instituted pattern of 
gendered violence and its erasure contains the loose thread of its own unraveling 
because the historically repeated pattern of violence leaves traces of each traumatic 
episode.   
As censorship disfigures the text, the disfigured text attempts to hide the 
disfigured physical body.  The censored historical text is riddled with holes filled with 
the ghosts of women’s bruised and disfigured bodies.  In David’s Story, although 
Dulcie is not raped according to the narrator, the violence done to her—she is stripped 
naked and electrocuted—is intended to gender her female and is therefore gendered 
violence.  The lead torturer instructs his cohorts, “Not rape, that will teach her 
nothing, leave nothing; rape’s too good for her kind” (178).  Dulcie represents the 
tension felt by women in the MK ranks:  she embodies the potential for rape that 
haunts those who have not yet been victimized.  David’s disfigured historical text is a 
metaphor for Dulcie’s disfigured, torture-scarred body which he censors but which 
haunts his narrative anyway.  In a culture of violence, each whole body deformed 
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represents a loss.  The narrator thus envisions Dulcie’s scarred body hidden under a 
guerilla uniform as a diminished whole: 
 
Her back is strong, broad, almost a square depending on where one 
considers the back to end.  This square is marked with four cent-sized 
circles forming the corners of a smaller inner square, meticulously 
staked out with blue ballpoint pen before the insertion of a red-hot 
poker between the bones.  The smell of that singed flesh and bone still, 
on occasion, invades, and then she cannot summon it away.  Each 
circle is a liverish red crinkled surface of flesh, healed in the darkness 
under garments that would not let go of the blood.  (19) 
 
Meticulously marked out like the plotted map of the new South Africa, Dulcie’s 
female body is only tolerated in the Movement because it is regularly unsexed through 
torture.  The comrade who is not perceived as a woman poses no threat of becoming a 
mother and Dulcie is allowed not only in the Movement but to continue as one of its 
leaders because she is not perceived as feminine.  Only feminine comrades threaten 
the integrity of the unit because their gender, according to David’s verbal slip, invites 
rape.  David misses the great irony of his belief:  rape is the very act that could 
impregnate female cadres, transforming comrades into mothers whom the patriarchal 
nation must then protect from rape.   
Unlike the expelled mother Sally, whose combat scars of rape are psychic and 
therefore invisible, Dulcie’s combat scars literally crisscross her body.  David 
demonstrates the facility with which the female comrade’s service and resultant scars 
are both censored from resistance history when he dismisses the one instance of 
Dulcie actually displaying a scar, “the trace of her ordeal” of a bee swarm attack for 
his examination (83).  Emblematically, even if unintentionally so, David tells the 
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narrator that “even as he stiffly bent closer to look, he could see no evidence of that 
savage attack” (83).   
Despite her pervasive haunting of his text, David’s repeated attempts to 
diminish Dulcie’s importance to it demonstrates the fact that history attempts to 
obscure trauma because traumatic testimony threatens the cultural discourse of power 
and domination.  Trauma survivors alienate those who have not survived similar 
trauma because survivor presence disrupts a culture that wishes to deny its culpability 
for their traumatic suffering.40  The culture of domination shuns survivors in order to 
repress the shame of having created the conditions that precipitated traumatic events.  
Those in power thus view the trauma survivor as a threat and attempt to deny her 
experience through cultural institutions in order to protect the culture’s discursive and 
ideological frames of homogeneity and benevolence.  Wicomb contends that those 
who “control discourse, whom a culture authorizes to speak,” are invested in survivor-
citizen silence because cultural spokesmen are also generally its perpetrators of 
violence (“Hear” 47).  To Wicomb, those in power “will not tolerate exposure and, 
indeed, will construct it as treacherous and politically unsound” (“Hear” 47).  The 
trauma sufferer’s testimony, silenced as culturally un-sound, is subversive for its 
affront to cultural ideology and other institutions, and principally to the monolith of 
history.   
 
Breaking Frameworks:  Traumatic Historicity 
To conceive of a history of trauma is to revise the definition of “history.”  
Freud provides such a precedent by replacing biblical history with an exploration of 
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trauma in “Moses and Monotheism.”41  He seems to deny the monolith—even the 
possibility—of historical reference in two ways:  by replacing supposedly “factual” 
history with his own fictional supposition; and by suggesting that the historical 
memory of a traumatized people is merely a version of that people’s history filtered 
through the lens of trauma.  Writing history as traumatic testimony is an exercise in 
historicity.42  In the novel, the narrator illustrates the choice that undergirds the 
practice of historicity.  By transforming David’s history into a traumatic testimony, 
she destroys the discursive framework of what constitutes a history, breaking down 
the binary opposition between testimony and history to create what we might call 
traumatic historicity.     
David is obsessed with finding and narrating an accurate history of the Griqua.  
He uses research techniques that, in Western academe, will yield an accurate and thus 
valid historical document.  David thus seeks out museums and historical monographs 
even if they are racist.  None of David’s attempts at hegemonic history making yields 
the information he seeks, yet he ignores as invalid a respected African mode of 
historical retention and transmission:  testimony.  David grimly endures the narratives 
of oral Kokstadt historian Thomas, and he dismisses his Ouma Ragel’s “old stories” 
as merely entertainment (27).  Although David seeks to create a history, his narrative 
is one of land loss and it is ruptured, fragmented, stalled.  What the reader begins to 
see even as David does not is that the real history in David’s Story is a traumatic 
testimony.  Despite his repeated efforts to censor and ignore oral narratives and 
women’s subordination, their residue marks the narrator’s text in both its form and its 
content.  The oral narratives she transcribes, her edits and addenda, her own diary 
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entries, are all—to David—extraneous to his history.  And, yet, the narrator includes 
them all, interspersed with sections of David’s own narrative, and all presented in a 
non-linear fashion that bears no resemblance to a formal historical study by Western 
academic standards.  I want to suggest that what David unwittingly delivers to the 
narrator is a testimony.  David’s Story illustrates and demonstrates in its textual 
explosion of “a proper history” that a history of trauma is indirect, and that the 
fragmented nature of traumatic history does not conform to—or fit within—
established Western narrative frameworks. 
Laub writes that the psychoanalyst sees “historical truth” in traumatic 
testimony which, I have explained, is considered an inaccurate history by Western 
scholarly standards (61).  Historical truth is that moment in a historical narrative that 
is inaccurate because it is the moment of trauma:  it is the moment that the frame of 
reference breaks.  Historical truth is traumatic truth.  If traumatic suffering is a state of 
unknowing, then historical truth is the record of that which is inconceivable and 
unverifiable.  Of an Auschwitz survivor’s testimony containing errors of established 
historical fact, Laub “insisted” that she spoke: 
 
not to the number of chimneys blown up, but to something else, more 
radical, more crucial:  the reality of an unimaginable occurrence.  One 
chimney blown up in Auschwitz was as incredible as four.  The 
number mattered less than the fact of the occurrence.  The event itself 
was almost inconceivable.  The woman testified to an event that broke 
the all compelling frame of Auschwitz, where Jewish armed revolts 
just did not happen, and had no place.  She testified to the breakage of 




As the Jewish example shows, one remembers, but one remembers falsely or 
inaccurately the traumatic event.  This falsely remembered moment is the moment of 
historicity.  The act or event that the individual cannot remember correctly is the very 
moment which the dominant culture censors from its record and which spawns the 
testimonial ghost.  A testimony of historical truth is a testimony of resistance because 
it names that which the dominant culture wishes to hide from its formal history.  For 
this reason, the testimony of resistance is about historicity and not history (62).  
Testimonial inaccuracy is impossible because testimony’s purpose is to acknowledge 
and record the indeterminate.  The very nature of testimony is inaccuracy.  The 
testimony of resistance further demands that we uncouple the experience-versus-
evidence binary in order to conceive of traumatic experience as historical evidence.43  
In the context of history making, the testimony of resistance is both about and an act 
of social resistance because it breaks the discursive frames of both oppression and its 
recording.  The narrative of David’s Story is such a testimony of resistance which, 
presented as historical evidence, breaks patriarchal frameworks of sexuality, 
domination, and history making.   
 
Writing Testimony, Writing Resistance 
Writing the recovered story of censored gendered violence in the MK, as 
Wicomb’s narrator does, is a politically subversive act that challenges the dominant 
anti-apartheid discourse of black unity.  Nevertheless, women in the text value 
independence more than they fear gendered violence or recrimination.44  Even though 
their sexuality is the basis on which they are exploited, it is through their autonomy 
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and anatomy that they mount their resistance.  In David’s Story, the gendered-female 
body is the site of both cultural resistance and control.  Young women comrades in the 
Venda wear traditional dress “buttressing the hips and buttocks into exotic insect 
shapes. . . .  with piles of wood balanced on their heads,” appearing to conform to 
patriarchal ideals of beauty.  At the same time, however, these women use their 
supposed conformity to patriarchal social mores to mount their resistance:  “their 
bodies a mere hint of movement within the sculpted shapes, the AK-47s perfectly 
concealed” (19).   
When her “time” comes during her MK swimming lesson, Sally knows that 
complicity in the rape act serves herself and not the hegemony.  It becomes her sense 
of agency in that it saves her life:  “because she would not let him force her, lord it 
over her, she forced herself and said, Okay, if you want.  It did not take long, and she 
had no trouble pushing him off as soon as he had done” (123).  In this context, 
complicity is resistance, and the comrade-rapist believes Sally’s apparent 
acquiescence because her complicity follows the cultural script of female docility.  
Yet Sally’s experience, which is indicative of a cultural phenomenon in anti-colonial 
liberation struggles, is absent from David’s narrative and MK discourse.  Like the 
women on the train in Tlali’s story, Wicomb’s narrator transgresses this cultural trope 
of concealment by assuming the presence of and adding black male sexual predators 
to the larger historical narrative.  
Because the narrator is witness to David’s testimony, she is co-creator of its 
meaning.  She embraces this role by literally creating meaning, often independent of 
David.  She even continues to augment the testimony after he is dead—and thus, 
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without his permission.  She tells the reader, “I took liberties with the text and revised 
considerably some sections that he had already approved” (3).  The testimony which 
the narrator fashions out of David’s story of land theft is one of censoring the mother 
figure from the national text.  David’s Story becomes in the end a traumatic testimony 
haunted by traumatic knowledge David sought to avoid:  his participation in apartheid 
South Africa’s subordination of black mothers, often through gendered violence.  The 
secret revealed is that the unity of the movement is not undermined by women’s 
opposition to sexual subordination but by the fact of the sexual subordination itself.   
This revelation is a ruse.  The ghost in the story, Dulcie, reveals this secret in 
an attempt to obscure a deeper, more shameful one.  Her demand for a just response 
to the Movement’s gendered violence diverts the reader’s attention away from the 
other “genuine and truthful” secret that preys on the conscience of the ghost (in this 
case, Dulcie) which Abraham calls the “phantom” in reference to the apparition of 
Hamlet’s father (188-89).45  David, who “believed it possible to father his text from 
such a distance” (2), unwittingly allows the inclusion of the secret Dulcie reveals.  
That secret ultimately proves him to be a liar.  The narrator describes their 
negotiations over which materials to include in the manuscript, recalling that “what 
become[s] clear as the lightning flashe[s] across the window [is] that these texts [a]re 
no cause for fear and anxiety, that David, having come from the meeting wild-eyed 
and trembling, [is] using the Griqua material to displace that of which he [can] not 
speak” (145).  In censoring the shameful secret, David insures that its residue 
broadcasts its existence.  The secret of gendered violence in the MK is no real secret, 
but it masks another secret wrapped in shame.  Revelation of the shameful secret is 
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the testimonial act that can initiate mourning and transformation of one’s sense of self 
and the world.   
David’s revealed story is not gendered violence in the MK.  The MK is a rape 
culture and gendered violence is its backdrop.  In the “different world” of the MK 
(196), gendered violence is not a disruption of the Real, it is the Real.46  As the Real 
is a construct, its relationship to moments of traumatic crisis is complex and 
paradoxical.  We tend, erroneously, to presume a reality divorced from crisis.  When 
a traumatic event occurs, we seek to return to that which we have perceived as 
uninterrupted normalcy.  In so doing, we censor the fact that the Real is not only 
comprised in part of but also was forged in strife.  In David’s Story, the story of 
gendered violence in the MK hides the shameful, more deeply hidden secret that the 
expulsion of the mother figure from the Movement seeks to masculinize the birth of 
the new nation.  And it hides the twin secrets of David’s participation and of Dulcie’s 
complicity in this expulsion. 
Sally’s ejection from the Movement illustrates the deepest secret of all:  that 
the threat to black unity is not warrior women like Dulcie.  For David, Dulcie’s being 
“not like a woman at all” (80) is incongruent with the gendered figure of the wife and 
mother enshrined in a patriarchy.  It is Dulcie’s unwomanliness, and thus her lack of 
potential for motherhood in such a social framework, which guarantees her position 
of power (albeit troubled) in the Movement.  Wicomb’s novel demonstrates the 
necessity of the mother figure to the ability to dismantle racialized oppression 
(Daymond xxvii).  The threat to the MK—to patriarchy—is neither the female 
warrior nor the mother.  The greatest threat is the woman who inhabits both roles:  the 
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warrior mothers who educate the next generation to subvert both racism and sexism.  
Sally is the warrior mother, teaching her daughter Chantal to swim so that Chantal 
will not have to be taught to swim later when she joins the struggle.  Practically, Sally 
hopes to prevent Chantal’s future rape by an MK swim instructor, but these 
swimming lessons are a metaphor.  Sally is in fact teaching Chantal to subvert 
matrices of domination disguised as egalitarian communities.  Her assumption that 
Chantal will join the MK belies Sally’s small faith that the current flawed struggle 
will end in the inclusive postcoloniality it promises.  In her simple act of 
appropriating the MK’s training regimen, Sally the warrior mother reveals her own 
secret of resistance:  she is the progenitor of the postcolonial nation.  On the eve of 
independence, Sally reconfigures both motherhood and nationhood by employing 
guerilla tactics to mother the next generation of South African mothers and a new 
national citizenry.   
If David’s Story illustrates the haunting of the censored testimony of traumatic 
history, then The Icarus Girl grapples with the consequences of an unspoken 
testimony of loss.  The novel is haunted by the ghost of the female body who has 
been erased from the transnational family and from the neocolonial nation. 
 
Allowed to Remember?  The Icarus Girl 
Unlike David’s Story, The Icarus Girl is framed as neither a history nor a 
testimony.  I read The Icarus Girl as a representation of the consequences of an 
absence of testimony.  A testimonial censorship so complete as to obscure the fact of 
the loss itself is the incorporation of that loss and an indicator of melancholia.  
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Melancholia is not only the failure to mourn and move beyond loss, it is also an 
attempt to forget that a loss has occurred.  The attempt must be repeated continually, 
which creates the opposite of the intended effect.  Rather than obliterate the lost 
object from consciousness, the repeated attempts to forget both the object and the fact 
of its loss means that the loss is foregrounded for the sufferer by virtue of continuous 
engagement with it.  TillyTilly is Jess’s ghostly manifestation of her parents’ 
offloaded melancholic attachments to their dead baby Fern.  TillyTilly first appears to 
Jess at a moment of crisis:  Jess both seeks and fears alienation from her peers and 
parents:  “They should leave me alone and let me read my books, let me think my 
thoughts,” she thinks (163, emphasis in original).  The manifestation of Jess’s social 
frustration, a series of hysterical attacks, compounds her sense of difference and 
isolation.  At this moment of traumatic loneliness for Jess, a corporeal twin arrives.  
TillyTilly is visible only to Jess, a child obsessed with being both subject and object 
of the gaze that separates and binds the self and the other.   
TillyTilly’s supernatural abilities pervade the rest of the narrative so that most 
of Jess’s subsequent experiences are also supernaturally infused.  I read Oyeyemi’s 
non-realistic portrayal of this period of profound transformation and growth for Jess 
as a metaphor for the manner in which narratives of trauma collide with the 
boundaries of restrictive, established narrative forms.  In its depiction of a protagonist 
who moves from a state of profound alienation to one of enlightenment, The Icarus 
Girl is a female postcolonial Bildungsroman.  But Oyeyemi’s text ties the narrative of 
maturity not just to the postcolonial nation but also to linked narratives of 
motherhood and loss.  Indeed, the experience of maternal loss launches Jess’s 
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narrative of transformation—her Bild—which becomes inextricably entwined with 
that of TillyTilly.  As the ghost of a censored loss, the character of TillyTilly 
functions as a reminder of the lost Fern but, in so doing, TillyTilly’s presence initiates 
Sarah’s eventual testimony of Fern’s loss.  Because Jess has by this point already 
deduced the truth through her experiences with TillyTilly, one might argue that 
TillyTilly is a phantasmic embodiment of the loss of Fern—a testimony in the form of 
a ghost.  By “reading” TillyTilly as the residue of her family’s loss, Jess “reads” 
TillyTilly as the testimony of loss that Sarah and Daniel will not and/or cannot utter.   
Bildungsroman is the German word for “novel of transformation” or “novel of 
education” that implies a hero’s quest to emulate the image of (God) the father (Feng 
2-3).47  The journey transforms the hero into a more mature, harmonious, 
knowledgeable, and spiritually fulfilled individual.  Despite the genre’s androcentric 
origin, a growing body of Bildungsroman scholarship has recently expanded the 
genre’s definition to include transformation narratives of female, racialized, and 
postcolonial protagonists.  These Bildungsroman so-called sub-genres subvert the 
traditional Bildungsroman plot in various ways.  When all of these “sub-genres” 
coalesce as they do in the Bild of Jess who is female, postcolonial, and racialized, the 
resulting narrative’s relationship with the Bildungsroman form is less an attempt at 
conformity than it is a continual and multi-pronged rupturing of the form’s traditional 
boundaries.   
More so than class or race, gender transforms the traditional Bildungsroman 
formula in the most meaningful and complex ways.  The Oedipal script of sons and 
fathers does not fit writing by and/or about combinations of daughters, mothers, girls, 
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and women.  It also does not accommodate the reconfiguration of the black family 
through colonialism.48  Further, in order for a young woman to discover and define a 
more mature, fulfilled, and enlightened self, she must defy not only the society’s 
patriarchal “traditions and definitions of the female self,” but she must also subvert 
the broad-reaching patriarchy of the novel form itself (Eysturoy 85).49  If a culture 
defines itself through its literature and vice versa, then the female Bild’s quest for a 
way to grow and to exist in the world is especially difficult because she must first 
escape and subvert these “seemingly inescapable patterns, images, plots, and forms”  
(Heller 26).50  Dana Heller finds even the conventional female quest story to be “a 
thwarted if impossible journey, a rude awakening to limits” on female experience 
(14).  Only the female protagonist who authors her own text can escape and subvert 
the restrictions of the traditional female Bildung plot.  In The Icarus Girl, Jess grows 
angry that Louisa May Alcott and Frances Hodgson Burnett do not “treat” their 
“nice” protagonists “better” (63).   Jess writes in her copies of Little Women and A 
Little Princess, replacing passages that “make us watch people be sick, and be poor, 
and lose everything, and die” with her own happier emendations (62).51  In so doing, 
Jess asserts her ability to tell “a proper story” even “better than Louisa May Alcott 
does” (62).  Jess’s rewriting of English female Bildungsromane not only reaffirms the 
female “I” as the texts’ central experiential perspective in subversion of patriarchal 
narrative norms, but Jess’s act also delivers Alcott’s Beth and Burnett’s Sara from the 
illness and poverty that confine them, charting in the process her own escape from a 
confining social order that censors the feminine.  The self-appointed narrator of other 
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female Bildungsromane, Jess, as the intertextual, omniscient female “I,” also adopts 
the authoritative role of narrator of her own narrative of transformation.   
Pin-Chia Feng calls attention to the female Bildungsroman’s lack of an 
identifiable pattern.  The genre is a “wild, wild zone” of fragmented narratives, 
repetition, repression, and the intersection of these forms with themes of race, 
migration, and gender (Feng 18).  I suggest that the confluence of forms and narrative 
experiences suggests the way we talk about trauma and testimony.  As a collection, 
women’s narrative bears the “traces of absence” that “paradoxically highlight what 
has been textually and politically suppressed” (Feng 19).  Freud calls repression 
“rejecting and keeping something out of consciousness” (“Repression” 86), but Feng 
suggests that female postcolonial Bildungsromane challenge cultural repression by 
acting as a collective “counter-memory,” to borrow Michel Foucault’s term 
(Language 160), against the restrictive, prevailing cultural and historical narratives.52  
If we read these texts in the context of trauma, then the female postcolonial Bildung 
functions in the same transformative manner as traumatic testimony.  Trauma initiates 
the female postcolonial Bildungsroman in much the same way it can initiate 
testimony. 
 
Diaspora Mourning, Diaspora Melancholia 
Like Morrison’s visitor Beloved, TillyTilly is the embodiment of trauma’s 
“resistance to narrative” (Morgenstern 112) but, more than that, she marks Sarah’s 
resistance to narrating her loss and Jess’s inability to do so for her.  In The Icarus Girl 
Sarah deals with mourning much like David does in David’s Story, by obsessively 
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censoring a crucial participant in her history.  The longer she tries to censor Fern’s 
existence; however, the greater the baby’s intrusion into her life becomes.  Like 
Sethe’s grown-up baby Beloved Sarah’s grown-up baby TillyTilly terrorizes her 
surviving daughter, eventually destroying property and harming people to make her 
presence obvious.  Although Sarah can see the results of TillyTilly’s destruction, she 
cannot see TillyTilly.  Invisibility is uncertainty, and Sarah does not believe TillyTilly 
exists.  Believing that Jess is the perpetrator is Sarah’s method of continuing to avoid 
the increasingly obvious.  This is because the mother in diaspora cannot mourn her 
dead child as she would in the homeland.  “I didn’t know I was allowed to 
remember,” Sarah tells Daniel after Jess finally confronts her, asking about Fern 
(180).   
Children rely on their caregivers to give meaning to “the unfathomable” 
trauma of sibling death and denial of meaning-making discussion can be catastrophic 
to the child (Charles and Charles).  When Sarah refuses to tell Jess about Fern, she 
forestalls the potential for crucial meaning-making and thus censors crucial self-
knowledge for Jess that impedes Jess’s development.  The most pathological family 
loss scenario is what Robert Krell and Leslie Rabkin call “a conspiracy of silence” in 
which none of the surviving family members discusses the sibling’s passing (474).53  
This is the mourning scenario The Icarus Girl presents.  Parent silence insulates and 
isolates the parent from the loss, but it also alienates the child from the parent and 
prevents both from addressing and possibly working through the loss.  Parent 
isolation is, to the child, a symbolic loss of the parent.  The parent’s emotional 
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unavailability can thus threaten the child’s sense of security more severely than her 
sibling’s death did.54   
Unfortunately, Sarah’s failure to mourn Fern’s passage has compromised her 
competency as a mother to Jess, both within Nigeria and without.  Consensus does 
not exist on what “postcolonial Nigeria” is, and the neocolonial nation that cannot 
define itself expels the mother.  Expulsion from the homeland nullifies Sarah’s 
existence as a mother.  Symbolically unable to protect her children either at home (in 
the homeland) or abroad in the colonial metropole, the post-independence mother in 
diaspora fails as mother.  I read Sarah as an exemplification of a Nigerian African 
mother struggling to reconfigure Yoruba motherhood in diaspora.  I read her as 
hampered by the double melancholy of the loss of a child and that of exile.  Indeed, 
Stuart Hall frames “the diasporic experience” in terms of melancholy (Chen 490).55   
As a biracial female in England, Jess has also been prevented from mourning 
her twin by the prevailing culture of British education.  Significantly for Jess, the 
school is a microcosm of the homogenizing nation, entrusted with “cultural 
transmission” to the next generation of Britons (Gilroy, Small 59).56  As the child of 
an immigrant parent, however, Jess’s continual attempts to assimilate only draw 
attention to her difference, as when she does not know the “‘normal’ fairy tales that 
her mother omit[s] to tell her” and so misunderstands the cultural references made by 
the other children at school (183).  Jess’s attempts at belonging, even as a native 
Briton, are doomed to fail because her racial difference trumps her nativity.57  
Because culture defined as racial homogeneity excludes blackness from Englishness, 
Paul Gilroy has famously argued that the immigrant’s attempt to adopt a European 
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identity in tandem with his existing black identity requires a form of “double-
consciousness” (Atlantic 1).58  Bhabha suggests that an attempt to assimilate is 
inimical to self preservation in general and to one’s healthful sense of self in 
particular:  the “intellectual and psychic ‘uncertainty’” of whether or not one belongs 
is one way in which the dominant culture dehumanizes the immigrant (136).59  By 
suggesting a “space between” blackness and British-ness, or a “continuity” of the 
two, Gilroy carves out a social space for Jess, who is biologically black and British.  
By framing that space as “provocative” and “oppositional,” Gilroy reiterates the 
backdrop of melancholia that characterizes the experience of inhabiting the “space 
between” two consciousnesses.  To view the interplay of black and British identities 
in the context of a traumatic split is to anticipate Hall’s vision of culture as foremost a 
“deeply subjective and personal” expression of one’s relationship to the social 
structure, but also “at the same moment, as a structure you live,” regardless of how 
problematic that relationship is (Chen 488). 
As a microcosm of the dominant culture, “family” is a culturally constructed 
group within which affiliation is constructed by the gaze of familiarity.  This local, 
internal gaze is overlaid by the gaze of external dominant cultural institutions and 
ideologies which determine both what constitutes a family and how the ideal family 
should and does operate.  Each culture has a specific ideal family image.  Marianne 
Hirsch’s term “familial gaze” refers to the ideological pressure exerted upon a family 
unit to conform to a particular culture’s ideal family image—“the powerful gaze of 
familiarity which imposes and perpetuates certain conventional images of the familial 
and which ‘frames’ the family in both senses of the term” (10).60  The presence of the 
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external familial gaze and each family member’s response to it in large part shapes the 
social construction of and the group identifying itself as a “family.”  Within the family 
unit, members seek recognition of themselves in one another and, simultaneously, 
hope to be recognized by the other members of the family.   
The quest for belonging based in sameness within the family is further 
complicated when the family loses a member and migrates to a new culture where the 
family’s composition differs from local ideals.  The surviving members of the migrant 
family must create a new family reality based on how the surviving family 
composition compares to the host country’s cultural ideal even as they struggle with 
reformulating their internal family reality as necessitated by loss.  Having survived 
both immigration to England and the death of her baby Fern, Sarah struggles to create 
a revised family reality in an English context even though doing so means foregoing 
significant elements of Yoruba mourning practice in relation to Fern’s passing.  When 
she returns to Nigeria with her family, it is now Jess who is acutely aware of the 
power of looking, of seeing, to either bind or alienate.  Outside the airport, just off the 
plane, Jess feels uncomfortably visible when she catches a Nigerian man’s eye from 
across the street as her father helps the driver load their cab:  “He was looking at her, 
but in a distracted manner, as if she was something to look at while he waited for 
something else” (16-17).  When Daniel reenters the car, Jess is relieved by the return 
of the familiar: 
 
as if a lone scrap of home had just blown into the car.  England, where 
people who stared at you would shift their eyes away with an 
embarrassed, smiling gesture if you stared back.  England, where 
people didn’t see you, where it was almost rude to, wrong to.   
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     Would her cousins be like this?  Would they look at her, then see 
her, and just not really…well, care?   See her, and leave her looking, 
trying to see something?  (17, emphasis in original) 
 
Jess’s questions belie her fear of a failure of family recognition and, thus, of 
connection and of belonging.  But her deeper fear of recognition is racialized.  In 
racialized England, Jess equates looking away with cultivated unfamiliarity.  When 
whites do see her, it is because she is related to them because they are her father’s 
family, and so those whites that do look, do so because they want to see her.  When 
confronted with the possibility of a racially homogeneous family in Nigeria, 
comprised of people she does not know, she wonders if the same rules hold true:  is 
there a difference between merely seeing another and the connective gaze of 
familiarity?   The answer frightens her when, much later:  
 
She had just realized with stunning clarity that she was the only person 
who saw TillyTilly.  She put a hand to her mouth as she tried to sort 
this out in her mind.  She didn’t know why it hadn’t occurred to her 
before.  TillyTilly had not met anyone in her family, no one had met 
her, and she refused to meet anyone.  And even when Jess was with 
TillyTilly, never mind that people couldn’t see Jess; the most 
noticeable thing was that they couldn’t see TillyTilly.  She suddenly 
felt very small and a little bit scared.  (164, emphasis added) 
 
Jess places great importance on TillyTilly’s presence, and she is shocked to learn that 
Tilly’s sphere of existence is limited to Jess’s own imagination.  TillyTilly has failed 
to make Jess visible, and the knowledge that TillyTilly is not part of the social 
construct of reality challenges the way Jess understands belonging. 
It is into Britain’s hostilely racialized environment that Sarah has given birth 
to the live Jess and the stillborn Fern.  In its failure to accommodate mourning 
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practices outside its own traditions, the dominant culture is in another way hostile to 
immigrants.  Migration limits the immigrant family’s potential for productive 
mourning when the adopted culture fails to provide access to or a supportive 
environment for the origin culture’s mourning rituals and tools.61  For example, in 
cultures that consider death as another stage of life, physical emblems of the deceased 
are used as mourning aids to maintain bonds with the deceased.62   
In Yoruba communities, the orisha (“goddess”) Ibeji is the protector of twins, 
which are cosmically powerful.63  Ibeji can cause sickness, infertility, and death 
within the family if they are not honored adequately.  In contrast, if properly respected 
they may bring good health, children, and wealth.  In Yoruba metaphysics, each living 
person houses one soul in a line of ancestral souls that are continually reborn.  Twins 
share one soul such that one twin houses the spiritual half of the soul and one houses 
the mortal half.  It is impossible to determine which twin houses which half of the 
soul, so both twins—whether living or not—must be treated as sacred.  For the 
Yoruba, to survive a twin’s death is to live with half a soul.  The living twin yearns to 
be reunited with the other who has passed into the land of the ancestors and to repair 
the damaged soul.  The deceased Yoruba twin is a lost object of powerful importance 
to the living Yoruba twin’s definition of self.  Contemporary grief theory notes that 
sibling loss disrupts attachment and forestalls relational development that is a crucial 
byproduct of constructive mourning.64  Jess’s relational difficulties in both the 
domestic and social spheres may be read as a result of her obstructed mourning for 
Fern.65   
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A twin that has passed into the land of ancestors is considered an ibeji child, 
not a dead child.  A figure dedicated to the orisha Ibeji (“goddess of the twice-born”) 
is carved to serve as a wooden surrogate and home for the spirit of the passed twin.66  
The ibeji carving is a material testimony of the child’s passing as well as a symbolic 
suggestion that the child is (albeit spectrally) still “alive.”67  Nurturing the ibeji 
carving keeps the twins’ shared soul in the living world and therefore with the living 
twin.  While this nurturing ritual is intended to curry favor with the twin who has 
passed and thus avoid family misfortune, it is also a physical enactment of 
acknowledging—of mourning—the ibeji twin in a ritual that reifies the Yoruba 
cultural emphasis on family as the most important of all social relationships. 
As a Yoruba mother, Sarah may well be the latest ideological casualty in a 
one hundred year campaign waged by European missionaries to force Yoruba women 
to abandon ibeji and other practices that employ mourning images.68  When an 
immigrant parent does not perform the mourning rituals prescribed by her culture of 
origin, for whatever reason, then she does not productively mourn the loss.  The text 
does not specify Sarah’s reasons for not carving ibeji when Fern passes, but the 
reader can reasonably locate their nexus at the intersection of her political exile from 
Nigeria and her status in London as an immigrant.  Migration as exile from a post-
independence Nigeria, a nation buffeted by “considerable social unrest and civil 
conflict” exacerbates Sarah’s stalled mourning processes because her “vulnerable” 
immigrant status in England renders her “especially reluctant to divulge experiences 
of torture and trauma,” even those that have occurred in England, and potentially 
disrupt her host country’s ideological framework of racial purity and harmony 
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(“Posttraumatic” 465).69  Whether cultural or not, the forces that stall Sarah, as a 
Yoruba mother, from productively mourning Fern’s passage into the realm of the 
ancestors also forestalls Sarah’s responsibilities as a mother to maintain the relational 
health of her family and, by extension, the community. 
The result of not mourning is melancholia, another term for post traumatic 
stress disorder (PTSD), which is the current term for traumatic suffering.  Children’s 
PTSD symptoms manifest most often as persistent anxiety and angry outbursts that 
impede their functionality in social, familial, and other spheres.  These symptoms 
follow the sight or awareness of a sudden, violent threat, injury, or death to a family 
member or other person, or one’s own survival of a death threat.  Jess’s frequent 
anxiety “attacks” with no discernable cause are very likely PTSD manifestations of 
the trauma of surviving not only Fern’s death but the threat of her own death as well. 
PTSD manifests in culturally specific ways, and the ways in which an 
immigrant suffers trauma may differ from those culturally sanctioned by the host 
country.  Cultural difference compounds the emotional isolation of the surviving 
citizen child whose immigrant parent struggles with the multiple losses of the 
deceased child and the homeland.  The surviving child identifies with the host 
country’s culture rather than with the immigrant parent’s culture of origin.70  To the 
immigrant parent Sarah, her child Jess who was born in England is as foreign to her as 
England is:  to Sarah, Jess is both English and Nigerian, and neither.  Jess is a lost 
love object for Sarah because Jess is crucially linked to both Sarah’s ibeji child, the 
lost object Fern, and to the lost love object of her homeland Nigeria.  In 
psychoanalysis, the sense of foreign-ness that pervades the Harrison family unit can 
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and does lead to a family crisis that stems from a mutual perception of disintegration.  
Sarah’s plan for a family visit to Nigeria is her emergency measure to repair her 
multiple losses:  Jess, Nigeria, and Fern.71 
The immigrant mother’s “complicated bereavement” stems from multiple 
losses:  the material loss of the deceased child, the metaphorical loss of the survivor 
citizen child, and the lost homeland.  If she does not attend to any number of these 
combined losses, the immigrant parent may see herself and be viewed by her family as 
culturally “impure” (Schreiber 138, 139).72  In the single event of Fern’s passing, 
Sarah has lost both a child and her mother country because she does not mourn Fern 
the way she might have had Fern been born and become ibeji in Nigeria.  Of course, 
this would only have been possible if Nigeria were a fully representative democracy in 
which, as Yoruba, Sarah could have continued to live.   
Sarah has lost so much more of her family than Fern, however.  Jess’s 
foreignness to Sarah represents a metaphorical loss of the survivor twin as well as the 
ibeji one.  In the immigrant family that has suffered the loss by death of a member, as 
the Harrison family has in The Icarus Girl, PTSD afflicts both the parents who have 
not appropriately addressed the loss and the child, Jess, onto whom the parents 
transfer their grief.  Unanchored by her mother’s alien status in England and her own 
alien feeling in Nigeria, Jess, citizen child of an exiled parent no matter which 
continent she inhabits, has no homeland.  The novel depicts this sense of perpetual 
alienation when, during her second trip to Nigeria, Jess begins speaking fluent 
Yoruba.  Though she is happy to be able to converse with Jess in her mother tongue, 
Sarah still considers her daughter “our very own Iya Oyinbo! [‘Mother Stranger’]” 
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(321).  Always the stranger, Jess lives in diaspora no matter where she is or with 
whom.   
Sarah’s silence about Fern manifests as both writer’s block (an obvious 
material referent to her refusal to testify her trauma of loss) and a feeling of inability 
to mother her surviving child Jess.  Traumatic knowledge changes the self, often in 
unanticipated ways.  For Sarah, the act of representation is so potentially trauma 
producing that she embraces silence to protect her known self from the unknown.73  
Sarah’s incorporation of the love object means that Fern’s memory is entombed in the 
surviving mother, not within the carved image of ere-ibeji as it should be.  The tomb 
is marked by Sarah’s continual efforts to maintain silence.   
Failure to carve ibeji or tell Jess about Fern’s passage is a failure to mother 
both twins.  Nurturing an ibeji carving is the physical act of mourning the passed 
child, but not carving ibeji is a physical act of not mourning the ibeji child.  Sarah’s 
refusal to participate in this important Yoruba ritual of mothering also robs her of a 
significant cultural parental competence.  In Yoruba cosmology, for Sarah to not carve 
an ibeji figure to commemorate (or mourn) the life and passage of Fern is to not 
acknowledge Fern’s transition from the world of the living into that of the ancestors, 
to ignore reverence for the sacred bond between twins, and to ignore reverence for the 
sacred bond between ancestors and the living.74  Because the ibeji carving is a visual 
reminder of the ibeji child, to not carve ibeji for Fern’s passing is to actively censor 
her existence from the family script.  In so doing, Sarah avoids mourning the loss 
because she transfers her unresolved grief to Jess.  While to have “done ibeji carving” 
(181) for Fern would mean that an ibeji figure would now function as a symbol of 
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Fern’s body, Sarah’s not having done ibeji carving culturally necessitates a material 
marker for the loss of Fern.  Sarah’s failure to mourn according to Yoruba ritual 
requires Jess to mourn in her place.  Not fluent in Yoruba cultural practices, Jess’s 
repeated, failed attempts at mourning emphasize her difference from her mother and 
her mother’s difference from her. 
In psychoanalysis, the parent’s transfer of grief to the survivor child can 
involve imposing an image of the deceased on the survivor.  In the novel, Jess 
becomes a material stand-in for ibeji Fern, a pawn “playing out the unconscious fears 
and fantasies” of Sarah, who attempts to navigate the British familial gaze and feels 
conscious of failing, in part because the biracial white and black family is extremely 
visible in London (Charles and Charles).75  Sarah’s biracial family disrupts the British 
cultural imaginary of the ideal white family.  Her ibeji-less family disrupts the 
Yoruba cultural imaginary of the ideal whole family.  As stand-in, Jess is the 
repository for Sarah’s displaced grief.  And, until TillyTilly surfaces as the new 
physical marker of Fern’s passing, Sarah offloads her guilt, self-loathing, and failure 
onto Jess.  Sarah makes Jess a scapegoat to her survivor’s guilt and her perceived 
failure to mother.76  Sarah’s displacement of grief and guilt onto Jess, as a means of 
protecting her censorship of Fern, severely impedes the two living women from 
developing a meaningful mother-daughter relationship.  When the parent cannot or 
does not mourn, she cannot instruct the child in how to mourn, and so the child does 
not learn how to mourn either.  Grief psychologists Timothy Yates and James 
Bannard have noted that in grief studies, children with unaddressed grief, particularly 
children who have survived a sibling’s death, may exhibit emotional or behavioral 
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problems (575).  As Jess’s hijinx with TillyTilly escalate, Sarah rightly begins to fear 
that her own failure to carve ibeji may be the explanation.   
Grief hallucinations are one way children respond to grief over a loss.77  Most 
hallucinations are audio, visual, or both, and audiovisual hallucinations are common 
in anxious children.78  Hallucinations are false sensory perceptions unassociated with 
real external stimuli, the content of which manifests hypochondriacally.  Jess is able 
to see what others cannot:  she intuits the loss of a twin spirit through reading the 
remains of Fern’s loss in the familial silence.79  Jess’s inherited PTSD manifests as 
physical illness in the form of panic attacks and a preoccupation with vision and 
being seen or not seen, which belies a melancholic attachment to Fern, who is hidden.  
For Jess, seeing connotes familiarity—in two senses of the term:  one who is known 
to her and one who is in her family—both of which are experienced as a threat by the 
survivor of sibling loss because familiarity breeds the potential for future loss.  For 
example, when Jess corrects TillyTilly’s assertion that the girl and the now-
frightening ghost are sisters, Jess wants to explain more fully: 
 
that sisters [i]s something about being held without hands, and the 
skin-flinch of seeing and simultaneously being seen.  But in falling, 
Jess herself kn[ows] that she need[s] to understand the precious danger 
of these things, and what they mean[ ], or she [will] never be happy.  
(219) 
 
Jess cannot explain these notions to TillyTilly because TillyTilly exists outside Jess’s 
family and familiar social spheres.  TillyTilly’s position as outside subverts the gaze’s 
power to shape their relationship which is always, to Jess, unfamilial and unfamiliar.  
In psychoanalysis, family ruptures like sibling death, immigration, or other deficits 
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that negatively affect the child contribute to child hallucination.  The child’s grief 
symptoms function as metaphors for the family issues the symptoms attempt to 
repair.  Through repair, the child hopes to cohere the family and protect it from 
further change.  The fact of the hallucination of TillyTilly is less telling than what the 
specter looks like, does, or says.  TillyTilly’s antics eventually exceed Jess’s control 
because Jess has not summoned her, but Jess does not know that she is Sarah’s 
designated mourner for Fern and that TillyTilly’s antics are ultimately directed at 
Sarah, not at Jess.   
Jess’s relationship with TillyTilly evokes the psychoanalytic image of the 
child digging as at a grave—to unearth or join the dead.80  Jess unearths and rejoins 
the dead by conjuring TillyTilly, who has a “verdant, earthy smell” and who pulls 
Jess down “through earth” into a space the size of a grave (273, 153).  Unearthing 
TillyTilly returns Jess to the moment of Fern’s death and Jess’s survival of the death 
threat.  The haunted child Jess is conflicted between maintaining ignorance of Sarah’s 
secret (the love object Fern) and eliminating the presence of secrecy.  The ghost 
TillyTilly is Jess’s way of both exposing and hiding Sarah’s secret.  The secret is 
always concealed because it is shameful, but concealed shame always returns to 
haunt.   
The survivor sibling Jess is haunted by the unknown, even secret, knowledge 
of Fern’s death and cannot ask about it.  In order to transform her relationships with 
both TillyTilly and her family into productive (as opposed to destructive) ones, Jess 
must be able to express in words the shameful family secret that TillyTilly represents.  
In this sense, Jess’s relationship with TillyTilly begins a failure because “Fern” is not 
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the name by which the apparition introduces herself to Jess.  It is not even 
“TillyTilly.”  Jess cannot pronounce TillyTilly’s actual name, Titiola, correctly.  
Instead, she dubs her the Germanic diminutive “TillyTilly,” only occasionally 
pronouncing Titiola at all and even then “in an overly English way” (68).  Jess 
realizes that TillyTilly’s destructive behavior stems somehow from Jess’s not being 
able to pronounce “Titiola:”  “Only Titiola’s name [is] left, and Jess ha[s] taken even 
that” (304).81  But telling “as much about TillyTilly as she [can],” “in a halting 
fashion,” to her friend Shivs begins the exorcism of Jess’s guilt and shame, exposing 
the secret as well as eliminating the need to keep one (269). 
In psychoanalysis, the child who hallucinates her deceased sibling is actively 
mourning in place of the mother who does not mourn the dead child.  TillyTilly is the 
manifestation of Jess’s attempt to mourn her mother’s loss and reinstate her mother as 
mother.  By conjuring TillyTilly’s presence, Jess performs the mourning 
acknowledgement of Fern that Sarah has not.82  The apparition of TillyTilly restores 
the lost twin Fern who in turn replaces Sarah’s lost parental competence.  The ghost 
TillyTilly makes Fern’s loss—and the fact of Fern’s existence—real by serving as a 
substitute for the ibeji statue never sculpted.  To hallucinate a dead person is to create 
an audiovisual testimony of the trauma of losing that loved object.  For Jess, seeing 
the hallucination—or ibeji spirit—of TillyTilly is tantamount to reading Sarah’s secret 
testimony of Fern’s loss.  For the displaced immigrant, hallucination becomes a way 
for the citizen child to mourn in place of the immigrant parent, for whom culture-of-
origin mourning rituals are unavailable in a hostile host country.  The British citizen 
Jess’s hallucination replaces Sarah’s absent Yoruba mourning ritual of carved ibeji, 
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forging a new mourning ritual that conforms fully to neither Yoruba nor British 
standards. 
Reframing the real through hallucination demonstrates the potential to change 
it, and thus to productively mourn a loss.  Reframing psychic tension can dissolve the 
need for repetition.  Freud’s psychoanalytic goal was to help the sufferer work 
through her trauma and thus to cease acting out.  This is also Sarah’s goal when she 
sends Jess to see Dr. McKenzie about the tantrums.  But Jess does not cease acting 
out; she reframes her view of reality by introducing TillyTilly into it and forcing a 
total transformation.  Edward Bibring argues that working off provides the possibility 
of breaking the framework of repetition compulsion by revising the conditions that 
compel the repetition in the first place.83  Grief hallucination as a response to the 
trauma of loss hinges on reframing reality through haunting.  The creative potential of 
grief hallucination is also the crux of its transformative—through testimonial—
potential.   
The silencing of Fern’s loss and absence dominates Jess’s childhood, and her 
recreation of the traumatic memory of her parents is necessarily fictional.  Jess 
intuitively creates a “postmemory” of Fern in Nigeria in the specter of TillyTilly 
(Hirsch 22), even though no narrative of “Fern” or much of that of “Nigeria” has 
previously been spoken in Jess’s presence.84  Seeing TillyTilly provides Jess with a 
community in exile, a link to Sarah’s world before loss—before losing Fern, before 
losing Nigeria.  Jess’s attempt to recreate the lost homeland in the ghost of a lost twin 





Jess is the trans-generational embodiment of Sarah’s attempt to survive in the 
space of the colonial metropole—of her position as the postcolonial expatriate who 
has embraced the opportunities granted by the former colonizer:  her white husband, 
economic and political stability, and a Western education.  While migration and the 
subsequent stress of enculturation usually translates into family conflict, the return to 
the homeland to mourn the loss of a child is healing.85  The return reverses the psychic 
stress of immigration, and it is during the Harrisons’ second trip to Nigeria that ibeji is 
carved for Fern and Sarah begins to mother Jess.  While the first trip to Nigeria births 
TillyTilly, the second trip sees her demise.  “Seeing” TillyTilly has been Jess’s 
attempt to repair the bridge for Sarah (and herself) to the lost motherland Nigeria and 
to the ibeji twin, all in the form of one ghost who screams the stunted testimony of 
their losses in the form of a “small, mauve stump; the remains of a tongue” (261).    
 In Nigeria, Sarah finally asserts her authority as mother and intimates that her 
motherhood of Jess is as good as a clean bill of psychiatric health:  “I’m her mother, 
and nothing’s the matter with her!” (327).  The next day, while driving Jess to a 
relative’s home, Sarah and Jess are hit by a car.  Jess is hospitalized in grave 
condition.  Her father tells Sarah to pray and admonishes her resistance: 
 
You know that when you pray, you are heard, if not by God, then by 
yourself.  When you pray, you tell yourself what you truly want, what 
you really need.  And once you know these things, you can do nothing 




Grandfather does not tell Sarah to pray to the Christian God but to testify of her 
losses, of which Jess may very well become the next one.  Jess’s grandfather, the 
family patriarch, also understands the importance of marking the feminine as central 
to the resolution of this family crisis.  By imploring Sarah to testify “what you really 
need,” Jess’s grandfather is also asking her to initiate a response from the ghost—
Sarah’s ibeji daughter.  In this vein, he invokes the goddess Ibeji not just to mark 
Fern’s passage into the realm of the ancestors, but also to keep the remaining twin, 
Jess, in the land of the living:   
By placing an ibeji carving in Jess’s hospital room, her grandfather does not 
restore order as the colonial patriarch is wont to do.  His act is one of respect and 
request.  In Yoruba cosmology, ibeji are notorious for setting their own agendas:  
families attempt to meet the wishes of ibeji; not the other way around.  Yoruba 
cosmology divides the cosmos into two distinct, overlaid realms:  “aye”, or the 
material world of the living, and “orun,” the world of the ancestors (and unborn).  
Ancestors walk among the living and influence their lives.  Grandfather’s action both 
acknowledges the power of his ibeji granddaughter Fern and exhibits openness for a 
ghostly visit in whatever form Fern may choose to arrive and/or intervene in the 
family’s affairs.  Fern responds, and she is responsible for Jess’s return to the realm of 
the living.  In Fern’s simple act of carrying Jess through the land of the ancestors back 
to the path of the living, she infuses Jess with confidence and knowledge.  The ibeji 
twin, the other half of Jess’s self, is catalyst toward transforming Jess the Bild into 





The ghosts Dulcie and TillyTilly transform Wicomb’s narrator and Oyeyemi’s 
Jess in fundamental ways by haunting them.  As a result of these hauntings, Wicomb’s 
narrator and Jess, as haunted individuals, both represent and embody the possibility 
for social change.  As a result of her textual relationship with Dulcie, Wicomb’s 
narrator writes Sally as an activist mother-guerilla, a metaphor of hope for 
transforming the next generation of South African women into those who will 
dismantle hegemonic frames.  As a result of her textual relationship with TillyTilly, 
Jess forces her family to acknowledge the secret of Fern’s death and to begin 
mourning her.  This simple act of uncensoring its loss binds the family together in a 
way that forges what Gilroy called “continuities” between Sarah’s Nigerian heritage 
and Daniel’s British one, creating the “space between” both ways of being in which 
Jess—the textual embodiment of the postmodern, postcolonial diasporic individual—
can be.   
Reading the ghostly remains of the censored female native in postcolonial 
literature challenges the hegemonic monoliths of patriarchy and nation.  Reading 
haunted postcolonial literature dissolves not only the integrity of these monoliths, but 
also the divisions between them.  Understanding postcolonial literature as testimony 
of the traumatic loss of the homeland requires a consideration of the possibility that 
nationhood in the European Enlightenment sense of the term may not be the desired 
outcome of decolonizing natives.  The “national question” may in fact be the wrong 
question.  In post-Atlantic slave trade Africa, nationalism is not about forming 
ethnically divided African nations but about embracing a form of pan-Africanism that 
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accommodates transnational or diasporic communities.86  While Casely Hayford, an 
attorney opposing colonial appropriation of African lands in 1919, accurately argued 
of West African communities that “the common danger to our ancestral lands has 
made us one” (qtd. in Ajayi 229),  J. F. Ade. Ajayi argues that if nationhood is 
predicated on popular consensus, then Nigeria needs to rethink its conception of 
nationhood because consensus does not exist among its various ethnic, linguistic, and 
otherwise striated groups.87  Over sixteen thousand communities in Nigeria are 
comprised of about three hundred fifty distinct language groups of varying sizes.  
These communities “are more in the nature of nations and nationalities than tribes or 
ethnic groups. Nigeria is therefore more of a multi-national than a poly-ethnic state” 
(Ajayi 232). 
 While South Africa’s heterogeneity is differently organized than Nigeria’s, the 
reality of land loss for many groups of South Africans beyond the Griquas 
necessitates the introduction of the idea of forming not the “new South Africa,” but 
perhaps a series of transnational South Africas.  Joe Teffo argues that South Africa’s 
history of racialized exclusion demands a post apartheid response that is inclusive of 
its “triple heritage” of converging indigenous, Islamic and Western cultures.88  By 
referring to each community within South Africa as a “nation” which should devise 
its own independent, locally-specified, “contextual” governance (Teffo), Teffo 
advances the notion of a multi-national South Africa similar to Ajayi’s conception of 
a multi-national Nigeria.   
The development of nationalist relationships and the concomitant vocabulary 
of motherhood are intended to homogenize the material conditions of variously 
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different groups and create emotional bonds that incite their collation into a “self-
identified nation” (Heng 31).  Rather than deploy the discourse of motherhood to 
nation building as a normalizing tactic, however, David’s Story and The Icarus Girl 
offer permutations of the figure of mother that recognize and value difference within 
the community.  In psychoanalysis, embracing difference within the self is the work 
of introjection, or of productively existing after suffering a traumatic event.  I read 
this notion of embracing difference within the self as a metaphor for the emerging 
postcolonial nation’s potential ability to celebrate differences within the national 




Chapter 4: Testifying Wounds 
 
Introduction 
In this chapter, I explore themes of mourning and melancholia defined by 
Freud in Meja Mwangi’s Carcase for Hounds (1974), Ayi Kwei Armah’s Fragments 
(1970), and Moses Isegawa’s Abyssinian Chronicles (1998), which represent various 
modes of trans-generational testimony released from bodily or psychic wounds.  The 
novels can be read on a historical trajectory that illuminates the ways in which 
gendered armed struggle and decolonization may reinforce or replicate colonial 
hierarchies rather than overturn them.  The novels illustrate crucial moments in the 
armed struggle for independence and postcolonial nation building during which 
wounded principal characters challenge colonial hierarchies in different national 
spaces by documenting their violence.  In so doing, the characters bear witness to 
traumatic histories they have not lived.  Physical and psychic wounds compel the 
characters’ bodies to repeatedly call for postcolonial social transformation in 
symbolic forms that seem impossible to procure.   
African literature is usually studied under the rubric of postcolonial studies, 
often with an emphasis on representations of native experience as shaped solely by 
the victimizing forces of colonialism.  This is likely because, despite formal 
independence, the reality for most of post-independence Africa is not truly post-
colonial in the sense of being “after colonization” or divorced from colonial socio-
cultural structures.  For most of Anglophone Africa, the moment of postcolonialism is 
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simultaneously the condition of neocolonialism.1  For the disenfranchised majority, 
neocolonialism looks and feels strikingly similar to colonialism.  Writers are 
informed by political conditions, and the condition of neocolonialism continues to 
perpetuate violence, both physical and psychic on black Africans.  The discourse of 
postcolonial studies offers an excellent paradigm for examining the metaphysics of 
the conditions of colonialism and neocolonialism in the postcolonial moment.  
However, it fails to provide a lens through which to analyze literary representations of 
the native as an agent of social change who actively creates culture and history by 
subverting residual and still oppressive colonial structures.  The discourse’s inability 
to historicize the colonial experience as part of the colonized (or formerly colonized) 
subject’s political agency limits its ability to accommodate literary testimonies of 
colonial and neocolonial trauma.   
Carcase for Hounds, Fragments, and Abyssinian Chronicles address issues of 
migration, colonization, and nation building through armed struggle and social 
activism.  Bhabha argues that postcolonial writers must grapple with these subjects 
prior to developing postcolonial national literary traditions, but I suggest that the 
proliferation of these literary tropes is part of a historically African literary tradition 
that pairs art with political agitation and social critique.  The preponderance of these 
themes in Anglophone African literature written after colonialism’s official demise is 
a form of communal testimony which initiates processes of social transformation 
through collective mourning and calls for justice.  I suggest that a psychoanalytic 
framework illuminates the political potential of literary representations of testimony 
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of that loss, for articulation introduces the possibility of worlding postcolonial 
nationhood and identity.   
I will provide brief summaries of the novels and then examine the ways in 
which they revise the conventional Bildungsroman genre through their collective 
focus.  I contend that, despite having male protagonists, the novels are a species of 
“feminine writing” that address the colonial debasement of the mother figure as an 
impediment to postcolonial nation building.2  I will conclude the chapter with 
implications for reading representations of testifying wounds in Carcase for Hounds, 
Fragments, Abyssinian Chronicles, and within the corpus of post-independence 
Anglophone African literature as a primer for reconfiguring the nuclear and national 
families. 
In the novels, the characters are wounded either bodily or psychically and, as 
a result, suffer compulsions to speak, write, or act out testimonies of the violence they 
have suffered.  A gunshot wound compels Mwangi’s General Haraka to repeatedly 
demand the traitorous Kikuyu Chief Kahuru’s severed head.  In Fragments, anxiety 
and depression move Baako to write numerous television treatments and journal 
entries on consumerist culture as the newest iteration of the Atlantic slave trade.  An 
abusive childhood and encounters with racism as an adult prompt Isegawa’s Mugezi 
to act in ways that expose or exploit corrupt governments and other institutions.  I call 
these injuries “testifying wounds” because although each marshals the sufferer’s body 
to testify its trauma, the drive emanates from an unknown, albeit internalized, source.   
The gaping wound received in violence may be read metaphorically as a 
mouth, for traumatic suffering releases a testimonial voice that calls for justice.  The 
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wounds wrought by colonialism are not merely material phenomena; a psychic 
wound also festers over time.  I read these three texts together because they are set in 
moments of revolution and the emergence of the postcolonial nation.  Armed struggle 
and decolonization both politicize literary cultural articulation, which is a people’s 
ability to speak the group into a “dynamic self-generating whole” (Cheah 235).  I read 
these two historical moments depicted in the novels as the developing nation’s 
testimonial moments.  Both struggle and decolonization articulate the collective 
trauma of colonial occupation and a transformed future.  In their depictions of 
principle characters as representatives of “the people,” Carcase for Hounds, 
Fragments, and Abyssinian Chronicles illuminate the politics of a gendered 
articulation of a traumatized nation’s past, present, and future. 
 
Carcase for Hounds, Fragments, and Abyssinian Chronicles:  Summaries 
Carcase for Hounds is set during the historical moment of Emergency in 
Pinewood Forest Station, a Kikuyu resettlement camp near the Aberdare Forest in 
Kenya.  A Mau Mau cell led by the legendary General Haraka has a camp in the 
forest several miles from the village.  The resident District Commissioner Kingsley is 
under enormous pressure from Headquarters to squelch Haraka’s activities in the 
district.  Kingsley has blanketed the area with leaflets promising amnesty to Haraka’s 
gang if they surrender by October 23.  Kingsley lays a dragnet and hopes to capture 
the elusive Haraka by force or surrender. 
Days before the amnesty deadline, Haraka is shot in the chest during a 
government raid on an oathing ceremony in Pinewood Village.  The gunshot wound 
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marshals the weakening Haraka’s voice to call feverishly for the village chief 
Kahuru’s head.  Haraka’s second-in-command and successor, lieutenant Kimamo, 
takes over the unit while the general is ill.  The closest medical help is in Meru on the 
other side of Mount Kenya, an impossible distance to move a dying man under heavy 
surveillance.  Inside the dragnet the gang waits, trapped in a cave.  Discovery looms 
inevitable.  The amnesty deadline passes and Kingsley intensifies his search.   
The shooting occurs midway through the text and, soon afterward, Haraka 
“stubbornly [clings] to his life” past the point when he should have died (119).  As 
the wound grows infected, Haraka becomes “more violent in his demand for the 
chief’s head,” sometimes to the point of requiring restraint (119).  He fixates on this 
single subject, “always mumbling to himself” in sleep and “demand[ing] the head 
every conscious minute” (119).  Scenes like this one echo through the second half of 
the novel: 
 
 “The chief’s head, Kimamo,” the general moan[s], his eyes staring. 
     “Yes, the head,” Kimamo answer[s] for the hundredth time. 
     The general’s laboured breath falter[s], then ca[tches] on again with 
rheumatic wheezing. 
     “Where is it?” he mouth[s]. 
     “It’s coming, general, it’s coming.”  Kimamo pat[s] him lightly on 
the arm.  “They will bring it.” 
     He sp[eaks] out of habit.  (119) 
 
Kimamo deploys several envoys to assassinate the chief.  All attempts fail either 
through desertion or ambush, and Haraka is able to stand just long enough to shoot 
each of those who returns empty-handed.   
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When their supplies are depleted and starvation is certain, Kimamo vows to 
grant Haraka’s wish by the next day.  The decision relieves and liberates Kimamo 
from obsessing about whether to prioritize starvation or the head.  By coincidence, on 
the night Kingsley announces that Operation Haraka has failed, Kimamo leads a 
suicide raid for the head.  In the dark, Kingsley’s soldiers believe Kimamo is Haraka 
and riddle him with bullets.  Kimamo is mortally wounded and returns to the cave to 
find Haraka alone.  The entire unit, except Kimamo and Haraka, has either died or 
deserted.  The novel ends with their deaths and Haraka and Kimamo move fluidly 
into the spirit realm just before Kingsley arrives.   
Fragments is set in the decades following a struggle for independence in 
Ghana like the one that Carcase for Hounds depicts in Kenya.  Fragments charts the 
return of a young black Ghanaian man, Baako, from a United States university.  The 
novel depicts Baako’s quest to contribute productively to postcolonial nation 
building.  Juana is a black Puerto Rican psychiatrist who has migrated to Ghana to 
work with trauma sufferers and Baako first sees her professionally.3  Their 
professional relationship transforms into a romantic partnership when each recognizes 
the other’s frustrated intentions for social transformation.   
Baako’s family wants him to behave like a “been-to,” which is an African 
who has repeated the passage Westward and has also returned.  Baako does not 
ascribe to be a been-to and instead writes television treatments about the African 
slave trade and colonial oppression for the state-run Ghanavision.  His producer 
rejects Baako’s subject as unbefitting the national agenda of celebrating its 
“inherited” “glorious culture” (146-47).  Baako quits Ghanavision, begins a journal, 
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and falls ill.  Like Haraka, Baako grows increasingly feverish as his resistance against 
the oppressive state waxes futile.  Baako is sickened by capitalist corruption of the 
national and nuclear families, and his writing challenges these neocolonial norms.  
Baako’s refusal to inhabit the been-to role reflects a larger aversion to assuming the 
capitalist father subject position that is his due as a been-to Ghanaian man.  Baako’s 
stance leaves his Ghanaian family fatherless and, even more important, threatens a 
social order predicated on patriarchal values.  His family commits him to a mental 
health facility and Juana prepares a space for him in her apartment.  I read the novel’s 
ending as the need to configure the postcolonial nation outside the structural 
hierarchies of the neocolonial social order.  The ending suggests that Juana will 
assume a directive role in relation to Baako after his institutional release.  Their 
partnership suggests the possibility of formulating a transnational, anti-patriarchal 
family model.  Throughout the novel, images of reproductive malady are associated 
with patriarchal constructions of motherhood.  Childless and single, Juana represents 
less an archetype of African motherhood than the possibility for envisioning new 
iterations of the figure of woman in the emerging postcolonial nation. 
While Carcase for Hounds and Fragments depict the conditions of armed 
struggle and an early, troubled post-independence, the epic Abyssinian Chronicles 
spans the last years of Ugandan colonialism, its independence struggle, Idi Amin’s 
military dictatorship, the civil war to oust Amin, and its immediate aftermath under 
Milton Obote.  As in Carcase for Hounds and Fragments, images of fertility, 
childbirth, and reproductive malady in Abyssinian Chronicles are associated with 
processes of revolution and nation-building.  
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The prominent mother figure in the novel is Padlock, mother to Mugezi and a 
religious fanatic who suffers near-orgasmic out-of-body experiences whenever she 
canes children.  Her beatings are so severe that Padlock is banned from the convent 
school in which she teaches before marrying Mugezi’s father, Serenity.  Padlock has 
no interest in marriage or motherhood and she directs her anger over the expulsion 
toward her children.  Padlock abandons Mugezi for several years when he is a child 
and he lives with his grandparents.  He apprentices to his grandmother’s midwifery 
practice and develops a following of pregnant women devoted to his talent for 
reading and assuaging their morning sickness and other reproductive ailments, and for 
predicting the health of their unborn babies.  After his grandmother is killed early in 
the novel, Mugezi moves in with Padlock and Serenity.  He is chagrined to discover 
that they have had several other children since abandoning him and whom they 
immediately charge Mugezi to babysit.  Padlock and Serenity beat Mugezi and “the 
shitters,” as he calls his younger siblings, repeatedly.  Mugezi nicknames Padlock and 
Serenity “the despots” for their dictatorial parenting style.  To Mugezi, Idi Amin is a 
benevolent national father next to his own abusive mother and her cohort Serenity.  
Mugezi enters seminary school at Padlock’s order, the first of a series of educational, 
government, and international organizations he encounters that repeat the colonialist 
dehumanization of blacks by Dutch white fathers.  As a result of these experiences, 
Mugezi later understands Amin’s dictatorship as a raced reincarnation of colonial 
domination.   
In the intermittent, temporary custody of his grandmother and, later, his aunts 
and female companions, Mugezi thrives.  All of these women have suffered gendered 
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and other forms of violence under colonial rule and under Amin, and all reside in the 
margins.  In their care, Mugezi feels nurtured and in turn is able to work productively 
toward individual growth and some meaningful occupation.  One day after he is 
grown, Mugezi is sitting on the rim of a paved-over volcano crater that also serves as 
a bustling urban center.  He has always considered the place to suggest a geological 
vagina that births the happenings of the city.  In this place Mugezi experiences a 
revelation of the intertwined historical futures of Uganda and himself.   
Mugezi soon flees ravaged postwar Uganda for safety, sponsored by a Dutch 
aid organization that needs a representative of “Africa.”  On the airplane, Mugezi 
faces a crossroads, caught between his opportunistic past and an uncharted future.  In 
Amsterdam, Mugezi is sickened by the international aid industry, which operates 
through the “necrophilic exploitation” of the “starving Africans” stereotype (419).  
Mugezi deserts his benefactor organization and enters the ghetto’s underground 
transnational community.  By abandoning Ugandan and Dutch circles of power, 
Mugezi deliberately renders himself officially nonexistent.4  Unable to afford to leave 
or apply for legal citizenship, Mugezi procures a fake British passport and becomes 
simultaneously an international citizen and homeland-less.  Now a blank slate, Mugezi 
reinvents himself as a gravedigger and cremator.  He begins to read the past lives 
marked on Dutch corpses as he once read the children’s’ futures etched into pregnant 
women’s bodies.  The novel’s ending depicts Mugezi’s epiphany of a reality inverted 
to expose interconnections across the globe, the generations, and the realms of human 
and spectral existence.  His previous intuition of a historical selfhood recurs at the 
novel’s conclusion in the form of a commitment to write Uganda’s traumatic history.  
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This narrative repetition is delivered to the reader as the novel Abyssinian Chronicles, 
a testimony of the national loss of the subversive mother as a model of the nation that 
could have been.  
 
Revising the Bildungsroman 
As postcolonial Bildungsromane, Carcase for Hounds, Fragments, and 
Abyssinian Chronicles are literary vehicles that interrogate socio-cultural and political 
institutions in order to initiate social transformation.  The novels revise the traditional 
Bildungsroman genre in two important ways:  through their collective orientation and 
by ungendering their male protagonists in order that they might speak responsibly as 
representatives of the collective.  The novels function as testimonies of the collective 
crisis of postcolonial nation formation, an ideological moment during which 
Slaughter observes that the Bildungsroman genre proliferates.  As testimony, Carcase 
for Hounds, Fragments, and Abyssinian Chronicles demonstrate that the emergence 
of the nation is the moment of articulation of the “meaning and scope of” postcolonial 
citizenship (Slaughter 1411).  Because the novel instructs its readers in how to 
become “the people,” literature creates culture as well as the nation.  For this reason, 
Cheah argues that the Bildungsroman genre is “imperative” for the process of 
decolonization because the narrative of the national Bildung follows that of the 
novel’s Bild who is its first and ideal national citizen (239).  My use of the term 
“nation” is fraught here as a familiar sign for the more amorphous notion of 
transnational or diaspora community which is, in fact, the sphere in which the 
postcolonial Bild hopes to mature as a citizen.   In its resistance to the formal colonial 
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administrative structures of neocolonial nation-statehood, the postcolonial 
Bildungsroman charts instead the formation of an informally organized international 
community.5  I mean to emphasize here, in this discussion of the intentional 
unboundedness of the postcolonial Bildungsroman’s emergent nation, the nuanced 
emphasis of post-independence Anglophone African Bildungsromane on inclusivity.  
This notion of inclusion (in opposition to the exclusivity of the nation-state) informs 
both the international borderlessness of the postcolonial diaspora community and the 
collective orientation of the novels studied in this chapter.  Izevbaye notes that this 
departure from the Western novel’s individualistic hero reflects a historical African 
rejection of the individual in favor of the collective as the potential source of social 
transformation.  The post-independence African novel represents a collection of the 
voices of a community that has been traumatically wounded by colonialism.  As a 
buried collective self emerges, the collective wound releases the voice of the incipient 
nation clamoring for recognition.  It grows louder when it encounters the possibility 
of listeners, screaming the people’s history of oppression.  This voice calling for 
justice takes the form of the emerging nation’s literature.   
The African novel’s collective voice recalls Mikhail Bakhtin’s conception of 
the novel as the most effective literary exercise in accommodating multiple voices.6  
It is precisely because the contemporary African novel is a hybridized form that we 
can read critics like Bakhtin to understand the collective narrative voice that issues 
from within an individual protagonist who is a representative of this collective voice.  
Bakhtin coins the term “heteroglossia,” an English translation of the Russian 
raznorecie (literally, “multilanguagedness”), to discuss the tension for cultural 
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primacy between a given people’s diversity and the national discourse of unity.  He 
argues that the novel is the best-equipped literary genre to represent and mediate the 
tensions between the voices of the people and the state.  This argument is especially 
prescient when the novel functions as a literary agitation against an oppressive 
neocolonial state, as do those studied in these pages.     
 
Male Writers, “Feminine” Writing 
Colonialism feminizes the African male writer to the point that it is possible 
for him to speak of the colonial condition on behalf of both sexes, by intentionally 
uncoding himself as a man in order to do so.  This is a radical appropriation of 
marginalization for subversive testimonial purposes.  While they may not be 
feminists, Mwangi, Armah, and Isegawa write about themes of gendered colonial 
oppression and liberation in ways that reject phallocentrism and engage with black 
feminist concepts.  Filomena Chioma Steady argues that African feminism looks at 
women first as human beings and secondly in terms of gender, class, cultural and 
racial dimensions of oppression.  Steady calls this approach “humanistic feminism” 
because its gender inclusive scope views the male-female relationship as two halves 
that make up one “human whole” (4, 7).  African feminism’s premise of 
complimentarity resonates with various African cosmologies of humanity.  While I 
argue that African notions of human complementarity make it appropriate to take 
seriously what an African man writes about women,7 I follow Steady’s lead in 
referring to African gender-inclusive belief systems as “feminist” in order to place 
them in conversation with Western discourses of gender that do not recognize the 
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existence of non-patriarchal social structures.8  By putting these seemingly variant 
discourses together, I attempt to read these novels differently than would be possible 
by situating my theoretical locus exclusively in either Africa or the West.  I use 
Hélène Cixous’s notion of “feminine writing” to recode these supposedly male 
narratives as female writing.  I do so because the texts call into question the black 
male postcolonial character’s relationship to the lie of national narratives of inclusion 
by depicting men who refuse or abandon patriarchal privilege in the moment of 
emerging nationhood.9 
“Feminine” writing, like testimonial writing, reconnects the wounded body 
and the psyche (Cixous 311).10  Cixous’s famous interest in linking writing to the 
body is useful for considering how a physical or psychic wound transforms the 
traumatized body into a vehicle for testimonial voice, and how “voice” can in turn 
manifest as a body of historical, testimonial literary repetitions.11  I am interested in 
the fact that the kind of writing Cixous describes is, in post-independence African 
literature, testimonial and raced as well as feminized by colonialism.   
Kaja Silverman’s conception of “historical trauma” can help us read a 
feminized postcolonial text (Male 55).12  History and trauma can rupture or even 
dismantle the master narratives of social order and power.  Carcase for Hounds, 
Fragments, and Abyssinian Chronicles all represent racialized male protagonists who 
reject their ungendered subject positions, which disrupts the (post)colonial order.  In 
psychoanalytic terms, gender is a set of culturally defined performances and 
expectations mapped onto bodies without regard to anatomy, and the hysteric is one 
who does not perform the required behavioral codes.  To be “male” in a patriarchy is 
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to have power and voice.  In this system, the subject without power and voice is thus 
female, “whatever her anatomical construction” (Boyarin 118).13  A number of critics 
like Eng, Daniel Boyarin, and Lynne Kirby provide a lens through which to ungender 
hysteria, which Freud originally conceived as a female disease.14  While women, 
working-class men, and other subalterns “bore the brunt of the shocks of modernity” 
(Kirby 124), the colonized man also receives an unequal share of modernity’s 
traumatic “shocks.”  Under Freud’s original rubric, hysteria feminizes the powerless 
male body by way of symbolic castration.   
While race, class, and gender can conveniently marginalize the other in order 
to maintain patriarchal order, what of the ideal male subject who intentionally 
declines his privilege and castrates himself?  The male hysteric’s refusal to perform 
codes of masculinity is especially “scandalous” for the social maintenance of male 
subjectivity because his refusal exposes a rupture in the patriarchy and thus the 
potential for its dismantling (Eng 177).15  Silverman argues that the male hysteric 
threatens not only patriarchal maintenance, but also the very nature of gender 
difference and reality as well.  The Oedipus model grants privileges to ideal male 
subjects who will accept the “dominant fiction[s]” of male subjectivity, law, and the 
nation (Male 2).  Living and believing in the validity of the Oedipus complex is to 
believe in a fiction, but adherence is also fictive.  The mandate to social conformity 
contains the seed of its own doom because no matter how closely a subject’s nature 
adheres to social norms, a part of the psyche always “remains in excess” of the 
dominant fiction (Male 2).  In other words, every participant in a social hierarchy is at 
least partially aware that the system’s survival hinges on mutual complicity.  The man 
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who embraces castration, alterity, and specularity “say[s] ‘no’ to power” (Male 2) and 
“this is not what ‘men’ are assumed to do” (Smith 109).16  Refusing to occupy a 
position of patriarchal position of privilege is the “very uncoding of men as men” 
(Eng 178).  As black postcolonial men who write about trauma and fertility in relation 
to nationalism and nation building, Mwangi, Armah, and Isegawa articulate perverse 
masculinities in the characters of Haraka, Baako, and Mugezi who in turn become 
vehicles for testimony, of recording colonial trauma.  The reader using the lens of 
female writing can read the refusals of Haraka, Baako, and Mugezi to claim their 
Oedipal roles—Haraka as chief, Baako as been-to, and Mugezi as a government 
investigator or professor—as a critique of patriarchal systems of gendered access to 
power.  In their depictions of masculinities that reject phallic standards, Carcase for 
Hounds, Fragments, and Abyssinian Chronicles reconfigure notions of masculinity.17  
If reconfiguring masculinity can dismantle the patriarchy, then these textual 
depictions also suggest a potential postcolonial lived femininity unencumbered by 
dominating masculinist structures.   
 
Locating the Postcolonial Figure of the Mother 
In the three novels studied in this chapter, representations of motherhood and 
birth are paired with efforts to birth the next iteration of the nation.  While Fragments 
and Abyssinian Chronicles rechart the Bildungsroman’s gendered focus to privilege 
the role of the mother, Carcase for Hounds depicts the detrimental ramifications of 
eliding the mother.  In Fragments and Abyssinian Chronicles, images of infertility 
and child loss symbolize the independent nation’s failure to deliver on the 
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revolution’s promise to end colonial influence.  In Carcase for Hounds, the absence 
of the mother figure, portrayed in both the presence of the failed would-be mother 
Muthani and in the absence of other mother figures, suggests that the impotent chief 
Kahuru, Muthani’s husband, functions as a metaphor for the failure of the native 
collaborator to birth the next iteration of Kenya.  In this context, it is interesting to 
note that the fictional Muthani’s name and the chief’s long infertility evokes the 
image of an earlier, similarly named Mary Muthoni Nyanjiru, whose famous anger 
against native male impotency in the face of colonial injustice is considered to be the 
birth of Kenyan women’s public nationalism.18   
 In their depictions of images of reproductive disease or loss associated with 
the pathologies of colonial influence, all of the texts evoke the colonial practice of 
debasing the native maternal.  While the colonial ideal of Victorian womanhood is 
encapsulated in the white European woman’s role of wife and mother, the colonizer 
does not view the native woman as either “woman” or “mother.”  Fragments and 
Abyssinian Chronicles draw a relationship between the woman at the moment of 
giving birth—of becoming a mother—and the birth of the neocolonial state.  In 
Carcase for Hounds, the gendered literary representation of Mau Mau differs from 
some historical narratives which credit women as integral to the struggle’s success.  
The lack of women is a destructive force that materially decimates General Haraka’s 
fictional cell, just as a lack of female participation would have doomed the historical 
Mau Mau resistance.  The novel’s depiction of gendered resistance as doomed 
suggests a critique of envisioning a gendered postcoloniality.19  I suggest that these 
three postcolonial Bildungsromane tie the narrative of maturity to the creation of the 
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post-independence nation as well as to the linked narratives of motherhood and loss.  
I suggest a new way of reading the novels’ maternal imagery:  to expand the reader’s 
focus so that related narratives of individual and national growth are informed by the 
cultural necessity of the figure of the mother to the national birthing process.  
Oyěwùmί theorizes the Yoruba conception of motherhood as “community-
transforming” and, as such, a “public institution” more important than any other 
(“Abiyamo”).  This Yoruba conception of motherhood as a crucially transformative 
cultural institution echoes across the continent.  In the postcolonial context, African 
social healing includes the presence of motherhood and birth. 
 
Testifying Wounds, Postcolonial Mourning 
Freud opens his landmark essay “Mourning and Melancholia” with a question:  
what work does mourning do?  While analysts have since debated the relationship 
between mourning and melancholia as different responses to loss, the psychoanalytic 
community has generally agreed that mourning offers a way to transcend loss and 
survive productively afterward while melancholy traps the sufferer in the moment of 
loss indefinitely.  I have noted in earlier chapters that melancholia infuses mourning 
processes and I am interested in this tension as an ontological site of grief’s 
transformative potential.20  Greg Forter cautions that misunderstanding melancholia 
can elide the violence of its effects on the sufferer because both mourning and 
melancholia result in at best violence and at worst death.21  To Freud, a crucial 
difference between mourning and melancholia is the emotional terrain that loss 
renders “poor and empty” (“Mourning” 246).  The violence of loss cuts the mourner 
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off from the world, but melancholia behaves “like an open wound,” bleeding the self 
dry and “emptying the ego until it is totally impoverished” (“Mourning” 253).  While 
melancholia can result in suicide if the sufferer’s hate of the buried object intensifies 
enough, mourning’s work can be just as deadly.  In order to save the self from the 
ego’s unhealthy attachment to the object, mourning requires “disparaging,” 
“denigrating,” and even “killing” the object (“Mourning” 257).  In Beyond the 
Pleasure Principle, Freud continues the work of “Mourning and Melancholia” by 
shifting our attention to the open bodily wound and its relation to the accompanying 
psychic wound. 22  I am interested in Freud’s use of images of open wounds and 
violence to the self as a way to describe the psychic effects of mourning and 
melancholia because Carcase for Hounds, Fragments, and Abyssinian Chronicles all 
depict wounded characters whose repetitive testimonies demonstrate a desire to 
mourn that is infused with melancholic attachment.  
Freud’s analogy of loss as a physical violence that inflicts wounds on the self 
underlies the vocabulary of trauma studies because trauma variously assumes the 
forms of violently inflicted physical or psychic wounds.  The word “trauma” is from 
the Greek trauma, meaning “wound.”  Originally used to designate a wound of the 
body, psychoanalysts now also use the term to signify a wound of the mind.  Caruth 
argues that the psychic wound is not a “simple and healable event” but is rather a 
series of them, beginning with an experience that occurs too quickly and 
unexpectedly to comprehend in the conscious (4).  The unknown event returns to the 
survivor in repeated nightmares and repetitive actions.  Trauma is not located in a 
single violent event in the past, but in its unassimilated nature—its unknowability—
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into the future.  To the trauma sufferer, the future looks like the past.  There is no 
revelation from which to develop or grow forward; there is only confusion and fear.  
Traumatized by the lack of understanding, the sufferer stands at the crossroads of 
mourning and melancholia.  The melancholic’s path to forgetting is short, a circle that 
begins and ends at the traumatic event.  The mourner’s path toward productive 
survival is long, full of switchbacks that repeatedly intersect the path of melancholy.  
Contemporary trauma studies discourse provides the vocabulary with which we talk 
about the survivor’s journey over one or across both of these paths. 
Laura Di Prete suggests that the only way to tell the story of a trauma—to be 
able to narrate that which is shrouded in the unknown—is to redefine our 
understanding of the notion of “voice.”23  First, we must recognize that testimonial 
voice—like trauma—operates independently of time and space.  As cinematic speech 
is present and current each time it is repeated, traumatic testimony is immediate and 
new each time it is spoken.  Testimony, like cinematic voice, is the “very essence of 
presence” (Silverman, Acoustic 43).24  Second, we must divorce voice from an 
exclusive relationship with language and instead expand its parameters to include 
verbal, nonverbal, physical, and written cues.  Finally, and most important, we must 
understand voice as linked to an expanded notion of “body” that is “tongued and in 
touch with what the mind cannot know” (Di Prete 88).  The wounded body, linked to 
the unconscious, “will voice its unspoken truth” (Di Prete 88).  The body voices 
trauma when and because the mind cannot.25   
In Freud’s reading of Torquato Tasso’s Gerusalemme liberata (Jerusalem 
Delivered), Tancred’s accidental double murder of his beloved Clorinda represents to 
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Freud the way trauma repeats itself for the survivor against his will, without cease, 
and implicates him in a historical pattern of repetition.26  Freud reads Tasso’s story to 
illuminate repetition compulsion as “passive experience” (Beyond 24, emphasis in 
original)27 which Caruth frames as haunting.  Repetition becomes an “unwitting 
reenactment” of an event “that one cannot simply leave behind” (Caruth 2).  What the 
sufferer cannot leave behind is the originary trauma, which may be a long-past 
traumatic event.  As we see in Carcase for Hounds, Fragments, and Abyssinian 
Chronicles, this event may precede the lifetime of the present sufferer. 
Literary representations of the speaking traumatic wound suggest the 
possibility of reading literature as a traumatic history.  The literary wound’s voice 
links the sufferer to others in the community and to the ancestor who suffered the 
original traumatic event.  This presence of another, a historical other in traumatic 
suffering and in the testimonial compulsion, suggests that trauma is historical.   
In literary testimony, the text alludes to a traumatic event that precedes the 
narrative’s beginning.  Morgenstern writes that locating the moment of the traumatic 
event in Beloved, for example, is difficult because the traumatic moment precedes the 
opening of the novel.  The traumatic moment in Beloved is not the infanticide because 
the only literary descriptions of it are mediated by white men.  That experience is not 
Sethe’s or the baby’s, but the text does not suggest an alternative possibility.  This 
example illustrates the fact that trauma does not reside in a specific literary moment 
or fictional character.  Instead, the suffering character Sethe is the embodiment of 
cultural suffering.  The infanticide is a literary reenactment of a historical event that 
precedes the pages of Beloved but that establishes the traumatic culture in which the 
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novel is set.  Beloved is both Sethe’s child and the representative of “sixty million 
and more.”  In much the same way that Beloved repeats collective historical trauma, 
Haraka’s shooting, Baako’s imprisonment, and Mugezi’s abuse are literary repetitions 
of historical trauma in different national spaces.   
I will now examine Carcase for Hounds, Fragments, and Abyssinian 
Chronicles in order to examine the ways in which traumatic injury can marshal the 
resources of the body in service of testimony and social justice.   
 
Calling for Justice in Carcase for Hounds 
Carcase for Hounds is a history of Mau Mau armed resistance in Kenya; it is 
Mwangi’s second Mau Mau novel.28  Historical discourse on Mau Mau generally 
affirms one of two conflicting mythologies, one of a positive social force that 
expelled colonialism and the other of Kikuyu regression into animalistic violence.29  
The novel is set in the early 1950s, just after post World War II mechanization 
rendered African subsistence (“squatter”) farming obsolete.  Legislation forced 
agricultural Kenyans off their land into rural employment centers so that settlers 
could expand their commercial farms.  In Kenya, 1945 to 1955 was about “the 
tyranny of property” as squatter resistance ensued (Atieno-Odhiambo 27).  The 
Kikuyu comprised half of Kenyan squatters in the late 1940s, so this group was 
disproportionately represented in the number of Kenyans expelled.  Kikuyu were thus 
crucial catalysts in the armed struggle for Independence.30  In Kikuyu cosmology, the 
earth is tied to home and the body.  To African Kenyans in the 1940s, being landless 
meant being homeless, excised from the sites of one’s birth, history, and the self.  To 
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the Kikuyu in particular, forced relocations “fragmented the African notion of self” to 
the extent that to become a “landless human” was oxymoronic (Atieno-Odhiambo 28-
29).  The resulting armed struggle was referred to as Mau Mau, an impoverished, 
initially all-male, unorganized network of guerilla cells “who went to war with 
nothing—no guns, no spears . . . nothing but determination to get freedom and their 
land” (Turner and Neal).31  When a State of Emergency was declared in 1952, Mau 
Mau resistance was already active.  After the declaration, thousands more men and 
women fled to the forests.  As the number of insurgents grew, a loose network formed 
across the forested territories.   
Of the thousands of forest fighters, most were Kikuyu and about five percent 
were women.  Despite their full participation as combat and non-combat troops, 
historical and scholarly record before the last decade have (except for a few notable 
exceptions) largely ignored Mau Mau women’s activities or have referred to them as 
“passive wings” (Kenya, Annual [1955] 37).32  Cora Ann Presley argues that 
gendered colonial historiographies and academic scholarship perpetuate the 
misperception that Mau Mau was also “a conflict among males,” and that Kikuyu 
women’s nationalism and Mau Mau involvement were “incidental” to the rebellion’s 
“main currents” (“Mau Mau” 502).  Gendering the Mau Mau rebellion erases the 
ways in which Mau Mau women ungendered Kenyan social and cultural roles by 
transforming the struggle into an egalitarian collective.  By erasing or deradicalizing 
Kenyan women’s contributions to the struggle, Mau Mau discourse ignores the 
movement’s radical potential to fashion an anti-colonial, post-independence Kenya.   
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By becoming warriors, Kikuyu women subverted traditional and colonial 
gender roles and constructions, and transformed the nature of Kikuyu political 
authority, which colonialism had assigned exclusively to men.  Tabitha Kanogo notes 
that women’s transformation from “guardians of the domestic front” to military and 
political guardians of the homeland was a “slow and painful process for the women” 
made so by initial male resistance and gender subordination (“Kikuyu” 78).33  Like 
colonial-era Kikuyu political circles, Mau Mau councils and gang leadership were 
originally all-male, but the creation of “joint men and women councils” and the 
promotion of women to gang leadership ungendered Mau Mau government and 
leadership to the point that troops marked “no difference between a male or female 
leader” (Gitahi).34   
 Outside the forest, thousands of women comprised a crucial non-combative 
network which is widely recognized as the reason the forest fighters (and the 
resistance itself) survived as long as they did.  Non-combat Mau Mau sympathizers of 
both genders provided information, arms, food, clothing, and medical supplies to the 
forest fighters, recruited new fighters and helped transport them to the camps, and 
administered loyalty oaths.  Non-combat Mau Mau women ranged in age and social 
position and undertook an array of subversive activities.35   
 Kikuyu women’s Mau Mau involvement irrevocably changed both the idea 
and practice of Kikuyu womanhood.   Mau Mau women’s work as soldiers, spies, and 
suppliers, and their inclusion in previously male-only realms like combat, politics, 
and law enforcement illustrate changing attitudes toward women’s full participation 
in the creation and administration of the armed struggle.  Mau Mau women also 
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ruptured the patriarchal system of domestic subservience.  Having survived “the 
worst of the hair-raising ordeals of Mau Mau,” they required revision of the domestic 
sphere as well as the public (Kanogo, Squatters 148).  Returning female soldiers 
would not return to domestic servility post-independence.36  The Mau Mau war 
transformed Kikuyu and Mau Mau gender because the women “could do 
everything—build a house, sell at the butchery—there was no such thing as a man’s 
job any more” (Turner and Neal).  In their Mau Mau work, Kikuyu women fashioned 
new social, political, and domestic roles and identities for themselves that introduced 
new possibilities for lived postcolonial experiences in Kenya. 
 The British use of phrases like “passive wing” obscures the breadth and 
crucial importance of women’s and men’s dangerous non-combat support work, 37 yet 
the Government’s actions and internal discourse give the lie to its dismissive 
rhetoric,38 as one District Commissioner reported tellingly, women “may well be 
described as the ‘eyes and ears of Mau Mau’” (Kenya, Political 1).39  The colonial 
government recognized women’s Mau Mau participation both inside and outside the 
forest as so crucial to the movement’s success that it attempted to gender the 
insurgency in order to squelch it.  The Government’s strategy was to separate the 
forest fighters, which were predominantly male, from their non-combat support, 
which was comprised of mostly women, via a multi-pronged campaign of arrest and 
detention, social policy, and villagization.    
 The 1954 “villagization programme” forced about a million Kikuyu to 
abandon their homesteads and build eight hundred new villages surrounded by barbed 
wire and watch towers (Johansson 24).40  Begun as “a punitive measure,” 
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villagization eventually became the Government’s anti-Mau Mau “centrepiece” in an 
array of divisive, gendered social policies (Kenya, African, Annual [1954] 33).41  
Calling women’s anti-colonial activism “far more rabid and fanatical than the males 
and more violent in their support of Mau Mau” (Kenya, Community, Annual [1956] 
4),42 the Government created the Community Development Department which seized 
land from Mau Mau supporters and reassigned it to loyalists (Great Britain 80),43 and 
rehabilitated sympathizers through propaganda and Maendeleo ya Wanawake 
(“Progress among Women”) clubs that provided members with social services denied 
to Mau Mau sympathizers.44 
I have summarized women’s crucial roles in the success of the Mau Mau 
struggle to underscore the paramount importance of Mwangi’s omission of women 
almost entirely from his representation of Mau Mau combat and non-combat forces.  I 
have noted that women comprised a small fraction of the combat troops, therefore 
Mwangi’s depiction of an all-male gang over the course of a few weeks is historically 
possible.  The text’s portrayal of non-combat Mau Mau support as all-male, however, 
contradicts a broad array of both indigenous and colonialist historical evidence.  The 
disparity between the fictional and historical records is so striking that I suggest that 
Mwangi was not toeing the colonial party line, but that we can read the novel as a 
critique of it.  The presence of Mau Mau women in the colony threatened colonial 
rule, and Mau Mau’s joint men and women’s councils and eventual sharing of 
domestic and military tasks was an affront to the British modernist discourse of 
gendered social roles and their construction.  The Government’s decision to gender its 
response to Mau Mau resistance suggests to Luise White that the Mau Mau-British 
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war was an armed debate over how to construct Kikuyu gender in a way that would 
achieve “a British vision of calm and productive African families” and impose 
patriarchal order (25).45   
*  *  * 
In Carcase for Hounds, Haraka’s foils are Kingsley and Kahuru, and the 
histories of the three men intertwine.  Kahuru is a collaborator with the Government 
“master” Kingsley (27), and succeeds Haraka as chief.  A fistfight between Kingsley 
and Haraka precipitated Haraka’s flight into the forest camp and Kahuru’s ascent to 
power.  Kingsley’s subsequent murder of “the little terrorist general” has rocketed 
Haraka into his current “turbulent task of gang leadership” (21).  The parasitic 
collaborator Kahuru is “the malignant undesirable rot that ha[s] grown up among 
[us]” (105).  In contrast, Haraka has always been a fighter, leader, and protector.     
As adults, Haraka, Kingsley, and Kahuru assume father roles that ultimately 
doom their potential for success because all three roles reinforce colonialism’s racist 
mythology.  General Haraka is preceded by legends of animalistic violence, strength, 
and speed and, indeed, this mythology serves Haraka by insuring that villagers fear 
and help him.  Kahuru deploys Haraka mythology to explain his political murders, 
and Kingsley affirms that mythos by accepting Kahuru’s assessments—“a Haraka 
thing”—as an excuse to avoid giving chase over “the most impassable terrain” (33).  
To Kingsley, chasing a legend is both “insanity” and affirming (33).  Successful 
completion of Operation Haraka will be Kingsley’s great triumph because he will 
have achieved the racialized and gendered colonial mandate.  To paraphrase Gilroy, 
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Kingsley will have symbolically protected the fair-skinned Lady Britannia from the 
penultimate black male predator.46   
Despite historical evidence that Mau Mau’s success depended on the 
involvement of the entire Kikuyu community, the novel portrays an all-male guerilla 
gang and nearly all-male non-combat Mau Mau sympathizers.  While the text does 
not specify whether the gang is all-male by preference or circumstance, I suggest that 
Haraka’s gang is doomed even before the shooting.  The gendered gang does not 
reflect the national collective, and Haraka’s worst fear is that he is not part of a 
collective resistance but was perhaps instead “tricked” into waging a one-gang war 
(102).   
Like the chief’s “barren” marriage (27), Haraka’s all-male cadre portends 
badly for the ideological space of the feminine and of motherhood in postcolonial 
Kenya.  If the cell itself does not or can not sustain an inclusive population, then what 
is the hope for the postcolonial nation?  Slowly, the gang is decimated by desertion 
and ambush.  The mission is flawed:  a gendered Mau Mau is doomed to fail.  Its 
failure in the novel to correct historical wrongs retards the possibility of charting a 
different future.  In depicting a masculinized armed struggle as doomed, the novel 
gestures toward the necessity of women’s inclusion to securing postcolonial success.   
The most influential female character in the novel is the chief’s wife Muthani, 
although she appears only twice.  She controls access to the chief, even for Kingsley.  
When Kingsley visits the village, “a woman look[s] out of the hut towards the Land-
Rover. . . .  Quickly the head [i]s withdrawn.  The chief emerge[s] from the hut a few 
seconds later” (27).  Muthani is the youngest daughter of Mwaniki, the last known 
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Mau Mau sympathizer in the village.  In lieu of providing a marriage dowry for 
Muthani, Kahuru sanctions Mwaniki’s political subversion even though, as Chief, he 
does not condone it.  By insuring her father’s life, Muthani insures local Mau Mau 
survival.  While the text does not specify whether Muthani relays information she 
learns from her husband to her father, Kahuru nevertheless hides his anti-insurgence 
activities from her.  When corporal Njoro arrives in the night to alert Kahuru that 
Mwaniki is hosting an oathing ceremony, Muthani grants Njoro access, and then 
watches them both.  Njoro’s attempt to alert Kahuru while revealing nothing to 
Muthani results in confusion:   
 
“Have you considered, chief?” he ask[s]. 
     “Considered what?” 
     “You told me you would, chief.” 
     The chief th[inks]. 
     “I don’t understand you.”  (77) 
 
Unable to make Kahuru understand the opportunity to kill Mwaniki and, Njoro hopes, 
receive a promotion for completing the job, Njoro instead signals their mutual fear of 
Muthani, a message which he knows the Chief will understand: 
 
The corporal lower[s] his voice to a whisper. 
     “It is about…about Mwaniki,” he sa[ys]. 
     The chief look[s] back instinctively at the dark interior of the house 
where the daughter of Mwaniki wait[s] in his bed.  Then he [comes] 
out and shut[s] the door behind.  The two move[ ] a little way away 
from the hut.  (77-78) 
 
If Muthani is not a Mau Mau informant, she is certainly an untapped resource.  The 
text does not specify whether she actively or secretly supports Mau Mau, or not at all.  
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Perhaps the text means to suggest that Haraka’s crucial failing is in not recognizing 
the magnitude of Muthani’s potential importance to his project.  The text does tell us 
that other village women participate in the oathing ceremonies, but these women are 
portrayed as little more than nameless and frightened.  Even though the novel is 
narrated in third-person and alternates perspectives among Kingsley, Kahuru, 
Kimamo, and Haraka, none of these male characters seems particularly cognizant of 
women’s participation as necessary to the resistance.  Their ignorance reinforces 
patriarchal views of women as cursory to militancy.  I suggest that Mwangi’s 
depiction of the failure of these would-be fathers of the Kikuyu illustrates the 
impossibility of fathering a postcolonial nation.   
The text also provides the possibility that Haraka inhabits a non-patriarchal 
form of masculinity.  The text describes Haraka’s relationship with Kimamo in terms 
that connote an intimate love that undermines their hyper-masculine personas of 
general and lieutenant.  Whenever Haraka and Kimamo are separated, Haraka wishes 
repeatedly that Kimamo were with him and, when Kimamo returns, “the general’s 
heart li[ghts] up” (49).  I do not intend to suggest that Haraka and Kimamo are lovers.  
I argue instead that by framing their relationship in terms of romantic intimacy, the 
novel suggests a subversive complexity to the lived masculinities of Haraka and 
Kimamo that patriarchy does not accommodate.   
Just before the amnesty date and his shooting, Haraka’s team approaches the 
villagers to “doctor them clean of the white man’s ills” in an oathing ceremony (57).  
The group’s oath-taking gives voice to the social wound of colonialism.  The voice is 
testimonial and juridical because the ceremony is a crucial step in organizing 
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collective resistance.  Haraka wants to “doctor” all the villagers because he sees “the 
tribal marks grow dimmer” as some shift allegiance to the settlers (57).  By “tribal 
marks,” Haraka means commitment to independence, and the marks’ dimming 
suggests waning village support for Mau Mau.  As history shows, non-combat 
support sustained the insurgency.  Losing the fictional villagers’ support will 
debilitate resistance in the district.   
When the Home Guard raids the ceremony, Haraka is shot in the gut.  The text 
represents the pain’s movement into his body in images of voice:  “Pain waves s[i]ng 
through his chest and body” (81).  Pain itself is also described in terms of voice:  
when angry that their escape bridge is not already in place over a spiked trench, 
“Haraka swallow[s] back a mouthful of screaming pain” (81).  It is significant that 
Haraka is shot during an oathing ceremony because he is wounded at the moment of 
his greatest threat to the colonial administration’s maintenance of patriarchal control 
over Kenya.  At this moment, Haraka represents the worst kind of African to 
Kingsley:  he has not only refused the Oedipal power bestowed on him, but he is also 
mobilizing an organized revolt against his former benefactor.  At the same time, the 
group oath-taking is a moment of collective testimony which binds the community 
together.  Ultimately, while shooting Haraka does eventually eradicate his branch of 
the resistance, it also fails to restore order.   
Very soon after he is shot, Haraka sees a vision of justice in a fevered 
daydream about Kingsley and Kahuru:  “as he watched the two images the heads fell 
off one by one.  At the sight of the bloody stumps of necks that were left, something 
laughed inside the general.  One long ecstatic howl” (103, emphasis added).  The 
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“something . . . inside the general” that releases a “long ecstatic howl” articulating a 
juridical purpose is the disembodied voice released by the gunshot wound, the voice 
that begins to call incessantly for the chief’s head.  The chief represents, to Haraka 
and the reader, African complicity in its own subjection.  Killing the chief becomes a 
symbol for Haraka of eradicating that complicity.  The severed head is both proof of 
the chief’s death and a symbol of silencing the collaborator’s praisesong for the 
master.  The wound’s repeated call for the chief’s head symbolizes the people’s cry 
for an end to colonial domination and African collaboration.   
Haraka’s wound links him to the collective in that his incapacitation requires 
other soldiers to carry out his wound’s directive.  I read Haraka’s continuous moaning 
for the head as both signifying and delivering a repeated testimony of the violence 
that Kahuru has wrought upon his people.  Testimony’s emergence is the beginning 
of productive mourning and Haraka’s drive to possess the chief’s head suggests the 
possibility of an “ultimate end” to colonial occupation.  The troops’ repeated failures 
to deliver the head trap Haraka in a melancholic attachment to the lost object, of 
which the head is a symbol.  In the sense that melancholic attachment precedes 
productive mourning, Haraka’s wound voices calls for both justice and mourning in 
the form of the head.  While beheading the corrupt chief will end corruption, 
reductively put, the price of mourning is to kill the object and killing the chief (as 
object) also obtains that objective.  Kahuru’s death may signal the beginning of the 
end of settler rule, but one death will not necessarily instigate it.       
As days pass, the wound grows more infected and Haraka’s obsession with 
Kahuru’s beheading intensifies.  It seems that the wound keeps Haraka’s body alive 
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for the sole purpose of repeating its demand.  The body has become the mouthpiece 
of the demand and it punishes any failure to comply.  Kimamo observes at one point 
that “the fever ha[s] killed all the better parts of the general” (116).  The gangrenous 
“rot” has gone to Haraka’s head and all that is left is a disembodied, testimonial, 
demanding voice “always talking of nothing” (122, 116).  At their most desperate 
hour, Kimamo screams at Haraka that it is impossible for them to get the chief’s head:  
he is too heavily guarded.  At this outburst, Haraka’s “granite eyes” shed “real” tears 
and “a little fresh blood appear[s] through his jacket” (126).  When spoken speech 
becomes impossible, the wound continues to make its demanding “voice” known by 
marking the body in blood. 
Haraka’s injury marks a turning point in the fighting and in the gang’s 
cohesion.  The wound demands the most daring mission under their most dangerous 
circumstances and thus begins the unit’s dissolution.  The longer the wound’s call 
goes unfulfilled, the worse it becomes.  The gash is now infected with gangrene.  It 
emits “blood mixed with the dark green mess oozing out to make an ugly sight 
uglier” as well as the “foul stench of rotting flesh” (122).  The wound finally grows 
so repulsive that one soldier “thankfully” disposes of a dead body rather than clean it 
(122).  The wound’s chances of healing diminish as the infection spreads, and so the 
gang’s chances of surviving Kingsley’s manhunt also plummet.  Their numbers 
diminish through desertion and capture, food supplies dwindle as gatherers do not 
return and sending new envoys becomes riskier, and morale sinks as the troops fear 
discovery by Kingsley’s tightening dragnet. 
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Later, on his way back to the cave after his own failure to procure the head, 
the mortally wounded Kimamo thinks, “the wound failed” (132), intuiting that 
Haraka’s wound carries a purpose and power beyond its shifting borders on Haraka’s 
skin.  The wound has failed, however, to turn the tide of either this gang’s survival or 
the resistance movement’s success.  When Kimamo reaches the cave, Haraka is alone 
and sits upright.  Kimamo is unsurprised at Haraka’s temporary recovery because 
Kimamo now believes that the general is impervious to death as long as Kahuru lives.  
Kimamo knows that even as the rest of their unit is dead, and that he too will soon 
die, the melancholic Haraka will remain trapped in this moment, “mumbling 
unintelligibly to himself” forever, “waking up again and again to ask for Chief 
Simba’s head” (132).   
During the ensuing exchange with Haraka, Kimamo’s head throbs relentlessly 
with Haraka’s repeated demand.  The headache has been a trope throughout the 
narrative, associated with Kimamo’s fear of failing to lead the gang as Haraka would.  
In the cave, Haraka knows that Kimamo has not brought the head, but he does not 
recognize Kimamo.  This is significant because throughout his delirium, Haraka has 
always recognized Kimamo, and only Kimamo.  Now, Haraka believes that the 
soldier returning in failure is Njogu, the last soldier who failed to behead Kahuru.  To 
Haraka, Kimamo’s cannot be the face of such an egregious disappointment because 
Haraka associates Kimamo with militaristic success—“pure officer material,” he has 
called Kimamo, “the settlers w[ill] hear more about him” (21).  To Haraka, Kimamo 
represents the last hope for the head and so much more.  The general’s 
disappointment and Kimamo’s worsening headache slowly coalesce, inform each 
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other, and bind the two men together.  Haraka’s disappointment feeds Kimamo’s 
headache, intensifying it:   
 
His head throb[s] now more painfully.  Every beat of his heart 
resound[s] like a tin drum in his head.  He close[s] his eyes tight, 
sh[akes] his head repeatedly, to no avail.  The general’s voice sound[s] 
frail and distant, growing gradually louder and reverberating to the 
point of jarring his whole body.  (133)   
 
Haraka’s voice has infiltrated Kimamo’s head:  “‘Njogu, you failed,’ the general 
seem[s] to rumble into his ears” (134).  Kimamo’s beating heart pulses in time with 
Haraka’s echoing accusation:  “You failed,” suggesting that failure has infiltrated the 
life force.  For the general, this episode is a reenactment of the other failures to 
behead Kahuru, and each failure to procure Chief Simba Kahuru’s head repeats the 
original failure to stop the collaborator who sold his neighbors.  To Haraka, endlessly 
echoing a historical trauma, failure is the life force.   
 Exacting the stated price for failure to destroy the chief, Haraka shoots 
Kimamo in a scene that is usually read as confirmation of Haraka’s fabled brutality.  I 
suggest that Haraka’s action instead liberates them both for neither will survive 
Kingsley’s detection.  This second shooting, of Kimamo, is timely, for even as the 
“strange booted feet” of Kingsley’s forces “tramp[ ] the jungle” outside the cave, 
Kimamo hears only Haraka’s gunshot and then, “darkness” (134).  We know that 
Haraka dies immediately after Kimamo because “suddenly,” in the “dark,” Kimamo 
is “not alone” (134).   
In the end, even though the gang is decimated, the novel’s depiction of 
Kimamo and Haraka in the realm of the ancestors foretells a new potential paradigm 
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for creating masculinity after colonialism—one that sheds the stoic warrior façade 
and instead creates connections with others.  In the novel’s final scene, Haraka 
“glide[s] over” to Kimamo, who sits “worn and lost” (134): 
 
The ghost place[s] its hand on his weak shoulder and sa[ys] comfortingly, 
voicelessly: 
      “Let’s go.” 
      “Where?” Kimamo’s lips move[ ] but no sound [comes]. 
      “The gate,” hoarsely.  (134) 
 
This exchange repeats verbatim the one Kimamo and Haraka have after Haraka is 
shot, but with a very different outcome.  Now, Haraka and Kimamo go together 
again, “hand in hand,” but this time “joyfully,” through “golden gates” into a jungle 
“with merry, laughing streams and no angry bursting rivers and no pale-faced fierce 
soldiers, and no guns” (134).  Kimamo notices that his companion in this merry place, 
as it has “always” been, is “his general,” Haraka (134, emphasis added).  The two 
warriors, famed as bloodthirsty killers, are depicted in this final scene in terms 
denoting gentleness, affection, and belonging that contradict the brutal Mau Mau 
mythos.  This language is more often associated with patriarchal constructions of 
femininity, yet the novel suggests that Haraka and Kimamo reject these gender 
constructions, and even war altogether, in exchange for a gentle, companionable 
masculinity that does not fit within the confines of patriarchal reality. 
Outside the cave, in the last lines of the novel, a hyena that has been calling 
periodically since Haraka’s injury cries again, “sarcastic” and timeless (134).  In 
Kikuyu cosmology, the hyena foretells a death.  This hyena’s cry indicates that, 
despite the trail of corpses littering the novel’s last pages, the death he has been 
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foretelling has not yet occurred.  Perhaps the hyena’s cry, coupled with Kingsley’s 
failure to capture Haraka alive, suggests that the predicted downfall will not be Mau 
Mau’s success but Britain’s colonial grip on Kenya.  By transporting both Haraka and 
Kimamo to the land of the ancestors and the unborn before Kingsley can kill them, 
Mwangi suggests a next stage after colonial domination that is not necessarily the 
death of the native but instead the potential for transformation and rebirth.   
 
Trans-generational  Testimonial Fragments 
In Fragments, Baako Onipa’s feeling of social dissonance creates a psychic 
wound that sends him into psychiatric consultation with Juana, an African American 
expatriate who has moved to Ghana to work with psychic trauma sufferers.  “It’s not 
really possible to work without others,” Baako tells Juana, but his former teacher and 
mentor Ocran has advised him that “you can’t do anything serious here if you need 
other people’s help, because nobody is interested in being serious” (118, 81).  Baako 
faces the paradox of hoping to help mobilize a collective in a community of 
individualists.  His inability to find a common mind alienates him from his avaricious 
family and stalls his career.  The resulting psychic wound spurs all of Baako’s 
writings, and we can trace its origins to his matriculation in the United States where a 
previous psychiatrist prescribed medication to counteract the effects of consciousness 
expansion toxins like those produced by LSD.  While Pinkie Mekgwe suggests that 
Baako is surprised by the level of individualism and consumerism he encounters upon 
his return to Ghana, I read Baako’s initial interactions with Juana and Ocran to 
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suggest that Baako anticipated what he would find and that the anticipatory 
knowledge, coupled with its later confirmation, are the source of his agitation.47 
Baako explains to Juana that he so feared an inability to “do anything 
worthwhile” after returning to Ghana that, according to his American psychiatrist, he 
was already spontaneously “generating [his] own expansion toxins” in anticipation of 
his return (102).  Kofi Owusu argues that Baako’s “madness” originates from his 
ability to see the madness in the world and his simultaneous inability to escape it:  he 
must see it because he can see while his grandmother Naana’s blindness protects her 
from viewing that which sickens Baako.48  I read Naana’s interactions with the mad 
world as quite perceptive.  She feels the Kliegs illuminating the airport at night, hears 
the mourning in African American music, and remarks on the strangeness of lighting 
the night, on shared traumatic histories she hears in the blues.  Baako’s madness is “a 
reflection of dis-ease” in an insane society that defines the sane as mad because they 
do not conform to insane social mores (Owusu 362).  I read Baako’s dis-ease not as a 
desire to escape from but as a refusal to conform to a flawed sociality.  To flee would 
be impossible, as the concluding ambush scene depicts.  After leading an out-of-
shape posse of would-be kidnappers on an enervating, wall-scaling chase in the nude, 
the nonconformist Baako is captured, tied, and institutionalized for male hysteria.  
His detention is masterminded by his mother Efua and his sister Araba who are 
symbols of the pathology that pervades consumerist articulations of motherhood. 
The voice of his writing emanates from Baako, but it is not his.  Baako is 
merely the present designee of a collective and trans-generational trauma of loss.  The 
Atlantic slave trade has wounded generations of Africans and this wound settles into 
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Baako’s psyche, releasing his writing voice.  The psychic wound hounds Baako to 
write even in adverse conditions of frequent illnesses:  “a fractured thought crossed 
his mind.  The urge to trap it before it disappeared made him forget the general pain of 
his body. . . .  he began to write” (156).  Through writing, Baako tries to access the 
knowledge to which his wound’s voice refers, but he is unable to.  He explains that his 
work at Ghanavision “was trying . . . to get hold of something.  It was like a growing 
happiness, or the beginning of a good understanding which would vanish easily in a 
moment” (122-23).   
Deciding to write at all was a traumatic experience for Baako.  He tells Ocran, 
“I had a nervous breakdown over it” (80).49  Similar to Haraka in Carcase for 
Hounds, Baako embarks on a mission to transform his society as part of a collective 
only to find himself without allies.  Baako tells Ocran that working alone and against 
the “general current” is “like being tricked into a trap” (103, 80).  Once he has 
resolved to write, however, Baako does not “do the usual kinds of writing” (80).  He 
develops several television treatments about slavery and oppression for Ghanavision.  
When Baako presents his treatments at a production meeting, his programming 
manager Asante-Smith questions “such a choice of topic” when, as Asante-Smith 
explains to Baako, “we’re a free, independent people.  We’re engaged in a gigantic 
task of nation building.  We have inherited a glorious culture, and that’s what we’re 
here to deal with” (146-47).  For Asante-Smith and others in power, the inherited 
“glorious culture” is Britain’s, not Ghana’s, and postcolonial “nation building” means 
censoring colonial history.  The “usual kinds of writing,” then, uphold these tenets, 
and perhaps Baako’s decision to write was traumatic because writing the unusual 
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means he will encounter resistance to his work.  Postcolonial Ghanaians like Asante-
Smith want to maintain their melancholic attachments to the lost object of their 
autonomy.  They cover these losses with a patina of gratitude for their “inherited” 
culture, repressing its violent arrival.  
As the been-to who eschews cargo to become a writer who insists on 
producing traumatic histories that implicate an “inherited,” “glorious culture,” Baako 
is the “incurable wound” on the surface of neocolonial Ghana (Owusu 363).  Baako’s 
compulsion to resist and chronicle is a task of heroic proportions that links Baako to 
“the old heroes who turned defeat into victory for the whole community” (103).  
Discouraged, Baako burns his treatments.  He attempts to explain his motivation for 
writing to Naana:  “I was trying to say things in my mind, to let other people see” 
(154).  But even as Baako is compelled to speak the “things” in his mind to others, 
the text suggests ignorance about the source of his compulsion.  When Efua asks, 
“What is it you can’t stop writing?” after an insomniac night of typing, Baako replies 
vaguely, “Just things I’ve thought about” (156).  In part, he seeks to put Efua off his 
trail because he senses her disapproval of his stance and of his writing, but Baako’s 
reply to his mother also belies his inability to explain his testimonial compulsion.  
Only Ocran seems to understand that Baako has within him “a fullness [he] need[s] to 
bring out” (193).   
After quitting Ghanavision, Baako’s compulsion to write continues in a 
journal, this time about what he calls “cargo culture,” or the worship of capitalism and 
its focus on acquisition.  In his journal, Baako writes that the been-to is dead to his 
African self.  He is instead a “powerful ghost, cargo and all,” the specter of the slave-
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trade collaborator who elevates himself and his family economically at the expense of 
the community (157).  The character of Brempong, whom Baako meets on his trans-
Atlantic flight, symbolizes the been-to.  Brempong brings appliances and money to his 
large family, who surrounds and worships him at the Accra airport.  The notion of the 
benevolent been-to is one of the significant effects of globalization, and Brempong is 
the epitome of cosmopolitan postcolonial Ghanaian consumerism.50  Brempong 
represents the been-to as a new kind of hero who, to Baako, is merely a deformation 
of the “old” African returning hero shaped by neocolonialism and its alter ego, 
globalization.  The return is crucial, for it supposedly differentiates the been-to from 
the slave.  But the premise of been-to ideology is that an African must journey to 
Europe or the United States and mimic the former master in order to improve his 
social status in postcolonial Ghana.  In the been-to mythos, the returner is transformed 
economically by the journey, now “a sort of charmed man, a miracle worker” able to 
distribute worldly goods rather than spiritual enlightenment (103).   
Araba instructs Baako that “men think they rule the world” (86), but even as 
this primary female character pulls aside the veil of male dominance, Baako has 
already demonstrated an alternative form of masculinity.  His refusal to inhabit 
neocolonial Ghana’s been-to subjectivity begins in America when he is still packing 
to return to Africa.  He brings only a typewriter and a guitar.  By packing only two 
carry-on tools of creativity rather than shipping a bounty of big-ticket appliances and 
a car to distribute in a consumerist display, Baako demonstrates that he intends to 
assume, once home in Ghana, the subject position of West African griot (musician, 
writer, historian) rather than that of cosmopolitan benefactor.  Baako’s refusal to 
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conform to the social mores of postcolonial Ghana’s “changed world” signals his 
refusal of the imported Oedipus:  “I know what I’m expected to be,” he tells Juana at 
their psychiatric intake meeting, but “it’s not what I want to be” (98, 103).  In quitting 
Ghanavision, Baako refuses the perks of power and adopts a postcolonial masculinity 
outside the patriarchy.  The potential for articulating alternative formations of 
masculinity recurs in the beach scene wherein a boy’s rhythmic drumming helps a 
crew of male laborers move a heavy load in pulses to his steady beat.  The boy’s 
music, not brawn, moves the heavy cargo and suggests that brute strength is an 
ineffective model of masculinity.  The scene suggests the possibility of privileging a 
common African societal balance of male-female-child-adult societal participation.51   
The novel uses images of infertility as a metaphor for social corruption and 
impotency.  Ghanaian mothers who embrace neocolonial values suffer reproductive 
trauma:  Baako’s mother Efua lost a young child, and her daughter Araba repeats the 
pattern.  Araba has had five miscarriages and is pregnant with a sixth child when 
Baako arrives from the United States.  She sees his return in symbolic terms and is 
convinced that the wealth she presumes Baako brings will coax this new baby to 
term.  The baby is born but the hasty, premature celebration of the birth, in 
contradiction to Akan custom, leaves the child dead.  Rushing the ceremony pushes 
the baby into the public sphere before he has decided whether to remain in the family, 
and a child who does not like what he sees may decide not to stay.  According to 
custom, the premature ceremony may have been responsible for the baby’s death, and 
Naana sees the consumerism that drove its scheduling in terms of violence.  
Increasingly, vices like consumption and greed are no longer considered criminal, 
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Naana laments to Baako; they are instead accepted as hallmarks of progress.  The 
phrase, “the world has changed,” is used to explain “every new crime,” Naana argues, 
and to “push a person to accept all” former injustices (98).  Sanctioning that which 
used to be a moral injustice rather than testifying of the suffering it engenders 
“bring[s] a sickness to the stomach of the listener,” she tells Baako (98).   
*  *  * 
Baako’s developing romantic partnership with Juana offers a fictional space 
for the figure of woman to occupy that is not defined by the patriarchy.52  The 
narrative does not hint that Juana becomes pregnant, but the next-to-last scene shows 
her hope for a productive future in preparing her unused room for Baako’s arrival 
after his institutional release.  It would be simplistic to suggest that Juana will give 
birth, with Baako as father, to a symbolic infant called postcolonial Ghana.  The text 
does suggest, however, that Juana and Baako will continue to work together as 
partners.  Whether they will remain romantically entwined or not is irrelevant, but 
Armah’s depiction of an egalitarian male-female partnership is significant.  Further, 
leaving the couple’s romantic status undefined at the end of the novel dismantles the 
potential for positing heterosexist assumptions about male-female relationship models 
in the postcolonial future that Juana and Baako will chart.  Juana and Baako together 
are a metaphor for a gender-inclusive postcolonial future.   
At the novel’s conclusion, Naana prepares to cross into the realm of the 
ancestors.  So close to joining the ancestors, Naana remembers those she leaves 
behind and those whom she will soon join.  Naana’s insight bookends the novel and 
has been throughout a source of companionship and inspiration to Baako—“I should 
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listen more to you, Naana,” he has told her, “but I always find you so sad” (97).  At 
the narrative’s close, however, Naana foresees possible change, one of which Baako 
can be a part, but which requires that he cultivate insight.  Naana describes her vision 
in an internal monologue directed to the ancestors:   
 
I know of the screens of life you have left us:  veils that rise in front of 
us, cutting into easy pieces eternity and the circle of the world, so that 
until we have grown tall enough to look behind the next veil we think 
the whole world and the while of life is the little we are allowed to see. 
. . .   [W]hen we grow just tall enough and, still clutching the useless 
shreds of a world worn out, we peep behind the veil just passed and 
find in wonder a more fantastic world, making us fools in our own 
eyes to have believed that the old paltriness was all.  (200-01) 
 
Naana’s revelation suggests, as does Kimamo’s and Haraka’s passage between realms 
in Carcase for Hounds, that an alternative but as-yet unseen version of the world 
exists outside fictive reality.  Naana releases her grip on the realm of the living and the 
reader is privy to her internal dying monologue.  Naana’s closeness to the ancestors 
gives her metaphysical insight and she regrets that she can not convey to Baako the 
“thoughts of his [future] happiness” with which she is “filled” (199).   
 
Words into Weapons:  Abyssinian Chronicles 
In Carcase for Hounds and Fragments, we see one primary wound that 
marshals the sufferer’s body to voice a call for justice.  In Abyssinian Chronicles, 
Mugezi makes a life out of reading and listening to the voices of others who have 
been wounded.  Mugezi’s multiple wounds release various modes of testimonial 
transmission throughout his life, beginning with testimonial performances and 
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culminating in a commitment to write the historical testimony of all black people.  
Mugezi has survived parental and institutional abuse, colonialism, civil war, and a 
military dictatorship.  After such violent beginnings, it is the casual stares and 
pejorative gestures he receives in public when he is with his white girlfriend 
Magdeleine that “[wear] me down” (460) so much that he disassociates repeatedly 
from official society.  The final metamorphosis of Mugezi’s testimonial voice from 
action to speech occurs after he has been wounded physically and psychically, has 
read the wounds of others, and, finally, has excised himself from all pathological 
affiliations and societal contexts.  Unfettered, unaffiliated, even officially 
nonexistent, Mugezi is sufficiently detached from the world to read it from a distance.  
The detachment precipitates his epiphany of an upended reality and sends him into 
language and employment training so that he can chronicle the history of Abyssinia 
with an arsenal of words sharpened “into weapons” (461).   
Mugezi’s childhood pranks are non-verbal attempts to speak about his 
community’s traumatic wounds.  Diana Taylor identifies a “performatic” realm of 
testimony in “trauma-driven performances” that function as testimonial actions 
(1674).53  These may initiate social and individual recuperation.  Trauma manifests as 
“acting out in both the individual and the social body” before the sufferer can speak 
about it (Taylor 1675).  Traumatic performances precede language and, thus, spoken 
testimony.  Taylor’s term “performatic” (from the Spanish performático) 
distinguishes trauma-driven performance from the “performative” which is based in 
language.54  Performatic recuperation can involve almost any type of movement, but 
traumatic movement will always be “bracketed from daily life” (Taylor 1677, note 3).  
 191 
 
Mugezi’s childhood performances all take the form of anti-colonial sabotage.  At 
seminary, for example, he shuts off the school’s electricity so that the abusive Dutch 
faculty will have to share its stores of frozen food with the malnourished African 
students.  Mugezi’s traumatic performance both calls attention to the faculty’s abuse 
and precedes his later writing, and both forms of expression are testimonial.   
While this and other childhood performatic protests are testimonial in nature, 
they are fraught by Mugezi’s immaturity and so they remain incomplete appeals to 
justice and productive mourning.  The voice speaks the survivor’s secret shame, and 
Mugezi’s shame is complicity in his own oppression—his childhood testimonial 
performances are anonymous.  When those in power inflict the same trauma on all or 
many members of a group, personal trauma binds the collective together.  In these 
instances, personal trauma can “mobilize collective acts of condemnation” (Taylor 
1675).  By operating alone and in secret, Mugezi misses a valuable opportunity to 
organize his fellow seminary students against the trauma of colonial education.  
Rather than name the oppression he has suffered to a witness and potentially initiate 
mourning processes, Mugezi flees Uganda.  But he cannot flee the state of 
melancholy.   
Mugezi’s experience demonstrates that an important link between the body 
and the voice is immigration.  Bhabha observes that the melancholic and the migrant 
speak the same “encrypted discourse” (164).  For Bhabha, the postcolonial migrant is 
necessarily a melancholic for whom the lost object is the national Heim.  Bhabha 
refers to the migrant’s bodily gestures as foreign to the physical lexicon of the host 
country; they repeatedly mark both the lost national Heim and the migrant’s 
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difference.  For Bhabha, because the gesture is not a spoken word, the repetition of 
gesture is not sufficient to bridge the void between action and knowledge.  The 
gesture becomes merely a mime of living, entrapping the migrant in a representation 
of a life he cannot live in reality because, as migrant, he is not schooled in the ways of 
being at home in the host country.  The migrant native remains trapped outside the 
host Heim, silent.   
As long as Uganda remains mired in postcolonial political upheaval, it will 
continue to be unheimlich to its native population.  As Mugezi’s experience in both 
post-war Uganda and in Amsterdam demonstrates, the postcolonial Ugandan is at 
home neither in the motherland nor abroad.  In particular, Mugezi finds that as half of 
an inter-racial couple in Amsterdam, “I hate[ ] the visibility Magdeleine accord[s] 
me” because it carries the responsibility of interracial access to privilege he wishes to 
refuse (461).  In order to access a measure of racial privilege through his gender, 
Mugezi must perform racist stereotypes of both the hyper-virile black man and the 
subservient house servant to Magdeleine’s social circle.  Unwilling to represent these 
competing essences of stereotypical black masculinity, Mugezi goes underground.  
His eventual epiphany shows him the possibility of constructing a non-patriarchal 
form of masculinity.  Like Haraka in Carcase for Hounds, Baako in Fragments, and 
Askar in Maps, Mugezi accepts his role as the recorder of social trauma and 
transformation.  Mugezi becomes another griot:  the writer, the testifier, the social 
critic, and historian.   
In Amsterdam, Mugezi comes to believe that his pastime of recreating 
histories of Dutch corpses in some way restores histories to the millions of 
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unremembered Ugandans, dead from decades of dictatorial rule and civil wars under 
Amin and Obote.  Mugezi has seen the disembodied body parts lying in the streets, the 
walking “corpses of war” crying testimonies on their way out of detention (306-09), 
the charred ruins of destroyed villages.  All wounds, scarred bodies, and decimated 
villages tell different histories of trauma, but these histories bind all sufferers together.  
The disfigured torture victims and urban destruction seem to Mugezi, who is an 
experienced midwife’s assistant, to be war’s afterbirth.  War was the birth of a new 
nation, Uganda, which has exited the womb of the central region’s L Triangle.  The 
Triangle is the nation’s geographic center and is a strategic military site for national 
control.  Shaped like a pubis, the Triangle is alternately occupied by rebel and 
government forces throughout the novel.  The narrative’s repeated images of rape and 
AIDS in describing political and military activities in the Triangle suggest repeated 
violations of the nation from external attackers as well as from pathogens inside the 
national body.  Although Mugezi is skilled in the art of divining afterbirth tissue for 
clues to a baby’s future, reading the “afterbirth of war” requires the ability to read the 
future of the emerging postcolonial, postwar nation (299).  For this divination, Mugezi 
learns to look into the past.  He begins by reading his Grandpa’s beaten corpse, seeing 
the political murder as a metaphor for Uganda’s post-independence dictatorial abuse 
of subversive citizens (313). 
 In the last pages of the novel, Mugezi is again sitting in a bustling urban 
center, this time at Amsterdam’s enormous Central Station.  Finally free of 
Magdeleine, he can now “discover the world peacefully and dream and redream it” 
(461).  In service of this goal, Mugezi has “attacked the Dutch language course like a 
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madman . . . attacked the subsequent job course with the same zeal” (461).  He 
garners a job at a magazine and there, “where words [a]re beaten into weapons, . . . I 
[am] gradually forging mine” (461).  The train station is and becomes for Mugezi, at 
this moment, the center and microcosm of the world: 
 
The sun [is] shining, doves [a]re fluttering about, three youths [a]re 
banging out a rock tune on scuffed instruments. . . .  Half-naked youths 
[a]re watching, travelers streaming past, trams rumbling.  People of all 
nations and colors pour[ ] into the great city like ants streaming toward 
predestined locations in subterranean tunnels.  (462) 
 
Images of birth, infancy, and youth dominate the scene, suggesting that Central 
Station is yet another womb, bringing forth “youths,” “half-naked,” from its vaginal, 
“subterranean tunnels” into the sunshine (462).  This image of birth precipitates 
Mugezi’s revelation:  “As I look[ ], my head beg[ins] to spin:  I [am] getting dizzy.  
People seem[ ] to be walking upside down, the dead rising from their graves, the 
living diving into fresh graves” (462).  The grave imagery is prescient for Mugezi, 
who has dug and excavated burial sites, but it also invokes the notion of the living 
moving freely between this world and the realm of the ancestors.  The ability to move 
freely among realms demolishes the boundaries of the real and thus posits, as in 
Carcase for Hounds and Fragments, the suggestion that reality is a fiction that can be 
replaced.  Abyssinian Chronicles takes this notion a step further, however, and where 
Carcase for Hounds describes in detail an arms-free pastoral paradise, Abyssinian 
Chronicles depicts not what Naana’s “more fantastic world” looks like, but what it 




There [is] motion and inversion everywhere:  the invaders [a]re being 
invaded, the partitioners being partitioned, the penetrators getting 
penetrated.  The mixing and juxtaposition of peoples bec[omes] mind-
blowing. . . .  I h[o]ld on to the cement bank in order to stop myself 
from spewing or getting spewed.  I ha[ve] found myself a stone to lay 
my head on, an enchanted hilltop made of boulders from all the 
corners of the globe.  (462) 
 
At the close of Abyssinian Chronicles, untied to nation, gender, or race, Mugezi 
belongs nowhere, and his epiphany of belonging everywhere erases formalized 
boundaries and ideological constructions.  He sees “motion and inversion 
everywhere” as patriarchal hierarchies, frames of reference, and social structures 
collapse into themselves and destroy each other (462).  He is “in” the transnational 
community that stretches everywhere, stretched out himself, prone on “an enchanted 
hilltop made of boulders from all the corners of the globe” (462).  Mugezi’s vision of 
the total inversion of reality is a look into the possibilities for a changed future, for 
postcolonial mourning.  Mugezi has not yet begun writing his text of the novel’s title, 
but the epiphany figuratively sends him into what he calls Abyssinia, inverting the 
life-death binary and linking him to his now-deceased father Serenity through their 
shared desire to write this story.  Serenity had also dreamed of writing the history of 
what he called Abyssinia, of all black people, and that dream repeats and crystallizes 
in Mugezi’s revelatory commitment.  The path to mourning, Mugezi realizes, is 
through the community from which he has so many times excised himself.  From his 
mental perch on the top of the world, Mugezi can envision a transnational community, 
an “enchanted” one comprised of “juxtapose[ed] peoples” from “all the corners of the 
globe.”  If the partitioners and penetrators are stopped, then we might read the end of 
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While Haraka, Baako, and Mugezi do not complete the tasks their wounds 
demand, each text ends with a signal of the potential for success to occur after the end 
of the narrative.  This possibility resides in the narratives’ movement into realms that 
may best be described as alternative realities.  Carcase for Hounds and Fragments 
both end after having just placed principle characters within the realm of the 
ancestors and unborn, and Abyssinian Chronicles ends with Mugezi having just seen 
an inverted vision of reality in which the living and spectral consort.  In each realm, 
violence and oppression are absent; joy and justice predominate.   
Moving the narrative action from the fiction of reality into an alternate realm 
of existence signals the epistemological and ideological possibilities for breaking 
down barriers surrounding notions of patriarchal reality, the condition of 
postcolonialism, and even suggesting the possibility of justice wrought from 
unconventional forms of gender and recuperative testimony.  Bhabha suggests that 
literature unconceals alternative ideas and beings that the real world cannot 
accommodate.  Specifically, he suggests that literary representations of “obscure 
signs of the spirit-world, the sublime and the subliminal” can write the world (12).  
The spirit-world and the sublime can inscribe, or world, the postcolonial world.  That 
all three novels’ final action takes place outside reality and temporality suggests the 
need to reconfigure postcolonial reality, citizenship, and societal parameters if post-
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independence African nations are finally to disengage from residual colonial realities.  
These narratives’ movement outside the real and the temporal are especially striking 
because the surrealist endings depart so dramatically form the realist portrayals that 
comprise the rest of the novels, thus highlighting the power behind the spectral 
representations.   
The three texts juxtapose references to the realm of the ancestors and the 
unborn with narratives that, while set in the present, also traverse the boundaries 
between the realms between living and spectral.  Oyěwùmί expands on this notion, of 
linking pregnancy with atemporality across many African communities, noting that 
across the continent, motherhood transcends boundaries of gender, metaphysics, and 
the individual body (“Abiyamo”).  This nexus of possibility is the atemporal moment 
which the pregnant woman inhabits in many African cosmologies.  I read this 
metaphysical juncture of past, present, and future in the texts as opening a space for 
the entrée of the mother figure into the birthing process of the postcolonial nation, an 
entry that reintroduces gender inclusivity to nation building.55  The surreal endings in 
Carcase for Hounds, Fragments, and Abyssinian Chronicles may suggest that 
“postcolonialism,” or a historical stage unlike that of colonialism, exists (like 
literature and trauma) only as an imagined reality.  I would like to think, however, 
that the narrative juxtaposition of genders and realist and spectral depictions 
demonstrates that the possibility of conceiving an independent nation resides in the 
creative potential of an atemporality that overrides linearity in favor of simultaneity—




Chapter 5:  Writing (in) Africa, Reading “African” Literature 
 
This dissertation has underlined the various ways in which trauma is 
witnessed and written in Anglophone African novels:  through damaged bodies, 
censorship and ghosts, and the wounded self’s trans-generational voice.  In this 
concluding chapter, I grapple with the question of who reads and writes “Africa” and 
Anglophone “African literature” in the contemporary metropolitan literary 
community.  I begin by examining the speeches delivered on the occasion of J. M. 
Coetzee’s 2003 Nobel Prize award in Literature, the responses of the African 
National Congress, the South African press, academe, and the mission statements of 
the two most influential institutions that determine what constitutes world literature, 
the Swedish Academy and the United Kingdom’s Man Booker Foundation.  It is 
appropriate that I conclude my study by examining the rhetoric of defining African 
literature because I have consistently argued that how we read that literature is 
inseparable from the ways in which such a reading constructs an Africa for 
consumption.  Given our increased attention to globalization, we might want to step 
back and try to understand how we as readers construct “Africa” as our neighbor in a 
global community.  We also need to consider how post-independence Anglophone 
African literature challenges ethnocentric and phallocentric constructions of Africa 
and African literature imposed by a metropolitan readership.  In these pages, I 
interrogate the ways in which public discourse shapes the contours of canonical 
Anglophone African literature and how that canon shapes and is shaped by our 
understanding of “Africa.” 
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I have chosen to focus here on Coetzee’s 1999 novel Disgrace, which won the 
Man Booker Prize and whose publication preceded his Nobel Prize, because it 
continues to receive the largest share of international critical attention of all his 
works.  Since the end of the twentieth century, Coetzee has been broadly heralded as 
the Anglophone African writer, and this pinnacle novel is widely considered to offer a 
new paradigm for conceptualizing justice in post apartheid South Africa.  Disgrace 
represents interracial rape and prostitution as a metaphor for the social trauma of 
colonialism.  I will argue that the popular reading of the white woman working 
against the colonial lynching narrative reinforces white privilege under the guise of 
progressive politics.  I interrogate the novel’s representations of interracial sexual 
exploitation and response through the interrelated lenses of trauma and social justice 
theories, reading against the grain of the popular interpretation to better illuminate its 
complications.  Postcolonial and trauma studies thus coalesce in the figure of the 
metropolitan reader as a potential witness to Anglophone African testimonial 
narratives.  Ultimately, I suggest that international reading practice marshals the 
power for social repression or transformation in its designation of the progenitors of 
Anglophone “African Literature.”  I analyze the ways in which public discourse 
enshrines a particular reading of Disgrace which reinforces colonialist representations 
of “Africa” and black Africans as victims devoid of the resources to shape their own 
postcolonial identities.  I offer an alternative reading of the novel that resuscitates and 
complicates fraught and repressed textual testimonies in order to illuminate traumatic 




For two decades, literary and popular critics have hailed Coetzee as one of 
South Africa’s most important writers who, along with other “best-known” white 
South African writers like André Brink and Nadine Gordimer, forges “‘new’ 
departures in South African writing” (Dodd 327).1  In particular, Coetzee is lauded 
for “subversively” rewriting not only the South African political novel “but also the 
discursive and ideological codes which make a liberal subject position tenable in the 
first place” (Bethlehem 20).2  Coetzee’s poststructuralist orientation begs an 
understanding of Coetzee as a linguist first, suggests David Attwell, which means that 
Coetzee’s writing “is a primary, constitutive element of consciousness and of culture 
at large” (Coetzee 10).3  In Attwell’s words, Coetzee’s more recent discomforting 
fictional engagements with the constructedness of violence and justice are harbingers 
of the way that an emerging post apartheid South Africa articulates its culture.  
Coetzee’s work has garnered copious critical praise for suggesting an “ethical 
engagement with history,” and particularly with the troubled history of apartheid 
(Marais, “Little” 159), as well as some feminist concern for his misogynistic “textual 
production of ‘woman’” (Dodd 327).4  Nevertheless, whether in the form of praise or 
critique, and critical attention to Coetzee weighs more heavily toward the former, 
Coetzee’s work and Disgrace in particular has generated an impressive body of 
scholarship.  Coetzee’s impressive string of international literary prizes began in 1977 
with South Africa’s premiere literary honor, the Central News Agency Literary 
Award for In the Heart of the Country, and culminated in 2003 with his selection for 
the world’s top literary recognition, the Nobel Prize in Literature.5  In his Nobel 
Award presentation speech, Per Wästberg of the Swedish Academy called Coetzee “a 
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Truth and Reconciliation Commission on your own” (“Work”).6  Disgrace has also 
won England’s top literary honor, the Man Booker Prize, making Coetzee the award’s 
first multiple recipient.7  Possibly the most prestigious literary award given for a 
single work, the Man Booker Prize’s value to the writer extends far beyond its 
£50,000 check.8  The Man Booker Prize Foundation acknowledges its “power to 
transform the fortunes of authors, and even publishers. . . .   Both the winner and the 
shortlisted [sic] authors are guaranteed a worldwide readership plus a dramatic 
increase in book sales” (Man Booker).  And, indeed, the sheer prestige of the prize 
guarantees the winner’s inclusion in the West’s bestseller lists, university literature 
syllabi and, in many cases (e.g., as with former winners Gordimer and Salman 
Rushdie), inclusion in the world literature canon.  Despite its international power to 
launch and bolster literary careers, The Man Booker Prize caters to an elite cadre of 
writers because only citizens of the British Commonwealth are eligible for 
consideration for the award.   
As a feminist and an Africanist residing and working in the metropole, my 
interest in Disgrace stems from my recognition that politics surround any act of 
representation.  Spivak examines an ethics of representation, specifically the 
communication that either takes place or does not because of absences—of telling, of 
understanding and, therefore, of knowledge.  For Spivak most, if not all, of the 
theoretical questions we explore in the humanities are underpinned by the question of 
knowledge.  Who creates it?  Who records it?  Who disseminates it?  And underlying 
these questions about the production and dissemination of knowledge are more 
questions, primarily of modus operandi and motive.  How and why is knowledge 
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created?  How and why is it recorded?  How and why is it disseminated?  This 
chapter will interrogate the complicated global network of representations created, 
recorded, and disseminated by the metropolitan literary establishment through its 
embrace of Disgrace.  I will also examine the politics surrounding this embrace.  I 
find that even as Disgrace is widely held to articulate a new, even ethical, vision for 
post apartheid South Africa, this reading of the novel in fact reinforces colonial 
structures of racism and sexism. 
Set in post apartheid South Africa, Disgrace is a material artifact of the 
postcolonial condition that represents interracial prostitution and rape as the most 
outrageous illustration of power imbalance.  In the novel, rape functions 
metonymically rather than metaphorically for the social trauma inflicted in Africa by 
colonialism.  Eileen Julien finds that rape functions similarly in Francophone African 
literature: 
not an aberration, not a singularly sick act, nor an individual problem 
in an otherwise healthy society. . . .  [Rape] is portrayed rather, as the 
French term viol makes clear, metonymically, as a quintessential act of 
violence in a context of rampant abuse, both political and sexual.  
(161, emphasis in original). 
 
The French term viol means mutilation, rape, or violation, and Disgrace opens by 
establishing postcolonial South Africa as a space in which sexual exploitation and 
violence have become normalized to the point of representing an agreeable solution to 
the protagonist David Lurie’s “problem of sex” (1).   
The novel’s protagonist and narrator is David, an urban white South African 
college professor beyond his sexual prime.  Disgrace opens with David’s 
representation of Soraya, a prostitute whom the text suggests to be Indian by its 
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descriptions of “her honey-brown body, unmarked by the sun” (1).  David tells the 
reader that “Soraya is tall and slim, with long black hair and dark, liquid eyes” (1), 
and he is her weekly client.  David eventually invades Soraya’s personal life and she 
rebuffs him, severing all contact.  Soon after, David quits his job over a sexual 
harassment complaint for raping his student Melanie whom the novel represents as 
racially ambiguous.  Fleeing scandal, David retreats to his daughter Lucy’s rural 
farm.  Almost immediately, three black men attack and imprison David, burgle the 
house, and rape Lucy.  Although she is markedly wounded by the incident, Lucy at 
first neither confirms nor denies David’s suspicion of rape and repeatedly refuses to 
report that aspect of their ordeal to the police.  David lives with Lucy for most of the 
second half of the novel, frequently berating the increasingly withdrawn Lucy to 
report the rape and leave the farm.  Instead, she remains on the farm and negotiates a 
“marriage” with her black neighbor and business partner Petrus:  his protection from 
further sexual assault in exchange for her land.  While Lucy’s rape is the novel’s 
narrative climax and focus of its denouement, Melanie and Soraya are quickly written 
out of the text when they refuse David’s sexual invasions early in the narrative.   
In a popular reading of the novel, Lucy refuses to report her rape to the 
authorities in order to stunt the reach of a suspect juridical institution.  Louise 
Bethlehem and Georgina Horrell capture the brutality of this inscription of justice on 
the female body most effectively.  Bethlehem observes that in Disgrace “it is rape 
which ushers in the ‘New World’” (21).  Horrell similarly argues that “it is on and 
through the body of Lurie’s daughter that the terms for white South Africa’s future 
‘remembering’ are ultimately sketched” (25).9  While neither Bethlehem nor Horrell 
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condone the violent abuse of a woman’s body as the terms for national 
transformation, they and the majority of gender critics who examine Disgrace focus 
on Lucy’s abuse to the exclusion of Soraya’s and Melanie’s.  Ignoring the brown or 
black women in the text elides their sexual exploitation and ignores their 
disappearances.   
In the novel, Lucy’s refusal to testify opposes David’s proposal to report the 
rape to the authorities who will, in turn, punish the rapists.  Because the novel 
represents David as the consummate colonizer, Lucy’s solution in opposition to his 
appears to be an anti-colonial critique.  The narrative represents Lucy in such total 
misalignment with David that one might be tempted to read her refusal to narrate her 
rape story as inhabiting a third space outside David’s binary worldview.  One might 
view Lucy’s refusal as operating on a trajectory not in opposition to David’s, but as 
instead articulating a radical alternative from the margin.  This reading, to which I 
will return later, argues that Disgrace suggests a radical new form of social justice in 
post apartheid South Africa.   
As testament to the power of organizations like academe, the Swedish 
Academy, and the Man Booker Foundation to shape the contemporary literary canon, 
the press has promoted the popular reading of Disgrace and discredited criticism, 
particularly post-Booker and post-Nobel.  The most notable dismissal was of the 
African National Congress (ANC)’s censure of the novel during the South African 
Human Rights Commission (SAHRC)’s hearings on racism in the media in 2000.10  




In the novel . . . it is suggested that our white compatriots should 
emigrate because to be in post-apartheid South Africa is to be in ‘their 
territory,’ as a consequence of which the whites will lose their cards, 
their weapons, their property, their rights, their dignity.  (qtd. in 
Bridgland)11   
 
Nadine Gordimer and Chris van Wyk, both South African writers, also criticized the 
novel.  Gordimer argued that “there is not one black person who is a real human 
being” in Disgrace, and van Wyk called the book “racist” (Donadio 1).12  The South 
African press dismissed the ANC’s statement as unfounded and two British papers 
cast the ANC as a bully.13  The controversy surrounding the novel’s release 
documents the politicized tensions surrounding race and representation in post 
apartheid South Africa.  At the moment of Disgrace’s ascendancy to canonical status, 
what was at stake in South Africa was the way we should read African literature and 
what to recognize as African literature. 
*  *  * 
Disgrace critiques David’s colonial ideology of normativity by representing 
his worldview in racial, gender, and moral binaries.  For David, to respond to the rape 
of his daughter is to choose one of two diametrically opposed options, e.g., to either 
report the rape or not, which is to either seek punishment of the perpetrator or not.  If 
David is positioned as the consummate colonizer, then his desire for punishment of 
the perpetrator is positioned as merely the first step toward repair of his damaged 
patriarchal status.  Victim testimony in Disgrace is bound up in David’s vengeful 
lynching impulse and is thus recast as worthy of colonial critique.  Lucy’s refusal to 
testify, because it opposes David’s proposal, is privileged in the novel as the ethically 
superior response to rape.  Further, Lucy’s refusal to seek punishment of her rapists is 
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represented as non-normative.  Lucy’s refusal to testify also works against the 
patriarchal rape narrative in which the victim publicly tells her rape story so that the 
community can punish her attacker for its own self-protection.  In a racialized culture, 
where the rape narrative has the potential to transform into the lynch narrative, Lucy’s 
refusal subverts both narratives.  The novel casts Lucy’s subversion of these two 
narratives as decidedly non-normative, radically marginal.  Because it disrupts 
racialized police justice, Lucy’s response is also frequently read as potentially 
political.   
If, as I suggested earlier, we read Lucy’s refusal to testify as positioned in 
opposition not to the father’s desire for testimony but in opposition to David’s binary 
view of vengeance versus inaction, then we may be tempted to read Lucy’s silence as 
a “slippage of categories” from the patriarchal juridical binary into what Bhabha calls 
the Third Space of articulation, from which Lucy articulates a new path to justice in 
South Africa—the path of protection for the black perpetrator (140).  As Bhabha 
describes it: 
 
The intervention of the Third Space of enunciation, which makes the 
structure of meaning and reference an ambivalent process, destroys 
this mirror of representation in which cultural knowledge is 
customarily revealed as an integrated, open, expanding code.  Such an 
intervention quite properly challenges our sense of the historical 
identity of culture as a homogenizing, unifying force, authenticated by 
the originary Past, kept alive in the national tradition of the People.  
(37) 
 
Construction of the Third Space is both outside binaries and also necessarily 
repetitive.  If the space remains constant, then it becomes normative and thus part of 
the binary.  I suspect that misapplication of Bhabha’s theory, whether intentional or 
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not, is at the heart of readings that assign a radical politicism to Lucy’s silence.  The 
fundamental problem with any attempt to position Lucy’s silence outside the juridical 
binary and within a marginal space of articulation between the performative and the 
pedagogical is that Lucy’s silence neither constitutes or slips through a rupture in the 
cultural script.  Nor does it challenge a historically “homogenizing, unifying” culture.  
On the contrary, Lucy’s silence adheres to racist patriarchal rape scripts that are 
centuries old.   
In her analysis of Rape Stories, which is a documentary comprised of rape 
testimonies, Wendy Hesford notes that social relationships among black and white 
men and women have been scripted by the “politics and historical consciousness of 
rape” (21).  While Hesford’s analysis refers to the racialized rape history of slavery 
and its aftermath in the United States, the notion of racialized and gendered relational 
scripts is transferable to apartheid-era and post apartheid South Africa.  These scripts 
inscribe whiteness and maleness with privilege which is maintained through the threat 
of rape (of the white woman by the black man) and by the act of rape (of the black 
woman by the white man).  These relational hierarchies based on rape inform and 
complicate the potentiality for sisterhood between black and white women,14 and also 
foreground the white woman’s power over the black man by either unleashing 
violence against him with her accusation or protecting him with her silence.  Lucy’s 
silent response to her rape by black men is more complicated than a simple conviction 
that hers is not a public narrative but a “purely private matter . . . in this place, at this 
time” (112).  It is also more complex than a desire to protect black criminals from a 
racist, corrupt judicial system.  Instead, Lucy’s silence invokes her power to decide 
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the fate of the black men by either signaling the conclusion of the lynching narrative 
or granting them life.  One could read Lucy’s silence as a melancholic attachment to 
the lost object of white supremacy in South Africa. 
 Lynn Higgins and Brenda Silver argue that the aesthetics of rape is its politics.  
Disgrace represents sexual exploitation in ways that are framed by and based on 
racialized constructions of rape, sexual exploitation, and justice.  While the typical 
rape model in a patriarchy involves a male aggressor and a female victim, in a 
patriarchal reality the majority of aggressors are also white and the majority of 
victims are black or brown.  The novel dismisses rape reality and privileges the 
centuries-old myth of black men raping white women.15   
Disgrace’s representations of sexual violence and responses to it are gendered 
and racialized by the sex and race of the rape victims versus that of the attackers, and 
also by the sex and race of the rape victims versus that of the narrator.  David is a key 
participant and interested party in every sexual violence or exploitation scenario in 
the novel:  he is Soraya’s “john,” Melanie’s rapist, and Lucy’s father.  From his 
complicated subject position, David is at best an unreliable narrator.  At worst he is a 
liar.  “Rapist narrative” shows the relationship between words and actions—to 
Hesford, rape is “both a material and discursive site of struggle for cultural power” 
(19).  Disgrace both narrates rape and employs a rapist narrator—and thus can only 
offer a skewed representation of rape as a racialized and gendered struggle for 
cultural power.  The narrative itself is David’s struggle to retain his own cultural 
power which the fall of apartheid has stolen it from him.  “Du must dein Leben 
ändern!:  you must change your life,” he thinks when he learns that Lucy plans to 
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marry Petrus rather than flee to Holland as he wishes.  But, he realizes, while “Lucy 
may be able to bend to the tempest; he cannot, not with honour” (209).  The novel’s 
mixed reception represents another level of the cultural power struggle over the 
global representation of “postcolonial Africa.” 
Julie Mertus writes that if power holders define crimes, then sexual 
exploitation and rape are defined according to the agendas of those in power.16  
History is written by the victor who decides which narratives to privilege and which 
to suppress.  Higgins and Silver write:  “Whether in the courts or the media, whether 
in art or criticism, who gets to tell the story and whose story counts as ‘truth’ 
determine the definition of what rape is” (1, emphasis in original).  As narrator and 
the holder and embodiment of textual power, David determines what is and is not 
sexual violence and exploitation in Disgrace.  He authors the history of colonialism in 
his representation of postcolonial South Africa.  In David’s narrative history, not all 
sexual violence and exploitation is represented as such.  Perhaps even more than his 
position as the white father, David’s narrative authority on such matters of definition 
is strengthened by his own experience as a sexual predator.  First, his narration 
renders the major incidents of sexual violence and exploitation to which he is party 
interracial.  Then he uses the racialized colonial paradigm to re-classify each incident 
as either exploitative or not.   
Disgrace quickly establishes David’s attitude toward non-white women as 
merely providers of a necessary service (sex), not exploitation, through his 
arrangement with Soraya.  We presume that David prefers to be sexually serviced by 
brown or black women because he chose Soraya from the “exotic” list in the escort 
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service directory (7).  David’s frame of his economic relationship with Soraya as a 
clean, predictable, high-priced, weekly “escort” meeting rather than as street 
prostitution undermines the possibility of characterizing it as sexual exploitation.  
David even goes so far as to fantasize that Soraya chose this career for its 
convenience and financial reward rather than out of circumstance.  He muses at one 
point, “It may be that she is not a professional at all.  She may work for the agency 
only one or two afternoons a week, and for the rest live a respectable life in the 
suburbs” (3).  Further, David imagines that Soraya shares a mutual “affection” with 
him (2), which suggests that she has sexual intercourse with him voluntarily.  This 
fantasy obscures the fundamental power imbalance in their relationship based on race, 
gender, and class.  Thus, while David represents his regular interracial sexual 
exploitation and eventual stalking of Soraya as culturally sanctioned and mutually 
enjoyed activities, the only kind of sexual relationship a black man can have with a 
white woman in this text is the worst kind of sexual violence:  gang rape.   
David frames the interaction between himself as white professor and his 
racially ambiguous student Melanie as “not rape,” but merely “an impulse” (25, 53).  
In an attempt to erase the patina of violation from their coupling in a racialized social 
context, he races Melanie increasingly non-white throughout the narrative.  First, he 
inscribes her with Asian exoticism, noting her “close-cropped black hair, wide, 
almost Chinese cheekbones, large, dark eyes” and, later, he Africanizes her fully by 
referring to her as “Meláni:  the dark one” (11, 18).  Because David-as-narrator races 
Melanie non-white, we must read her as non-white.  Indeed, while the text never 
assigns any definitive racial or ethnic classification to Melanie, it does provide a basis 
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for David’s ability to write brownness upon her body and then to later rewrite her as 
black.  During the faculty hearing over Melanie’s sexual harassment complaint 
against David, Dr. Farodia Rassool suggests that “in a case with overtones like this 
one . . . the wider community is entitled to know . . . what it is specifically that 
Professor Lurie acknowledges and therefore what it is that he is being censured for” 
(50).  By referring to “overtones like this one,” Farodia may imply a racial component 
to the sexual harassment case in addition to that of “abuse” (53).  Yet, while David 
later entertains various explanations of why his sexual encounters with Melanie are 
censured, he never acknowledges responsibility for racialized sexual exploitation or 
rape.  Instead, he muses that his “affair with the girl” ended and is censured perhaps 
for their age difference, the student-teacher power imbalance, and perhaps even his 
failure “to supply something” to Melanie (42, 171).  “I lack the lyrical,” he later 
explains to her father Mr Isaacs (171).  Yet, by racing Melanie as he does, David 
confirms Farodia’s concern, re-mapping his rape of Melanie to the colonial paradigm 
of interracial sexual exploitation.  Their teacher/student power imbalance reinforces 
the master/slave dynamic David has already established as the preferred paradigm for 
his erotic pursuits.  Finally, David’s fatherly instinct toward Melanie, whom he calls 
his dark “child,” again reinforces his status as the white father to the raced, gendered, 
infantilized other (20).  Thus, while David entertains the possibility that certain 
imbalances may have doomed his “affair” with Melanie, he does not represent it as 
the complex network of patriarchal control it surely is. 
Race mediates the response to sexual violence and exploitation in Disgrace.  
In the novel the question of justice is gendered and racialized across the sexual 
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exploitation of three women in the form of rape and prostitution, yet in its focus on 
the rape of the white woman the novel provides meager, if any, response to the sexual 
exploitation of an Indian woman and the rape of another woman of color by a white 
man.  In focusing on the colonial model, Disgrace fails to recognize the sexual 
exploitation of the black or brown woman as exploitation.  David denies these women 
the opportunity to testify their traumatic experiences by erasing them from the text, 
thereby denying them and the community any potential for recovery or a just 
response.  David assumes no just response is required for his sexual violence against 
Melanie and Soraya.  In the colonial social model, the sexual violation of the brown 
or black woman by the white man is not violation.  David’s dismissal of Melanie’s 
rape as rape is so complete that he refuses to read her sexual harassment complaint 
against him during the faculty hearing on the matter.  Refusing to defend himself 
against the charges implies that David denies any basis to them.  Any regret David 
later feels is for his failure to have been a better boyfriend to Melanie, not for 
attacking her.  His narrative perspective obscures Melanie’s resistance and rewrites 
their coupling as consensual.  For his exploitation of Soraya, David perceives no 
censure except the trouble of finding another “exotic” prostitute when she terminates 
their business arrangement after he invades her private life: 
 
[H]e pays a detective agency to track her down.  Within days he has 
her real name, her address, her telephone number.  He telephones at 
nine in the morning, when the husband and children will be out. 
     “Soraya?” he says.  “This is David.  How are you?  When can I see 
you again?” 
     A long silence before she speaks.  “I don’t know who you are,” she 
says.  “You are harassing me in my own house.  I demand you will 
never phone me here again, never.” 




David undermines the authority of Soraya’s second and final refusal of his invasion 
by correcting her English.  In so doing, he highlights her racial difference to dilute his 
transgression. 
David seeks a repaired scene regarding Lucy which, to him, means removing 
both the rapists and the raped from the area.  He incessantly browbeats Lucy for 
refusing his solution:  “your situation is becoming ridiculous, worse than ridiculous, 
sinister.  I don’t know how you can fail to see it.  I plead with you, leave the farm 
before it is too late.  It’s the only sane thing left to do” (200).  To refuse the will of 
the father, to refuse to restore patriarchal order, is insanity.   
Insofar as Coetzee’s writing invites difficult questions about the intersections 
of race, representation, and agency, I propose to read Disgrace in the context of these 
questions, but also to question the way the novel is read.  Reading the novel as merely 
one layer in a cultural context rife with tension suggests Derek Attridge’s notion that 
the text being read “demand[s] a new work in response” (Singularity 92)17 such that 
the work invites “new ways of reading” and “new ways of writing,” rendering any 
reading of Disgrace a new layer on the existing, strifed literary discourse surrounding 
the text.  The novel engages with questions of trauma and social justice in the 
postcolonial situation.  We can engage with its literary representations to illuminate 
the problems that underlie questions surrounding the implementation of social justice 
in a postcolonial condition, and the ways in which trauma studies can inform our 
reading of postcolonial testimonies of colonial trauma in the text—or the absence 
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thereof.  What does the presence or absence of traumatic testimony in a postcolonial 
text that represents colonial trauma suggest? 
Disgrace subscribes to a metropolitan juridical epistemology, but constructed 
notions of justice are not universally desired or appropriate.  In the novel David scoffs 
at Lucy’s protective arrangement with Petrus and instead pushes judicial solutions.  In 
a context in which David represents the cultural minority, his racial privilege allows 
him to ignore or denigrate indigenous African understandings of justice.  Rather than 
rely exclusively on colonialist models, purveyors of social transformation in post 
apartheid South Africa must interrogate metropolitan notions of justice and seek 
responses to interracial sexual exploitation that meet the needs of African as well as 
European victims and communities.  Trauma and justice theories provide a 
framework for such responses, which are based on victim testimony and productive 
mourning.  The South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) adopted 
this framework for its own methodology. 
Reading Disgrace through the interrelated lenses of trauma and social justice 
theories engages productively with the novel’s questions of traumatic sexual violence 
and the potentiality for a response in a form that can lead to social and individual 
mourning.  Both African and non-African critics with a social justice agenda are 
currently grappling with theoretical and material implications for initiating socially 
transformative (i.e., mourning) processes within neocolonial conditions of injustice.  
Many of these writers including Mertus, Amadiume, Mahmood Mamdani, and 
Soyinka pay particular attention to gendered and colonial violence.  With respect to 
trauma, Fanon’s psychoanalytic work elucidates the psychopathology caused by 
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colonial violence in Algeria.18  Finally, as this dissertation argues, much African 
literature written both prior to and since independence represents and acts as 
traumatic testimony.  Justice and trauma theories therefore help to lay out the 
problematics associated with exploring the possible forms social mourning might 
take, if any, in a social context of domination.  
Freud defines traumatic neurosis as psychic repetitions or reenactments of a 
life-threatening accident. Today’s discourse of Post Traumatic Stress Disorder 
(PTSD) is still engaged with the ghost that haunts the trauma sufferer; that ghost is 
the experience that remains unknowable.  Both trauma and social justice studies are 
concerned with the relationship of the traumatic experience of an individual as 
representative of and related to the traumatic history of a people, and with the healing 
implications of testimony (or what the TRC called truth).  Like trauma, healing 
occurs at two levels:  the individual and the social.  At the social level, healing is 
referred to as social justice and it seeks to install equity among the members of a 
community after a conflict that was originated either externally or internally.  Equity 
requires that the needs of both the individual victim(s) and the community be met.  
Testimony (truth) serves here to identify the crimes committed, their perpetrators, and 
their victims.  Testimony thus allows for reparation to the victims, for social justice in 
the form of punishing the perpetrators and facilitating reconciliation among the 
members of the community, and finally for the creation of a traumatic history.  
Testimony thus functions both juridically (i.e., in proctoring reparation and 
punishment) and as a means of recuperation (in that its historical narration initiates 
processes of social and individual mourning).  Truth is a prerequisite to reconciliation 
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or social justice, not an alternative to it.  In the case of South Africa, the TRC equates 
truth with reconciliation, or social justice, and this is not necessarily a like pairing.  
Truth can exist without reconciliation, and reconciliation can exist without testimony.  
To achieve social justice, truth is essential, but so is reparation.  Soyinka argues that 
the TRC’s failure to incorporate the important element of reparation prevents the 
possibility of achieving reconciliation through truth alone: 
 
An ingredient is missing in this crucible of harmonization and that 
ingredient is both material and moral.  The moral element is glaring 
enough, though it is much too nebulous to assess—that element being 
remorse and, thus repentance. . . .  And [the material], I believe, is 
where the cry for Reparations for a different and more ancient cause 
suggests itself as the missing link between Truth and Reconciliation.  
The actual structuring of Reparation is secondary. . . .  The essential is 
to establish the principle:  that some measure of restitution is always 
essential after dispossession.  (Burden 34, 35-36)19 
 
The omission of reparation is an omission of accountability, argues Soyinka.  And the 
omission of accountability is particularly egregious in the pursuit of social justice in a 
postcolonial community like South Africa, in which the former perpetrators must 
forge a new nation with their former victims.  The TRC’s provision of amnesty for 
apartheid perpetrators decriminalizes their past abuses and rewrites the nation’s 
history of traumatic violence in the interest of authoring a new South Africa for the 
future.  The problem with this, argues Soyinka, is that memory (history) has 
implications for power.   
Mamdani argues that if, as Foucault claimed, power relations inform the 
institutional production of knowledge, then the TRC’s limitations on history, 
criminality, and victimhood (for instance, ignoring the three and a half million 
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victims of forced removals) produced a particular apartheid truth.  This “TRC 
mindset” attempts to pave the way for future racial harmony by erasing the nation’s 
racially fraught past (Farred 116).20  The TRC’s selective production of “truth” has 
implications not only for the future potentiality of achieving social justice through 
mourning in South Africa, but also for the health of the nation’s relations with the rest 
of the world.  Given Africa’s postcolonial subordination in the world community 
through dismissive foreign policy, economic colonialism via the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, and its media and cultural 
representations, internal South African reconciliation takes on a new importance as a 
microcosm for global reconciliation.  In a traumatized global economy, Soyinka 
argues that: 
 
Where there has been inequity, especially of a singularly brutalizing 
kind, of a kind that robs one side of its most fundamental attribute—its 
humanity—it seems only appropriate that some form of atonement be 
made, in order to exorcise that past.  Reparations, we repeat, serve as a 
cogent critique of history and thus a potent restraint on its 
[retraumatizing] repetition.  (Burden 83)   
 
Moral and material reparation need not be economic, argues Soyinka, but a recording 
responsibility is the overarching theme of postcolonial traumatic testimony and its 
aim of social mourning, or justice.  Derrida ties mourning and justice to the ethical 
and the temporal, calling justice a “responsibility” to the ghosts of the past, the 
unborn of the future, and those that surround us in the present (xix).  Metropolitan 
acknowledgement of colonial abuses, preservation of slavery’s historical sites, and 
fair trading practices with developing African countries all satisfy the overlapping 
requirements for truth (testimony), history (memory), and social healing 
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(reconciliation).  Amadiume and An-Na’im emphasize that the definitions of 
mourning, which they call healing, and social justice vary situationally: 
 
The possibility of social justice as both end and means of healing 
[mourning] and reconciliation is examined in the light of the fact that 
conceptions and mechanisms of realizing social justice vary among 
countries, societies and cultures, and even perhaps gender and class.  
(6)21   
 
Thus, Soyinka requires that reparation should not only “respond to the heroic latitude 
of the victims by an equally heroic act of remorse” but also be “expressed in some 
ingenious way” (82) that meets the specific needs of the victims and/or the 
community.  
Trauma sufferers need to testify to responsible witnesses who will hear the 
event’s reality in the name of justice.  The potential for mourning lies in the 
testimony’s attempt to reproduce history in order to secure justice.  Representation 
becomes the telling—the narrative—of the injury, which is an imperative precursor 
for the pursuit of justice.  If the victim can name the injury, then she can begin to 
heal, and the hearer of the traumatic testimony can know how to pursue a just 
response to it.  In addition to initiating justice, testimony is linked to subject 
(re)formation.  Trauma survivors, and in particular of rape, writes Mertus, often see 
themselves as un-whole and “searching to be whole again” (149).  Testimony allows 
them the opportunity to become subjects again, thereby undoing the power of the 
violence which has rendered them objects.  This premise applies not only to 
representations of knowledge production within literature, but in the form of literature 
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itself.  In the specific case of Disgrace, the first step in the pursuit of justice is 
rereading the sexual violence back into the text where it has been obscured by David 
and ignored by some critics.  In particular, we need to reread those textual moments 
in which sexual exploitation has been rewritten for guilt-free consumption, as David 
rewrites his “affair” with Melanie and his “arrangement” with Soraya.   
David’s displacement of sexual violence and exploitation from the text 
suggests its displacement from the Real, which evokes the notion of a traumatic 
accident.  To describe trauma as emanating from outside one’s experience allows the 
possibility of anticipating the traumatic accident as distinct from one’s “normal” 
experience.  In fact; however, the reverse is true.  The notion of traumatic possibility 
means that the possibility of a traumatic event always exists, but its timing and 
occurrence are never certain.  Trauma is accidental only because of its 
unpredictability.  The notion of traumatic possibility takes on added significance in 
the context of interracial rape in the colonial situation.  To the colonized and post 
apartheid black or brown woman, rape is an expected part of her experience, but the 
act is a surprise each time it occurs for each victim.  The traumatic suffering that 
ensues is caused not by the event itself but by the rupture in “the mind’s experience of 
time” (Caruth 61):  the threat is recognized a moment too late.     
Within traumatic experience lies both the threat of death at the moment of 
traumatic injury and the diminished quality of life as a result of the trauma (including 
repeated traumatic reoccurrences).  Trauma imbeds not only destruction but 
survival—life-threatening events cause traumatic suffering, and so the reaction is not 
to the event but to the “peculiar and perplexing experience of survival” (Caruth 60).  
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The traumatic survivor has survived the death threat without knowing death, and so 
survival means repeatedly grappling with the necessity and impossibility of knowing 
the threat to life.  In Disgrace, we see Melanie’s symbolic death during her rape and 
Lucy’s description of herself as “dead” in a letter to David after her rape (161).  
Surviving a rape means to continually repeat the reemerging back into life. 
David thwarts individual and social mourning and justice in three crucial 
ways:  by not representing the sexual exploitation of all women as traumatic; by 
ignoring the importance of individual trauma in the traumatic history of a colonized 
people; and by prohibiting traumatic testimony, the prerequisite to justice and 
healing.  As narrator, David instead mediates representations of sexual exploitation 
through racist colonial stereotypes of the sexually lascivious brown or black woman 
and the desexualized white woman.  For example, he describes Melanie as perhaps 
acquiescing too easily during his attack, allowing some critics to read the incident, as 
David does, as merely “intercourse” or “seduction” (Bethlehem 21; Marais, “Little” 
173).22  As narrator, David never considers that Melanie’s and Soraya’s conquests are 
more than likely fueled by gendered, racialized, economic (and, in Melanie’s case, 
authoritative) power relationships rather than by mutual affection.  Victim complicity 
in these cases serves not only the hegemony by validating racist scripts; it also serves 
the victim because it saves her life:  in the case of rape, to choose life often involves 
choosing rape over death.  The rapist David believes the victim’s complicity because 
it follows the cultural script which is, in this case, the sexual availability of the black 
or brown woman to the white man.23   
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In contrast to Soraya and Melanie, the white woman Lucy is represented as 
the epitome of nonsexual:  David suspects that she is a celibate lesbian.  Lucy’s 
relationship to David as his daughter notwithstanding, as narrator he represents her as 
strange and uninteresting.  This because Lucy is sexually unappealing to David, who 
measures female worth in terms of sexual desirability.  Even in a sexualized context, 
as when David and Petrus’s brother in law Pollux view her exposed breasts, Lucy is 
never represented as a sexual being.  The sexual context always serves some other 
purpose; as when in this scene it reinforces David’s view of Pollux as a sexual 
predator. 
 In another racialized contrast, David graphically displays the black or brown 
woman sexually splayed across the text for the reader’s pleasure while shielding the 
sexuality of the white woman from the reader’s view even after her violation.  David 
describes his rape of Melanie in titillating detail, displaying his exploitation of the 
brown woman to his readers like some broken, exotic prize.  Melanie’s rape takes 
place at her apartment, into which David “thrusts himself” with “words heavy as 
clubs” (24, 25).  His entries into the apartment and into Melanie’s life are as violent 
as his entry into her body.  David describes Melanie during the rape as dead, “as 
though she had decided to go slack, die within herself for the duration” (25).  She is 
not only lifeless, but disembodied as “her limbs crumple like a marionette’s” (24).  
Finally, Melanie is dehumanized “like a rabbit when the jaws of a fox close on its 
neck” (25).  Re-raced, displayed, disembodied, dehumanized, and lifeless, Melanie is 
fully dismissed during her own rape.  Indeed, it is possible to read this scene as a 
suggestion that David is guilty of more than rape and denial, but of symbolic murder 
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as well.  Melanie is next seen in the novel ten pages later no less disembodied:  a 
helmeted “figure in black,” a passenger on a motorcycle (35).  David describes even 
her exit from the text in aggressively sexual terms:  “Melanie, on the pillion, sits with 
knees wide apart, pelvis arched” (35) in a reenactment of the sex act—astride a 
throbbing phallic hog with her thighs encasing her lover’s hips.  She never speaks 
again.  We see her once more, onstage from twenty rows back near the end of the 
novel, acting in a play.  No longer subject, she is now purely an object of David’s 
sexual fantasy of control:  “If, for instance, those absurd clothes were to burn off her 
body in a cold, private flame and she were to stand before him, in a revelation secret 
to him alone, as naked and as perfect as on that last night in Lucy’s old room” (191), 
he muses, then perhaps he could own her again. 
Unlike his limited experience with Melanie, David’s sexual exploitation of 
Soraya in a rented room is so regular that he describes merely an amalgam of their 
many encounters.  Unlike his representations of his couplings with Melanie or his 
experience of the attack at Lucy’s farm, David describes his sexual encounters with 
Soraya as expected, clean, and uncomplicated: 
 
On Thursday afternoons he drives to Green Point.  Punctually at two 
p.m. he presses the buzzer at the entrance to Windsor Mansions, 
speaks his name, and enters.  Waiting for him at the door of No. 113 is 
Soraya.  He goes straight through to the bedroom, which is pleasant-
smelling and softly lit, and undresses.  Soraya emerges from the 
bathroom, drops her robe, slides into bed beside him. “Have you 
missed me?” she asks. “I miss you all the time,” he replies.  He strokes 
her honey-brown body, unmarked by the sun; he stretches her out, 




This scene opens the novel.  David presents his arrangement with Soraya as the 
successful solution for one of life’s chores—sex—almost as if he had opened his 
narrative with the declaration that he has found an excellent housekeeper.  Indeed, his 
evaluation of Soraya could apply to either a prostitute or a housekeeper—to any 
provider of a regular service:  “he has been on her books for over a year; he finds her 
entirely satisfactory” (1).   
In contrast to these representations, David narrates the rape of the white 
daughter Lucy as offstage.  The reader is locked in the bathroom with David and we 
are denied any but a few details regarding her attack or its ramifications.  Much later, 
we learn that Lucy is pregnant and intends to parent the baby.  Interestingly, Lucy’s 
rape is positioned as the novel’s narrative climax and is framed and discussed as 
violation repeatedly during the entire second half of the text.  Lucy’s rape, however, 
represents a climax not only because it is the most transgressive sexual exchange 
(indeed it is the only sexual transgression, in David’s view) and therefore the most 
noteworthy, but its transgression is multiplied by its violation of not only white 
authority but also of patriarchal norms of racial homogeneity, sexual monogamy, and 
heterosexuality.  If Lucy’s rape is transgressive because her attacker is black, then the 
violation is compounded by the fact that her attacker is also more than one in number.  
Notwithstanding the fact that the repertoire of accepted colonial sexual exploitation 
includes all of these “transgressions,” David’s narration during the second half of the 
novel repeatedly reflects his reaction to the transgressive multiplicity of Lucy’s 
violation as urgently requiring a juridical response. 
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 Yet while David enacts the colonial impulse to protect the white woman’s 
sexual integrity and therefore frames Lucy’s rape as a violation, Disgrace also offers 
the sexual exploitation of the white woman as repair for colonialism in a perversion 
of biblical law’s “an eye for an eye” solution to injury.  This is Lucy’s response to her 
rape, and its viability as an alternative response relies on the reader’s acceptance of 
the twin colonial myths of the black male sexual predator of white women and the 
black Africans’ desire to invert the apartheid hegemony and vengefully dominate 
whites.  The difference between David’s and Lucy’s responses to her rape is in their 
framing of it as respectively warranting repair and as repair itself. 
The novel’s representations of perpetrators of sexual exploitation also require 
interrogation.  Not surprisingly, David frames himself not as a rapist but as a wronged 
father.  In fact, the reader can easily forget (indeed, if he ever considered) that David 
is a sexual predator.  The other sexual perpetrators in the novel; however, are framed 
only as sexual perpetrators.  Lucy’s refusal to discuss her rape or the rapists robs 
those black men of any identity other than that of black rapist.  In fact, we cannot 
even refer to these men as anything but as black and/or as rapists.  As narrator, David 
does not allow Lucy to provide us with any other descriptors.  Because they are 
described only in terms of their blackness and by the fact that they “do rape” (158, 
emphasis in original), the rapists are dehumanized, merely examples of the colonial 
stereotype of black men as animalistic sexual predators.  Indeed, David does refer to 
them as animals, as both the injury and the response he seeks are clearly racialized.  
“You filthy swine!” he later calls Pollux (206).  Further, with the exception of Pollux 
who “was there to learn” (159) and may not have actually raped Lucy, the black 
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rapists disappear from the text immediately after their transgression against the 
narrator’s white daughter.  Pollux reappears several times, but he is represented as 
mentally deficient and violently unreadable, even animal-like.  “I don’t trust him,” 
David tells Lucy.  “He is shifty.  He is like a jackal sniffing around, looking for 
mischief.  In the old days we had a word for people like him.  Deficient.  Mentally 
deficient.  Morally deficient.  He should be in an institution” (208).  David thus 
recasts Pollux as the mythic animalistic black male sexual predator who should be 
confined, the only identity the black man can assume in order to continue inhabiting 
this text. 
In characterizations like this one, David fails to recognize the importance of 
individual trauma in the traumatic history of a colonized people.  Freud’s 
understanding of survival is that the individual’s trauma and survival engenders a 
history of trauma and survival of a larger group, even of multiple generations.  The 
trauma of rape takes on a communal proportion that becomes the traumatic history of 
a formerly colonized people.  If, as Caruth writes, “the formation of history” is “the 
endless repetition of previous violence” (63), then history both binds and implicates 
us in “each other’s traumas” (24).  In Disgrace, Farodia implicates David in 
apartheid’s history of repeated interracial sexual violence during the hearing on 
Melanie’s complaint.  In fact, Farodia argues that the hearing itself is a series of 
repetitions, a smaller situational replay of the larger historical one.  She notes:   
 
We are again going round in circles, Mr Chair.  Yes, he says, he is 
guilty; but when we try to get specificity, all of a sudden it is not abuse 
of a young woman he is confessing to, just an impulse he could not 
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resist, with no mention of the pain he has caused, no mention of the 
long history of exploitation of which this is part.  (53, emphasis added)   
 
Sadly, this moment of clarity is lost in the larger agenda of the meeting, which is 
devoted to establishing David’s level of sincerity in his apology rather than his guilt 
or innocence, or even his or the university’s ethical obligation to Melanie and her 
recovery from rape trauma.  Farodia’s assertion invokes the notion that in a colonial 
culture, to survive rape is to face the potential of being raped again so that survival 
takes on subversive qualities for the colonized black or brown woman.  Survival 
begets the desire for justice—for resistance—in a condition in which sexual violence 
is the norm.  Farodia rejects David’s impulse to place his “impulse” outside Melanie’s 
normal experience by reinforcing the presence of the threat of sexual violation in the 
brown woman’s postcolonial condition as a constant possibility.  Farodia’s 
testimonial voice in the text, like Melanie’s, is quickly silenced. 
 In this and other ways, David as narrator silences testimony.  Indeed, to 
paraphrase Spivak, stalling (and forestalling) of the victim’s testimony is the story of 
Disgrace.24  Much of what is telling about the telling—or not telling—of sexual 
violence and exploitation narratives in the novel is their placement either partially or 
wholly in the margins of the text.  In some cases they are relegated to margins outside 
of the text.  The text’s obscuration of Lucy’s rape from the reader’s view, and of 
sexual violence against brown women represented otherwise in the text, leaves behind 
what Higgins and Silver call: 
 
a conspicuous absence:  a configuration where sexual violence against 
women is an origin of social relations and narratives in which the event 
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itself is subsequently elided. . . .  Rape exists as an absence or gap that 
is both product and source of textual anxiety, contradiction, or 
censorship.  (3) 
 
Silence has implications for justice and healing:  it prohibits both.   
He who controls the narrative controls the potential for trauma recovery and 
the concurrent pursuit of justice.  Disgrace is a collection of informational failures or 
absences controlled and mediated by its narrator David.  For all his caterwauling 
about Lucy’s failure to testify to the police, David is just as invested in silence as she 
is.  Banishment from the text prevents Soraya and Melanie from giving testimony to 
their exploitations and thus initiating judicial processes against him.  David briefly 
presumes Soraya has left the city, but we hear nothing directly from Melanie and 
Soraya after they reject his sexual invasions.  Rather than allowing their traumas to 
haunt him—these traumatized women haunt the margins of the text instead.   
While the white victim stays in the text, but she is also silenced.  Although 
discussion of her rape reoccurs periodically throughout the second half of the novel, 
we receive little direct testimony of Lucy’s ordeal.  Immediately after the rape, she 
tells David:  “You tell what happened to you, I’ll tell what happened to me” (99), 
indicating that she will not report the rape to the police.  In the next few weeks, while 
she does acknowledge the rape to David, it is only in abstract terms and she still 
leaves certain details unspoken.  For instance, she says her youngest assailant “was 
there to learn” (159) but does not clarify whether he raped her as well or merely 
watched the others do so.  In the remainder of the novel, Lucy does little more than 
remind us repeatedly that she is withholding information.  She is frustratingly reticent 
about the details of her rape, leaving both David and the reader in troubling silence.  
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The story Lucy eventually must report is one that the body will out—her pregnancy.  
Thus, the only testimony Lucy will offer, her child’s body at birth, will occur off 
stage, after the novel’s conclusion.  In the end David as narrator, not a politically 
empowered Lucy, stalls the rape narrative. 
 The popular reading of Disgrace views Lucy’s silence as a political refusal to 
testify.  This reading ignores the counter-narrative of Soraya’s and Melanie’s 
inabilities to refuse or choose to testify.  The reader is not told whether Soraya reports 
to her employer or Melanie to her father and the university.  Any testimonies these 
women may or may not offer take place off stage, and thus are not witnessed by the 
reader.  In contrast, Lucy’s refusal to testify occupies center stage and renders the 
reader, and David as houseguest and patriarchal protector, her captive witnesses to a 
testimony never delivered.  It is important to clarify that Lucy’s refusal to name the 
rape publicly does not in fact render it nonexistent to her.  It is, however, nonexistent 
to the public prior to the baby’s birth.  While Lucy’s response to the rape is silence, 
and while she may consider that response to be just, if she does not narrate her 
trauma, then she can not begin the work of living productively after the fact.  Further, 
in the juridical sense, if no injury is named publicly then no public and/or punitive 
response to it can occur.  In some ways, Lucy’s silence is the opposite of punishment 
because it seeks no repair from the perpetrator in response to the injury.  While it is 
true that refusing to narrate her injury may protect Lucy from further injury (i.e., 
retraumatization), victim silence also protects the perpetrator who remains free to 
injure others.  Particularly if Lucy’s suspicion that her attackers are “rapists first and 
foremost” is true (158), then if she takes no action to hinder their mobility in the 
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district they will likely rape other women too.  If the rapists are allowed to continue to 
“do rape” to other women (158, emphasis in original), then Lucy’s silence is 
destructive to herself and the community, not benevolent.  Hesford and Wendy Kozol 
find that violation of the survivor (or witness) is necessary to expose the crime—both 
must live through the trauma all over again via testimony in order to initiate healing 
for the survivor and a witness response in the name of justice.  While silence may 
prevent repeated trauma to the survivor, Lucy’s silence, no matter how potentially 
radical, prevents working through.  This retards the potential for her own healing of 
trauma and justice to occur via testimony.   
Disgrace is not about the exploited.  Nor is it about responding to the victim 
of gendered and racialized violence.  We know little about Melanie, Soraya, and Lucy 
beyond the (a)sexual and, because the novel is told from David’s point of view, what 
we do learn of these women is filtered through his patriarchal gaze.  David’s narrative 
is instead about the exploiter.  The reader cannot escape David’s chronic 
objectification of women or his torturous patriarchal guilt for failing to protect Lucy, 
and even Melanie as a surrogate daughter-lover.  Instead of representing the 
testimony of the trauma sufferer, David substitutes his testimony:  that of the 
perpetrator.  By centering on his own monologue to the exclusion of any substantial 
testimony from the victims, David-as-narrator prevents the possibility of any form of 
justice or mourning.  David’s patriarchal desire is ultimately to repair the injury not to 
Lucy, but to his own subject position:  robbed of both possessions and means of 
mobility, and locked up while his white daughter is raped by black men, David 
suffers a deep blow to his patriarchal self.  His desire for repair is for his own ego 
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trauma, not for Lucy’s rape.  David’s worries about himself and then Lucy far eclipse 
her own words on the matter.  In his musings on the Isaacs’ case, his ruminations on 
the effects of his actions on Mr Isaacs, then on his family, eclipse any consideration 
of his effect on Melanie.  By focusing on how sexual exploitation affects the white 
father to the near exclusion of its effect on the victim, Disgrace represents interracial 
gendered violence from the point of view of the rapist.  
In his reassignment of traumatic testimony to the perpetrator and in his 
adherence to racialized colonial definitions of gendered violence and justice, this 
narrator’s postcolonial “justice” is white and male.  As much as readers may want to 
ascribe a sense of radicalism to Lucy’s silence as an antidote to neocolonial 
institutional racism, the racialized exploitations of Melanie and Soraya and the 
conspicuous absence of their testimonies in the text make it impossible for us to 
ignore their silence as well.  In the end, the novel offers no recuperative potential to 
any of victims of sexual exploitation.  The only advantage to testimony in Disgrace is 
its dual benefit to the father.  First, securing punishment of his daughter’s rapists 
could assuage his guilt for not having been able to protect her from injury.  Second, 
seeking punishment would render the rape valuable in that it would allow him to 
reenact the lynching narrative, to punish the black man for raping his white woman.  
Trauma in Disgrace becomes a homosocial transaction of patriarchal maintenance—
the daughter’s rape becomes about the father and recasts the victim as a “tax” the 
perpetrator steals from the father (158).  In a racial reversal of the colonial lynch 
narrative, Isaacs threatens David with punishment under the university guidelines and 
symbolically castrates the teacher by removing him from his post.25  Of course, David 
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undermines the realization of Isaacs’s revenge fantasy by resigning his position, 
which is already a fairly benign censure for rape relative to that possible through the 
state’s juridical system.     
 The text portrays Lucy’s acceptance of her rape by several black men as her 
resigned (taxed) defiance against the former apartheid juridical order.  The novel 
suggests that white women’s sexual autonomy is the price whites pay to remain in 
South Africa after the fall of apartheid.  But Lucy explains to David that rape is the 
“tax” she has also paid for being an unprotected white woman in South Africa at that 
moment (158).  By trading her sexuality for land use, Lucy ruptures the homosocial 
exchange between white men and black men by removing her sexuality from the male 
economy.  In so doing, of course, Lucy elides black and brown women from 
consideration at all.  To rewrite Spivak’s famous words, one might say that in the 
novel the white woman saves the white man from the black man and the black man 
from the white man so that the white man can live in a multi-hued nation.26  
Rather than challenging racist and sexist colonial power structures, David’s 
narration reifies them.  By representing and promoting the prevention of individual 
healing or social justice in the aftermath of racialized and gendered exploitation, 
David, as narrator, reinforces the colonial paradigm of racialized and gendered power 
that must be dismantled.  As the white father, David offers female bodies as 
commodities.  We must recognize that the sale or sacrifice of Soraya and Melanie to 
the white father reenacts the white colonizer’s rape of the black or brown native, in 
which her sexual integrity is regularly stolen as a condition of oppression.  We must 
notice the textual offering of the white female body as a “tax” (158) paid to black 
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men and for the reading pleasure of a metropolitan audience.  Is David the patriarch 
attempting to impose order on a racially messy South Africa?  If so, then his 
assumption that Lucy is a desired material payment echoes the colonial myth of the 
black man lusting after white women.  David’s sexual sacrifice of women during their 
exploitation and his relative lack of response to that exploitation simultaneously 
perpetuate and are offered as repair for the colonial rape of Africa.   
I hope my interrogation will help to emphasize the necessity of interrogating 
the politics surrounding the voice of authority represented in postcolonial 
Anglophone African literature.  As academics we need to expose and foreground the 
constructed nature of history writing, and seek out the testimony of the oppressed in 
order to accommodate a multiplicity of truths and to initiate social and individual 
transformation.  We particularly need to engage in this type of exercise when reading 
texts like Disgrace that feature problematic narrators.  I hope that my “inventive 
reading” has exposed a new set of possible questions to ask about the politics of 
silencing and excavating gendered and racialized trauma and testimony in African 
literature.   
By reading Disgrace’s fictional vision of a new, post apartheid South Africa 
alongside the international discourse of what constitutes Anglophone African 
literature, I have attempted to demonstrate that the trauma of colonialism persists into 
the post-independence era.  The voices and bodies of black Africans are silenced in 
Disgrace, and I have attempted to illuminate the ways in which reading African 
literature informs not only our understanding of the literature itself, but of the world, 
how we construct it, and all of our places in it.  If postcolonial literature is a literature 
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of nation-building, as Bhabha suggests, then when we read postcolonial literature as 
testimony, we enter a site of social transformation.  Post-independence Anglophone 
African literature depicts the nation in flux.  As testimony, it initiates social mourning 
and thus transformation.  As readers, we are transformed by our exposure to traumatic 







                                                 
Chapter 1 
 
1 Ayi Kwei Armah, Fragments, 1970, African Writers Ser., reset ed. (Oxford:  Heinemann, 1983).  J. 
M. Coetzee, Disgrace (New York:  Penguin, 1999).  Tsitsi Dangarembga, Nervous Conditions (Seattle:  
Seal, 1989).  Nuruddin Farah, Maps (New York:  Penguin, 2000).  Moses Isegawa, Abyssinian 
Chronicles (New York:  Vintage, 2001).  Meja Mwangi, Carcase for Hounds (Nairobi, Kenya:  East 
African Publishing House, 1974).  Helen Oyeyemi, The Icarus Girl (New York:  Talese, 2005).  Zoë 
Wicomb, David’s Story, 2000, Women Writing Africa Ser. (New York:  Feminist P at City U of New 
York, 2001). 
2 Geoffrey H. Hartman, “On Traumatic Knowledge and Literary Studies,” New Literary History 26.3 
(1995):  537-63.  
3 Étienne Balibar, “Is There a ‘Neo-Racism’?” trans. Chris Turner, Race, Nation, Class:  Ambiguous 
Identities, by Étienne Balibar and Immanuel Wallerstein (London:  Verso, 1991) 17-28. 
4 Cathy Caruth, Unclaimed Experience:  Trauma, Narrative and History (Baltimore:  Johns Hopkins 
UP, 1996). 
5 Jacques Derrida, Specters of Marx:  The State of the Debt, the Work of Mourning, and the New 
International, trans. Peggy Kamuf (London:  Routledge, 1994). 
6 Even as trauma is unspeakable, its presence in the psyche creates a language, or cryptology, as a 
means of representing the event to the survivor.  Traumatic representation can assume various forms 
that affect the survivor’s chances for cure in different ways.  Understanding these differences requires 
an awareness of the concepts of introjection and incorporation as distinct responses to loss.  Both are 
ways to represent the traumatic event to the survivor.  Analysts have used the two terms 
“incorporation” and “introjection” interchangeably because both mechanisms accommodate the 
suffering ego’s inclusion of the object.  The reader requires a clear understanding of incorporation’s 
and introjection’s differing relationships to language in order to accurately discuss the psychological 
ramifications of the different ways of representing colonial and neocolonial violence.  Maria Torok 
distinguishes between the two mechanisms, and her analysis is useful for discussing the different ways 
in which various subjects process the traumatic nature of their racialized situations after independence.  
The crucial difference between the two mechanisms lies in what, exactly, is taken into the self and the 
method for doing so.  Incorporation is born out of a lack, or loss, and the body or psyche engulfs the 
object as compensation.  The energy of this action is directed inward; it aims toward foreclosing 
awareness of the object and of loss.  Incorporation is the basis of what Freud calls melancholia.  
Introjection, in contrast, cannot originate in the loss of a love object.  Instead, introjection is born out 
of contact with the object and the ego’s relationship with it.  Introjection is not an act of engulfing the 
object, it is instead the ego’s accepting all the complexities of its relationship with the object which can 
enrich and transform the ego through the experiences of contact and acceptance.  Introjection functions 
as an instinct toward growth, not as a decision to compensate, and the energy of this action is directed 
outward and forward.  We can think of introjection as the goal of mourning processes.   
Introjection is characterized by inclusion and identification, not by the repression of 
incorporation.  Thus, language and time operate differently for introjection and incorporation.  
Incorporation is quick and painless, while introjection is a lengthy process fraught with psychic pain.  
Torok calls the process of incorporation “magical” because it seeks an “instantaneous” solution to the 
problem of loss (“Illness” 113).  The incorporating ego marshals the resources of the self—language, 
behavior, bodily states, or several of these simultaneously—to support its magical fiction of 
compensation.  Yet, magic disrupts accurate representation and so incorporation is concerned with 
instant repression or the obstruction of naming.  Notwithstanding its opposition to meaning, 
incorporation thus has a crucial relationship with language.  Incorporation masks the repressed object 
and the fact of its repression in a cryptic language of obscuration.  The magic of cryptic representation 
 235 
 
                                                                                                                                           
is so potent that it masks the loss and its subsequent repression even from the ego.  Paradoxically, as 
much as incorporation attempts to obscure accurate representation of the object and its repression, the 
fact of its repression is based on accurate and enduring representation.  Thus, the encryption of the 
object obscures the presence of that object in its crypt which is in turn engraved with the markings of 
the object’s internment.  Importantly, the inability to represent prohibits cure.  As a result of 
incorporating the traumatic experience, the survivor is haunted by repetitions of it.  In contrast to 
incorporation, introjection is slow enough to allow the formulation of language.  The gradual growth of 
desires allows their eventual validation and naming.  Testimony is the language that the sufferer is 
finally able to produce in an attempt to make sense of the lost experience, the world, and the self.  One 
who identifies the presence of and works through a traumatic experience does so in the language of 
introjection, which creates the potential for cure.       
In this study of traumatic literary representation, the relationship between traumatic 
experience and language is crucial.  My investment in distinguishing between the pathology of 
incorporation and the potential for cure that characterizes introjection is to provide a vocabulary for 
discussing the various ways in which colonial and neocolonial violence are represented in post-
independence Anglophone African literature.  In addition, this distinction also provides a way for 
talking about how that literature is read.  Anne Cheng warns against a simple binary conception of 
incorporation and introjection as exclusively pathological or curative.  She argues that Torok’s 
distinction reinforces this binary and precludes the possibility of a range of responses to trauma that 
may (or, Cheng suggests, always) embed elements of both health and pathology.  Post-independence 
Anglophone African literature, continuing as it does a mixed literary heritage of both cultural 
domination and resistance, reflects in its representations both incorporative and introjecting textual 
relationships to the trauma of colonial and neocolonial violence—often within the same literary work.  
Wariness of simplistic binaries is a crucial consideration for reading this literature.  Anne Anlin Cheng, 
The Melancholy of Race:  Psychoanalysis, Assimilation, and Hidden Grief, Race and American 
Culture (Oxford:  Oxford UP, 2001).  Maria Torok, “The Illness of Mourning and the Fantasy of the 
Exquisite Corpse,” The Shell and the Kernel:  Renewals of Psychoanalysis, by Nicolas Abraham and 
Maria Torok, ed. and trans. Nicholas T. Rand, vol. 1 (Chicago:  U of Chicago P, 1994) 107-24. 
7 Ayi Kwei Armah, “Writing as a Profession in Africa:  Aspects of Literary Craft in a Time of 
Permanent Crisis,” Drexel University, Philadelphia, 17 Apr. 2003. 
8 Dangarembga studied medicine in Cambridge for three years beginning in 1977.  She also studied 
psychology at the University of Zimbabwe. 
9 Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, Trans. Constance Farrington (New York:  Grove, 1963). 
10 Uzoma Esonwanne, “The ‘Crisis of the Soul’:  Psychoanalysis and African Literature,” Research in 
African Literatures 38.2 (2007):  140-42.  Simon Gikandi, “Chinua Achebe and the Invention of 
African Literature,” Things Fall Apart, by Chinua Achebe (Oxford:  Heinemann, 1996)  ix–xvii. 
11 Juliana Makuchi Nfah-Abbenyi, Gender in African Women's Writing: (Re)Constructing Identity, 
Sexuality, and Difference  (Bloomington:  Indiana UP, 1997). 
12 Françoise Vergès, Monsters and Revolutionaries:  Colonial Family Romance and Métissage 
(Durham:  Duke UP, 1999). 
13 Bougoul Badji, La Folie en Afrique:  Une rivalité pathologique (Paris:  L’Harmattan, 1993).  Rita el 
Khayat and Alain Goussot, Psychiatrie, culture et politique (Casablanca, Morocco:  Éditions Aïni 
Bennaï, n.d.) 
14 Achille Mbembe, On the Postcolony, trans. A. M. Berrett, Janet Roitman, Murray Last, and Steven 
Rendall (Berkeley:  U of California P, 2001). 
15 Nicolas Abraham and Maria Torok, The Shell and the Kernel:  Renewals of Psychoanalysis, ed. and 
trans. Nicholas T. Rand, vol. 1 (Chicago:  U of Chicago P, 1994). 
16 Ifi Amadiume and Abdullahi An-Na’im, eds., The Politics of Memory:  Truth, Healing and Social 
Justice (London:  Zed, 2000). 
17 Embedded in this tradition is the writer’s choice of language.  At Drexel, Armah answered the 
language question as other African writers have, which is to say that writing in the colonial languages 
of English and French reaches the largest reading audiences.  Writing in English, Armah says, extends 
his readership beyond African book-buying and university readers to the same constituencies in 




                                                                                                                                           
18 Stanley Leavy, The Psychoanalytic Dialogue (New Haven:  Yale UP, 1987). 
19 Susan Z. Andrade, “Influences:  Death of a Discipline and African Literary Studies,” PMLA 123.1 
(2008):  239-41. 
20 Dori Laub, “Bearing Witness or the Vicissitudes of Listening,” Testimony:  Crises of Witnessing in 
Literature, Psychoanalysis, and History, by Shoshana Felman and Dori Laub (New York:  Routledge, 
1992) 57-74. 
21 Shoshana Felman “Education and Crisis or the Vicissitudes of Teaching,” Testimony:  Crises of 
Witnessing in Literature, Psychoanalysis, and History, by Shoshana Felman and Dori Laub (New 
York:  Routledge, 1992) 1-56. 
22 William Shakespeare, Hamlet, ed. Barbara A. Mowat and Paul Werstine, The Folger Shakespeare 
Library ed. (New York:  Washington Square, 1992). 
23 Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, A Critique of Postcolonial Reason:  Toward a History of the Vanishing 
Present (Cambridge:  Harvard UP, 1999). 
24 For more on the testimonio’s address to the cross-cultural reader, see Doris Sommer, Proceed with 
Caution, When Engaged by Minority Writing in the Americas (Cambridge:   Harvard UP, 1999).  John 
Beverley addresses the question of subaltern representation in the context of the academic study of 
subalternity as a practice which often reinforces hierarchical positions.  Beverley’s examination of the 
debate surrounding the veracity of Rigoberta Menchú’s testimonio, I, Rigoberta Menchú, begs the 
question of whether doubts about Menchú’s accuracy and honesty are rooted in ethnocentric ranking of 
written over oral history, and class.  The mere existence of a debate exposes the dilemma of 
reinforcing Menchú’s subalternity even as the historiographic study of her work is meant to liberate 
her and other subalterns from colonial silencing.  John Beverley, Subalternity and Representation:  
Arguments in Cultural Theory (Durham:  Duke UP, 1999).  Rigoberta Menchú, I, Rigoberta Menchú:  
An Indian woman in Guatemala, comp. Elisabeth Burgos-DeBray, trans. Ann Wright (London:  Verso, 
1987). 
25 Homi K. Bhabha, The Location of Culture (London:  Routledge, 1994).  Ranjana Khanna, Dark 
Continents:  Psychoanalysis and Colonialism (Durham:  Duke UP, 2003). 
26 Lauretta Ngcobo, And They Didn’t Die, Women Writing Africa Ser. (New York:  Feminist P at City 
U of New York, 1999). 
27 Amma Darko, Beyond the Horizon, African Writers Ser. (Portsmouth, NH:  Heinemann, 1995). 
28 Mariama Bâ, So Long a Letter, trans. Modupe-Bode-Thomas, African Writers Ser. (Portsmouth, NH:  
Heinemann, 1989). 
29 See, for example, Gayl Jones, Corregidora (Boston:  Beacon, 1987); Jamaica Kincaid, Annie John 
(New York:  Farrar, 1983); and Paule Marshall, Brown Girl, Brownstones, 2nd ed. (New York:  
Feminist P at City U of New York, 1981), and Daughters (New York:  Plume, 1992). 
30 Toni Morrison, Beloved (New York:  Penguin, 1987). 
31 These tropes repeat across much contemporary Caribbean literature.  Edwidge Danticat, Breath, 
Eyes, Memory (New York:  Vintage, 1994).   
32 Some Francophone African literary scholars, for example, have begun to reject the terms 
“postcolonial” and “Francophone” to describe their scholarly discourse because its contemporary 
traumatic concerns no longer center on France and its former occupation.  The historical fact of 
colonial occupation is no longer foregrounded in some North African community discourses and 
testimonial literatures.  Neither, of course, is it forgotten.   
33 For further reading on the debate over the politics of using the term “postcolonial,” see Valérie 
Orlando, Nomadic Voices of Exile:  Feminine Identity in Francophone Literature of the Maghreb 
(Athens, OH:  Ohio UP, 1999); and Ella Shohat and Robert Stam, Unthinking Eurocentrism:  
Multiculturalism and the Media (London:  Routledge, 1994).  
34 A melancholic attachment dooms the sufferer to a future of traumatic repetitions of the event.  
Sigmund Freud, “Mourning and Melancholia,” On the History of the Psychoanalytic Movement, 
Papers on Metapsychology, and Other Works, vol. 14 of The Standard Edition of the Complete 
Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, trans. and ed. James Strachey (London:  Hogarth, 1957) 237-
58. 
35 Fanon discusses Lacan’s theory of the mirror stage in Black Skin, White Masks.  Frantz Fanon, Black 
Skin, White Masks, trans. Charles Lam Markmann (New York:  Grove, 1967).  Lacan, Jacques.  Ecrits: 
 237 
 
                                                                                                                                           
The First Complete Edition in English, trans. Bruce Fink, Héloïse Fink, and Russell Grigg (New York:  
Norton, 1996). 
36 David L. Eng and David Kazanjian, “Mourning Remains,” introduction, Loss:  the Politics of 
Mourning, ed. David L. Eng and David Kazanjian, (Berkeley:  U of California P, 2003) 1-25. 
37 Nicholas T. Rand, “Renewals of Psychoanalysis,” introduction, The Shell and the Kernel:  Renewals 
of Psychoanalysis, by Nicolas Abraham and Maria Torok, ed. and trans. Nicholas T. Rand, vol. 1 
(Chicago:  U of Chicago P, 1994) 1-22. 
38 Ayi Kwei Armah, “Larsony, or Fiction as Criticism of Fiction.” New Classic 4 (1977): 33-45.   
39 This refusal to conform to disciplinary boundaries established by modernity’s fathers demonstrates 
what V. Y. Mudimbe refers to as the Africanist appropriation of power in the self-creation of ways of 
knowing, or gnosis, which infiltrates the colonial apparatus of knowledge about Africa.  Mudimbe’s 
work both acknowledges and appropriates Foucault’s notion of the ordering of knowledge systems.  V. 
Y. Mudimbe, The Invention of Africa:  Gnosis, Philosophy, and the Order of Knowledge, African 
Systems of Thought (Bloomington:  Indiana UP, 1988).  Michel Foucault, The Order of Things:  An 
Archaeology of the Human Sciences (New York:  Vintage, 1994). 
40 Defining an African literary work as a “novel” calls to mind the violent collision of African and 
Western literary traditions that took place in the colony’s mission school classrooms.  Kwame Anthony 
Appiah, Chinweizu, Onwuchekwa Jemie, Ihechukwu Madubiuke, Neil Lazarus, and Wole Soyinka all 
grapple with questions of defining “African” literature by Africanist literary standards rather than by 
Eurocentric ones, an argument that begs the question of how to define Africanist literary standards 
after four hundred years of cultural genocide.  Chinweizu and Joanna Sullivan argue that the 
contemporary African novel is not a mere hybridization of indigenous and imperial artistic traditions 
because it often rejects Western literary practices in favor of indigenous ones or, when it does 
incorporate them, it does so in ways that signal its rebellious appropriation.  Recent Africanist 
scholarship has recognized that the contemporary African novel genre bears only slight resemblance to 
the Western notion of “novel” and that African novels “took from the West only the very idea of the 
novel . . . but not its concrete forms” (Nikiforova 425).  Kwame Anthony Appiah, In My Father’s 
House:  Africa in the Philosophy of Culture (New York:  Oxford UP, 1992).  Chinweizu, Onwuchekwa 
Jemie, and Ihechukwu Madubiuke, Toward the Decolonization of African Literature, vol. 1 
(Washington, DC:  Howard UP, 1983).  Neil Lazarus, Resistance in Postcolonial African Fiction, 
(New Haven:  Yale UP, 1990).  Wole Soyinka, Myth, Literature and the African World (Cambridge:  
Cambridge UP, 1976).  Irina Nikiforova, “The Development and Distinctive Features of Forms of the 
Novel in African Literature,” Research in African Literatures 18.4 (1987):  422–33.  Joanna Sullivan, 
“Redefining the Novel in Africa,” Research in African Literatures 37.4 (2006):  177-88. 
41 While repression fixes the subject in time, space, and personhood, the positionality of dislocation 
and marginalization assumes movement.  Carole Boyce Davies, Black Women, Writing and Identity:  
Migrations of the Subject (New York:  Routledge, 1994). 
42 “Feminism” is a fraught term and discourse in the global community.  M. J. Daymond and Trinh T. 
Minh-ha elucidate the notion that as much as a “universal” feminism almost always means middle-
class, white, Euro-American women’s concerns, appending terms like “of color” and “Third World” to 
“women” or “feminists” as a corrective measure is just as bisecting and hierarchical as appending 
“wo” to the root “man.”  Black feminists have addressed at length the importance of examining the 
ways in race and class inflect feminist concerns.  More recently, Oyèrόnké Oyěwùmί and others have 
theorized the place of African feminisms in the global feminist, women’s studies, and gender studies 
communities.  M. J. Daymond, introduction, South African Feminisms:  Writing, Theory, and 
Criticism, 1990-1994, ed. M. J. Daymond (New York:  Garland, 1996) xiii-xliii.  Trinh T. Minh-ha, 
Woman, Native, Other:  Writing Postcoloniality and Feminism (Bloomington:  Indiana UP, 1989).  
Oyèrόnké Oyěwùmί, ed.  African Women and Feminism:  Reflecting on the Politics of Sisterhood 
(Trenton:  Africa World P, 2003).   
43 See the previous note.  Also, Rosalyn Terborg-Penn and Andrea Benton Rushing destroy the Euro-
American feminist mythology of African women as merely objectified victims of patriarchal societies 
across history and the continent.  Oyěwùmί and Amadiume demonstrate that power and gender were 
tied not to the body in many pre-colonial African communities but to other factors such as age and 
social status.  Rosalyn Terborg-Penn and Andrea Benton Rushing, eds.  Women in Africa and the 
African Diaspora:  a Reader, 2nd ed. (Washington, DC:  Howard UP, 1996).  Ifi Amadiume, Male 
 238 
 
                                                                                                                                           
Daughters, Female Husbands:  Gender and Sex in an African Society (London:  Zed, 1987).  
Oyèrόnké Oyěwùmί, The Invention of Women:  Making an African Sense of Western Gender 
Discourses (Minneapolis:  U of Minnesota P, 1997). 
44 Lois A. West, “Nation,” A Companion to Gender Studies, ed. Philomena Essed, David Theo 
Goldberg and Audrey Kobayashi (Malden, MA:  Blackwell, 2004), Blackwell Reference Online, 14 
Oct. 2007 http://www.blackwellreference.com/>. 
45 Although Stratton’s study appeared before more recent work on African women’s writing, the focus 
of much Anglophone African literary scholarship remains focused on exclusively either men or women 
rather than looking at them together.  Florence Stratton, Contemporary African Literature and the 
Politics of Gender (New York:  Routledge, 1994). 
46 I am thinking in particular here of the women’s community formed in Ngcobo’s And They Didn’t 
Die.  Hazel V. Carby, “‘On the Threshold of Woman’s Era’:  Lynching, Empire, and Sexuality in 
Black Feminist Theory,” Dangerous Liaisons:  Gender, Nation, and Postcolonial Perspectives, ed. 
Anne McClintock, Aamir Mufti, and Ella Shohat, Cultural Politics, 11 (Minneapolis:  U of Minnesota 




1 Both novels are groundbreaking.  Nervous Conditions is Dangarembga’s first novel as well as the 
first novel published by a black Zimbabwean woman.  Maps is Farah’s seventh.  It is part of his 
“Blood in the Sun” trilogy along with Gifts (New York:  Penguin, 1993) and Secrets (New York:  
Penguin, 1998), about the uncertainty of postcolonial national identity.  Farah is the first Somali 
national to publish a work of fiction in any language (English), and also the first to publish a novel in 
Somali. 
2 Rhodesia was colonized for its rich mineral and gem deposits beginning in 1889 when Cecil Rhodes 
persuaded Britain to charter his British South Africa Company (BSAC).  Somalia has long been an 
attractive territory for its string of ports along the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean.  Between the 
seventh and tenth centuries, Muslim Arab and Persian traders established trading posts along Somalia’s 
Gulf of Aden, which the British later viewed as a strategic fort as well.  The Ogaden region lies 
between Greater Ethiopia and Somalia and represents, for the land-locked Ethiopia, access to 
Somalia’s crucial trade ports on the Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean.  For more on Rhodesian history, 
see Abiodun Alao, Brothers at War:  Dissidence and Rebellion in Southern Africa (New York:  St. 
Martin’s, 1994).  For more on Somali history, see I. M. Lewis, The Modern History of Somaliland, 
from Nation to State (New York:  Praeger, 1965); and David D. Laitin and Said S. Samatar, Somalia:  
Nation in Search of a State (Boulder:  Westview, 1987). 
3 Many Somalis consider the July 1, 1960, Independence joining British and Italian Somalilands a 
“bitter harvest,” arguing that Somali independence is only partial as long as the Ethiopian-held Ogaden 
territory, Kenyan-held Northern Frontier District, and French-owned Djibouti are not part of the 
Somali Republic (Laitin and Samatar 67). 
4 I use the term “colonial discourse” to refer to the construction of knowledge about the nature of 
colonialism, the colony, the colonized, and the colonizer.   
5 For more on the relationship between the individual and the postcolonial community see, among 
others:  Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth; Achille Mbembe, “African Modes of Self-Writing,” 
trans. Steven Rendall, Public Culture 14.1 (2002):  239-73; Oyěwùmί, African Women and Feminism; 
R. Radhakrishnan, “Nationalism, Gender, and the Narrative of Identity,” Nationalisms and Sexualities, 
ed. Andrew Parker, Mary Russo, Doris Sommer, and Patricia Yaeger (New York:  Routledge, 1992) 
77-95; and Spivak, A Critique of Postcolonial Reason. 
6 As an example, Spivak notes that the historical reconstruction work of the Subaltern Studies 
collective is necessarily masculinized by virtue of the insurrectionist texts’ relationships to the 
dominant group and colonial administration.  Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, “Can the Subaltern Speak?” 
Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture, ed. Cary Nelson and Lawrence Grossberg, (Champaign:  U 
of Illinois P, 1988) 271-314. 
 239 
 
                                                                                                                                           
7 Sangeeta Ray, En-Gendering India:  Woman and Nation in Colonial and Postcolonial Narratives 
(Durham:  Duke UP,  2000). 
8 Ray, En-Gendering.  Tovi Fenster, “Space and Cultural Meanings,” A Companion to Gender Studies, 
ed. Philomena Essed, David Theo Goldberg, and Audrey Kobayashi (Malden, MA:  Blackwell), 2004, 
Blackwell Reference Online, 14 Oct. 2007, <http://www.blackwellreference.com>.   
9 This continuous cycle of production and reproduction recalls Anthony Giddens’ notion of nations as 
containers of power, each one an ideologically bounded site of tension among variously ranked 
constituencies for representation, identity, and resources.  Conventional discussions of national 
formation have also carried the baggage of ethnocentric analysis, assuming that Western modernity 
facilitated the origin of the nation.  This assumption denies the possibility of other nations formulated 
in other regions and at other times.  Such bias politicizes the discourse of nation-building and 
nationhood in a global context by claiming epistemological ownership over national formation in 
native communities.  This epistemic domination accompanies that of geographic domination, for 
“territory and its domestication was the crucial marker of modernity evident in the rise of nations and 
the growth of colonial powers” (Westwood).  Anthony Giddens, Contemporary Critique of Historical 
Materialism, (Cambridge:  Polity, 1985) 119-21.  Sallie Westwood, “Unequal Nations:  Race, Citizen, 
and the Politics of Recognition,” The Blackwell Companion to Social Inequalities, ed. Mary Romero 
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McClintock’s insightful reading of the feminized treasure map in Henry Rider Haggard’s King 
Solomon’s Mines (London:  Dent, 1885).  
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confession, diary, interview, eyewitness report, life history, novella-testimonio, nonfiction novel, or 
fictionalized history.  In the case of a Latin American Indian testimonio speaker addressing an 
ethnically dissimilar Indian reader, the testimonio’s call to solidarity may require using the colonial 
language such that becoming a comrade requires adopting the guise of the enemy.  For more on 
testimonio studies, see John Beverley, Testimonio:  on the Politics of Truth (Minneapolis:  U of 
Minnesota P, 2004); Doris Sommer, Proceed with Caution, especially chapter five, “No Secrets for 
Rigoberta;” and Yvonne Unnold, Representing the Unrepresentable:  Literature of Trauma Under 
Pinochet in Chile (New York:  Peter Lang, 2002). 
14 See Appiah’s chapter seven, “The Postcolonial and the Postmodern,” in In My Father’s House.  
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UP of America, 2006) 173-88. 
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wa Thiong’o, Petals of Blood (New York:  Penguin, 1991). 
17 Smith issued the Rhodesian Unilateral Declaration of Independence on November 11, 1965. 
18 Scholarship on Nyasha’s illness tends toward defining her illness as an eating disorder and 
identifying how colonialism has sickened her.  In general, Nyasha is said to be sick because she is 
trying to refuse Englishness and the colonial system kills her in retaliation.  Sue Thomas suggests that 
Nyasha is sick from “a critical and highly ambiguous attempt at self-determination” and rebellion 
against “the sexual and cultural politics” of the dinner table as emblem of colonial hegemony (191).   
Brendan Nicholls argues that Nyasha deploys illness as a radical bid to “re-author colonial history, 
Settler law, and Shona tradition” (122).  The much-debated question of whether or not the African 
Nyasha can actually have a “Western” hypochondriacal disorder like anorexia or bulimia is both 
irrelevant and a rehearsal of ethnocentric assumptions about Africans as being almost the same, but not 
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quite Western.  Michelle Vizzard allows for the possibility that Nyasha may have anorexia, which she 
considers “a condition usually associated with the middle class West” (207).  Vizzard suggests that this 
disease’s representation in “an African text is one that raises a number of problems” but “can be 
understood” to be a result of Nyasha’s intensive exposure to Western middle class culture through her 
father (207).  Thomas argues that disallowing Nyasha an eating disorder based on cultural exclusivity 
reinforces the mythology of the African woman as lacking interiority because the collective nature of 
much of indigenous society precludes individual self awareness, and lack of significant exposure to 
Europe precludes any cultural similarities as coincidence.  This mythology is employed to dismiss 
Nyasha’s eating disorder as impossible on the basis that black women can not suffer psychiatric 
problems because they lack sufficient levels of self-awareness to develop them.  Nicholls argues that 
we should call Nyasha’s eating disorder “boulimia” from the Greek bous (“ox”) and limos (“hunger”) 
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bulimia is an inclusive diagnosis of Nyasha’s broad-reaching melancholia.  Nicholls’ assignment of a 
Greek name to Nyasha’s illness reinforces the mythology of a Hellenic creation of Western science 
and thought.  Because Dangarembga represents this mythology as the architecture and curriculum of 
Sacred Heart convent, and she critiques it via Tambu’s melancholic embrace of classical education in 
Nervous Conditions, Nicholls might have better served Nyasha by suggesting a Shona term to describe 
her illness.  Dangarembga tells interviewer Kirsten Holst Petersen that “cases of anorexia have been 
reported in Zimbabwe” but she also hints that the disease may be underreported and/or misdiagnosed if 
only Western conceptions of the disease are applied (Petersen 345).  The Zimbabwean hesitancy to 
name a condition a disease when it may not be one differs from a Western compulsion to diagnose.  
Brendon Nicholls, “Indexing Her Digests:  Working Through Nervous Conditions,” Emerging 
Perspectives on Tsitsi Dangarembga:  Negotiating the Postcolonial, ed. Ann Elizabeth Willey and 
Jeanette Treiber (Trenton:  Africa World, 2001) 99-134.  Kirsten Holst Petersen, “Between Gender, 
Race and History:  Kirsten Holst Petersen Interviews Tsitsi Dangarembga,” Kunapipi 16.1 (1994):  
345-48.  Sue Thomas, “Rewriting the Hysteric as Anorexic in Tsitsi Dangarembga’s Nervous 
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Dangarembga’s Nervous Conditions,” SPAN:  Journal of the South Pacific Association for 
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Zimbabwe under a new constitution, it did so on the condition that Britain regain colonial rule until the 
elections in exchange for financing a voluntary land-redistribution program.  Although they were the 
minority population in (Southern) Rhodesia, whites owned seventy percent of the land.  Independence 
came at the price of further domination, and the land redistribution program has degenerated into 
neocolonial cronyism, resulting in widespread black landlessness, starvation, and poverty.   
20 “Chimurenga” is a Shona term meaning “struggle.”  Zimbabweans divide their recent history into 
three chimurenga periods, and all concern the right to habitation and farming (ownership) of the land.  
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The First Chimurenga was the 1896-97 Shona revolt against Rhodes’ British South Africa Company at 
the inception of imperial (and subsequent colonial) rule.  The Second Chimurenga was the 1972-80 
guerilla war for national independence.  Although hordes of white farmers fled to South Africa, 
Britain, and Australia during the second Chimurenga, whites remained the owners of about seventy 
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and under dispute” or “provisional administrative line.”  See, for example, “Somalia Political Map,” 
map, 24 Jan. 2008, 1 May 2008 <http://www.maps.com/ref_map.aspx?cid=694&pid 
=12353&nav=MS> and “Somalia (Small Map) 2008,” map, Perry-Castañeda Library Map Collection, 
U of Texas (US Central Intelligence Agency, 2002), 21 Apr. 2008, 1 May 2008 
<http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/cia08/somalia_sm_2008.gif>.  For more on Somali-Ethiopian 
history, see Alexander de Waal, Evil Days:  Thirty Years of War and Famine in Ethiopia (New York:  
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representation of England to the English” (Critique 113).   
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(1927) to the Task of Thinking (1964), ed. David Farrell Krell (San Francisco:  Harper, 1993). 
28 The phrase “mimic men” is Bhabha’s (88), borrowed from V. S. Naipaul’s novel The Mimic Men 
(New York:  Vintage, 2001).  For more on colonial policies enacted under the rubric of civilizing 
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Michael Blundell and Garfield Todd (Westport, CT:  Praeger, 1999), especially chapter two, “The 
Political History of Zimbabwe.” 
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the Hypochondriacal Response.”  Cheng’s discussion of racial melancholia as not “merely a symptom 
but as an analytical paradigm responsive to the material and imaginative realities of racial dynamics” 
in the United States (xi, emphasis in original) is transferable to the racialized cultures of Fanon’s 
colonial Antilles and neocolonial Africa.  Cheng writes: 
 
On the one side, white American identity and its authority is secured through the 
melancholic [incorporation] of racial others that it can neither fully relinquish nor 
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accommodate and whose ghostly presence nonetheless guarantees its centrality.  On 
the other side, the racial other (the so-called melancholic object) also suffers from 
racial melancholia whereby his or her racial identity is imaginatively reinforced 
through the [incorporation] of a lost, never-possible perfection, an inarticulable loss 
that comes to inform the individual’s sense of his or her own subjectivity.  Already 
we see that these two ‘sides’ are in fact implicated by one another.  (xi) 
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30 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, Anti-Oedipus:  Capitalism and Schizophrenia, trans. Robert 
Hurley, Mark Seem, and Helen R. Lane (New York:  Viking, 1977).  See in particular chapter two, 
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APA, 1994) 658-61.   
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Nicholas T. Rand, vol. 1 (Chicago:  U of Chicago P, 1994) 125-38. 
39 Cheng 35, 46. 
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41 John K. Noyes, “S/M in SA:  Sexual Violence, Simulated Sex and Psychoanalytic Theory,” 
American Imago 55.1 (1998):  135-53. 
42 Nyasha references, perhaps unintentionally, the nineteenth century kidnapping, enslavement, 
display, and later racist “scientific” study of Saartje Baartman a Khoisan woman from what is present-
day South Africa.  Baartman’s ordeal was inflicted upon her to test, prove, and display supposed proof 
of the centuries-old racist European stereotype that African women had different genitals and body 
shapes than European women did, which was supposed to signify Africans’ sub-humanity.  Nyasha’s 
fear of developing a “large backside” illustrates her internalization of the white Western woman’s fear 
of developing the supposedly large buttocks for which Baartman was infamous in Europe.  For an 
interesting juxtaposition of visual and spoken colonial and anti-colonial discourses on the history of 
Baartman’s capture, display, death, and interment, see Zola Maseko’s film, The Life and Times of Sara 
Baartman:  “The Hottentot Venus” (New York:  First Run, 1998). 
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response to the novel supports this reading.  Dangarembga tells interviewers Rosemary George and 
Helen Scott:  “In Zimbabwe, however, people are much more conscious of the question of Nyasha’s, 
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stranger in her own country” (314).  Rosemary Marangoly George and Helen Scott, “An Interview 
with Tsitsi Dangarembga,” Novel:  A Forum on Fiction 26.3 (1993):  309-19. 
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“annihilates the story” and prevents any judiciary or curative response (68).  Laub’s “Bearing Witness 
or the Vicissitudes of Listening” is an excellent explication of the listener’s (and, I suggest, the 
reader’s) responsibilities vis-à-vis traumatic testimony.  
45 The character Martha from Dangarembga’s play She No Longer Weeps (Harare, Zimbabwe:  
College, 1987) is perhaps a representation of the more mature dissident Nyasha would have become if 
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Amadiume, Male Daughters, Female Husbands; Farah, “A Conversation with Nuruddin Farah;” 
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1 The work of the Subaltern Studies Group charts the ways in which silence is employed, exposed, and 
eliminated in colonial Indian history. 
2 Botha’s presidency ended in 1989 when he suffered a stroke and resigned.  His campaign of terror to 
eliminate opposition, from 1985 to 1988, was characterized by intensified state violence in the form of 
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soldier-police patrols in armed tank-like vehicles, destroying black squatter camps, and detaining 
thousands of blacks and so-called “coloureds” under the Internal Security Act.  Of the detainees who 
died, causes ranged from murder by the authorities to suicide.   
3 During the final throes of the apartheid government’s stand against civil agitation, Botha declared a 
state of emergency on July 20, 1985, covering thirty-six magisterial districts in the Eastern Cape, and 
in the Pretoria-Witwatersrand-Vereeniging region.  In October, Botha added the Western Cape.  The 
state of emergency censored the media, limited black and so-called “coloured” mobility via curfews, 
and expanded Presidential decree power beyond the reaches of the constitution and Parliament.  On 
June 12, 1986, four days before the ten-year anniversary of the Soweto uprising and one year into the 
limited state of emergency and detainment sweeps, Botha simultaneously ordered some minor race-
based reforms and expanded the state of emergency to cover all of South Africa.  The state’s lip 
service to racial equity failed to quell increasing black civil unrest, and fearful whites fled the country 
in waves.  The government again expanded its powers to declare certain places “unrest areas” and 
crush protests there with an expanded arsenal of violent methods.  For an excellent documentary 
account of the repressive violence Botha’s government deployed during the state of emergency, see 
Witness to Apartheid, dir. Sharon I. Sopher and Kevin Harris, California Newsreel, 1986.   
4 These groups were the African National Congress (ANC), the Pan Africanist Congress, and the South 
African Communist Party. 
5 MK (short for Umkhonto we Sizwe, literally “Spear of the Nation”) began as an independent guerrilla 
unit but eventually became the military wing of the ANC’s opposition to the South African apartheid 
regime.  MK proclaimed its existence on December 16, 1961, and the apartheid regime immediately 
classified it a terrorist organization and banned it.  By 1994, the South African National Defence Force 
(SANDF) had absorbed the MK.  For more on how the anti-apartheid rebels waged guerilla warfare, 
see Stephen M. Davis, Apartheid’s Rebels:  Inside South Africa’s Hidden War (New Haven:  Yale UP, 
1987), and in particular chapter four, “The ‘AK-47 Song’.” 
6 Mandela was sentenced to life imprisonment and incarcerated on June 12, 1964.  He was freed on 
February 11, 1990.  The MK suspended armed attacks on August 1, 1990.  In December 1991, the 
Convention for a Democratic Southern Africa (CODESA) met at the World Trade Centre in 
Johannesburg to begin work on a transitional constitution extending political rights to all groups and an 
election date for a democratic, transitional, multiracial government.  For more on South African 
historical timelines and a regional overview see Turner.   
7 Sarah’s move may have been part of a United Kingdom campaign begun in the 1970s to recruit 
Nigerian nurses for public, inner-city hospitals unable to attract sufficient numbers of native nurses.  
See Cecilia Menjívar, “Migration and Refugees,” A Companion to Gender Studies, ed. Philomena 
Essed, David Theo Goldberg, and Audrey Kobayashi (Malden, MA:  Blackwell, 2004), Blackwell 
Reference Online, 14 Oct. 2007 <http://www.blackwellreference.com>.  
8 Khanna specifically mentions Frantz Fanon, Albert Memmi, and Aimé Césaire.   
9 Khanna elaborates on this point at length. 
10 Wicomb has expressed discomfort in “To Hear the Variety of Discourses” with any but a locally 
specific theory to discuss South African writing, advocating instead one that reflects community- and 
individual-level needs of South Africans.  Wicomb is wary of imposing supposedly universal 
modernist theoretical paradigms onto a diverse body of South African ways of living and expression 
that neither conform nor attempt to conform to modernist mores.  In short, Wicomb is wary of 
replicating the colonial encounter in literary analysis.   
In interviews, Oyeyemi avoids using the term “magical realism” to describe her method of 
“taking things out of context” and “chopping up rules” even while The Icarus Girl is one of the recent 
African novels most widely celebrated for its magical realist qualities (Oyeyemi, interview).  Other 
reviewers and interviewers also refer to the novel as a magic realist engagement with African 
mythology.  See also Karen Campbell’s “Vivid ‘Icarus’ Charts a Child’s Search for Self,” and Felicia 
R. Lee’s “Conjuring an Imaginary Friend in the Search for an Authentic Self.” 
Although Western critical consensus since the 1980s has regarded magic realism to be a strain 
of postmodernism’s larger project of challenging hegemony in general and the Western literary model 
in particular, writers of literature which critics call “magic realist” have a history of discomfort with 
any but the most specific use of the label.  African writers especially have expressed dismay over the 
recent critical trend of labeling certain African writing “magic realist.”  I suggest that this reticence 
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may exist because magic realism evolved out of Africana literary traditions.  Mario de Andrade’s 
landmark novel Macunaíma is grounded in questions of Afro-Brazilian identity and race, and Gabriel 
Garcia Márquez’s work is marked by the deep and varied African, Indian, and Spanish cosmological 
influences on his native Colombia.  To call African literature “magic realist,” and therefore at the end 
of the trajectory of literary modal development, is to ignore its founding relationship to the mode of 
magic realism and thus reinforce colonialist discourse of African literature and ways of knowing and 
being as derivative of Western forms.  In what would appear to be an alignment with Wicomb’s stated 
wish above, Stephen Slemon looks for ways to read literature frequently labeled magic realist through 
a locally specific lens of postcolonial theory.  Mário de Andrade, Macunaíma, trans. E. A. Goodland 
(New York:  Random House, 1984).  Karen Campbell, “Vivid ‘Icarus’ Charts a Child’s Search for 
Self,” rev. of The Icarus Girl, by Helen Oyeyemi, Boston Globe 20 June 2005, 30 Mar. 2006 
<http://www.boston.com>.  Felicia R. Lee, “Conjuring an Imaginary Friend in the Search for an 
Authentic Self,” rev. of The Icarus Girl, by Helen Oyeyemi, New York Times 21 June 2005, late ed.:  
E1.  Helen Oyeyemi, interview with Anita Sethi, “I didn’t Know I was Writing a Novel,” Guardian 
Unlimited, 10 Jan. 2005, 30 Mar. 2006 < http://books.guardian.co.uk>.  Stephen Slemon, “Magic 
Realism as Postcolonial Discourse,” Magical Realism:  Theory, History, Community, ed. Lois 
Parkinson Zamora and Wendy B. Faris (Durham:  Duke UP, 1995) 407-26.  Zoë Wicomb, “To Hear 
the Variety of Discourses,” South African Feminisms:  Writing, Theory, and Criticism, 1990-1994, ed. 
M. J. Daymond (New York:  Garland, 1996) 45-55. 
11 David L. Eng and David Kazanjian, preface, Loss:  the Politics of Mourning, ed. David L. Eng and 
David Kazanjian (Berkeley:  U of California P, 2003) ix-x. 
12 R. John Williams, “Doing History:  Nuruddin Farah’s Sweet and Sour Milk, Subaltern Studies, and 
the Postcolonial Trajectory of Silence,” Research in African Literatures 37.4 (2006):  161-76. 
13 Dipesh Chakrabarty suggests that “ruling-class documents often used for historical reconstructions 
of working-class conditions can be read both for what they say and for their ‘silences’” (179).  This 
work bears a parallel to the trajectory of this chapter, in that the colonial state’s silencing of peasant 
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